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MODERN CIVILISATION
IN RELATION TO
CHRISTIANITY

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

MODERN CIVILISATION

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IN RELATION TO

CHRISTIANITY

A SERIES OF ESSAYS

BY

WILLIAM M'COMBIE

EDITOR OF THE "ABERDEEN FREE PRESS"

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PREFATORY NOTE.

THE following Papers are reprinted from the ABERDEEN FREE PRESS, in which they have been appearing at intervals during the last two years. They are meant to be contributions, so far, to the philosophy of our modern society. But, aware that such Essays must conform to the limits and requirements of the original medium of publication, intelligent readers will not expect to find in them a systematic, and still less an exhaustive treatment of the subject. The writer has had one leading and definite object in view throughout. Regarding Religion as the ultimate element of social cohesion, and Christianity as supplying the only force that can secure for civilised communities continued progress, he has striven to bring our social evils, and perilous social tendencies, into the light of this great truth; at the same time subjecting to the test of facts some of the more prominent social theories opposed to it. The earlier papers of the series were printed before the death of Mr. Buckle, but the writer sees no reason for modifying either the tone or substance of the criticisms on his system, which, indeed, presents us only with the lucid concentration of a wide-spread phase of current opinion.

There are many other features and tendencies of modern society, as well as of modern thought, which the writer would

have wished to treat of in connection with those here embraced. The field, however, is all but unlimited, and the publication would be open to the same charge of incompleteness though there were added a third or a half more to its contents. Yet imperfect and incomplete as these Essays are, perhaps thoughtful persons will find in them as much of a suggestive nature as may lead them to acquit the writer of impertinence in presenting them to the public in this collected form.

ABERDEEN, *December* 1, 1863.

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MODERN CIVILIZATION.

I.—INTRODUCTORY.

WERE a competent observer called on to point out that branch of human inquiry which had, within the last few years, risen most rapidly in importance, he would, undoubtedly, name that which is somewhat loosely designated "Social Science." From being nowhere—or only dawning on the view of two or three closet theorists and dreamers—it has come, within a period so brief as to be full in the recollection of comparatively young men, to engage the earnest attention of many of the most highly endowed and gifted minds of the age; whilst the study is stimulated, authenticated, and invested with public *eclat*, by a great associative organisation, which, in its peripatetic annual session already divides public interest with the British Association for the Advancement of Physical Science itself.

This sudden development of a great branch of inquiry is remarkable. In itself very remarkable, but still more so in the main cause to which it is due. The inquiry has not been a matter of choice—of taste, or of voluntary application—with the far greater number of those who have engaged in it. The investigation had become inevitable. It has been forced upon us. Curious and strange though it be, it is nevertheless true that, while—

"The proper study of mankind is man,"

it is the last to which he is drawn. How distasteful self-inquiry is to the most is well-known; and men have been scarcely less reluctant to investigate the laws and conditions of social action than the springs of their own individual actions.

But social questions could not be longer put by. The new elements and forces introduced into society by the progress of physical knowledge, discovery, and invention, induced a development of social diseases and evils which were coming rapidly to an alarming head. Drunkenness, pauperism, crime,—dense and growing masses of ignorance and heathenism in our large towns, immorality and returning barbarism in the country—required to be vigorously assailed. To deal with social evils had

become matter of life-and-death importance to society. And how deal with them effectively, without tracing them to their sources? The treatment, otherwise, must be purely empirical; and, whilst inducing temporary alleviation, might only aggravate the cause.

The practical exigency became thus the parent of the speculative investigation. The cause is obvious; it lies in the sudden practical pressure of startling social phenomena. The course, however, which the investigation has taken, or is taking, is due, in great measure, to the type of inquiry popular and prevalent at the time. Physical studies, and the investigation of physical phenomena, have now for a long period most largely engaged the attention of scientific inquirers. The domain of physical nature is not only more accessible than that of mind and moral activity, but the results are much more definite, direct, and tangible. The success with which physical inquiries have been prosecuted in recent times, and the conspicuous results which have accrued from them—the command over the forces of nature which they have given us, and the scope and range they have afforded the inventive power—have made them specially popular. Those vast realisations—in the form both of scientific truth and practical power—have served to exalt physical and discredit moral science. Hence, as one cause, the tendency, so manifest, to pursue science on the physical rather than on the moral side. But the study of social phenomena is a mixed study. From the compound nature of man it is of necessity so, as well as from his contact, as a social being, and at so many points, with the physical world. But here the physicist, engaging in such inquiries, is peculiarly liable to mistake—specially open to the danger of adopting a hasty style of generalization. Because science has achieved so much in the region of physical nature—because it has so vastly extended the range of human power—he is apt to jump to the conclusion that it can accomplish everything. It is forgotten that society is moved by moral forces, or it is assumed that these can be subjected to the same criteria—and ordinated under the same organon—which we have applied with so much success to physical phenomena. Hence such titles as "Social Statics," "Science of Society," and "Social Science" itself. In these and like current phrases, it is assumed that social questions may be dealt with as physical questions are dealt with,—tacitly, therefore, that they do not embrace any essentially different or irreducible element.

This is one danger to the integrity and comprehensiveness of modern social inquiries; the danger from the physical side—viz., that moral causes should be discredited or ignored. Many of our theologians, preachers, and moralists err on the other side—by treating man as if he were purely a spiritual being, and expecting by this exclusive treatment to cure our social maladies and evils. Neither the one course nor the other can be successful, and because either displaces or altogether leaves out half the data. A "Science of Society," or more, properly, Social

Philosophy, if it would be adequate and successful—if it would give us results, at once reliable as truth, and as the grounds of practical and effective treatment of social maladies—must take due account both of the physical and spiritual side of man's nature.

The danger is not now of the neglect of such studies, but of their misdirection—of exceptional treatment and hasty generalizations. Such inquiries must now be pursued. They will be pursued. Men cannot again go to sleep on the brink of social volcanoes. But it is of the greatest importance they should be pursued on a solid and sufficiently comprehensive basis. All parties require this. Our theologians and preachers as well as our physical investigators, our statesmen as well as our philanthropists.

It is important to the religious instructor to know the physical conditions and requirements of social well-being, nor less important is it to the physicist and secular moralist to know the great foundation and pervasive principles of the spiritual economy. Whatever truth there may be in a favourite dictum of the day, that Science and Theology should be each allowed to pursue its independent course, it is not and cannot be applicable in the domain of Sociology. Here—and start from whichever side you may—the one inquiry will run into the other. You cannot keep them apart. And for the most unconquerable of reasons—because the physical and the spiritual meet and blend in that social life of man, which forms the subject-matter of the inquiry. Even John Stuart Mill admits that an Utilitarian scheme of morality needs, in order to its completeness, to embrace elements supplied by Christianity; and whatever may be thought of their possible coalescence, the admission at least suggests what will certainly be found to hold true, that religious teaching, if it is to meet current requirements, must take account, as well of the ascertained conditions of social well-being, as of the prominent characteristics and tendencies of our social life. The Christian teacher cannot afford to disregard discovery, or even popular theory, in any department of inquiry, least of all in the sphere of human society and life, with which he has so directly and constantly to deal. Familiarity with, and a just appreciation of, the results and tendencies of investigation in this sphere would keep him in healthy contact with current thought, and form no mean auxiliary in bringing home his appeals to the "business and bosoms" of men, while, in the absence of such recognition, he too often preaches quite away from their ruling sympathies, if he does not, by ludicrously traversing what is now matter of common knowledge, excite their ridicule and contempt. How deeply and directly important to the statesman and to the social philanthropist it is that the investigation of social questions should be comprehensive and thorough, is too obvious to need to be set forth.

In short, on all grounds, and whether we look at the one side or the other—whether our social phenomena are regarded more from the scien-

tific or from the spiritual point of view—it is necessary that account be taken of all the leading constituents of man's nature, and which thus enter as elemental forces into our social life. It is only thus we can save ourselves from crude, one-sided, and misleading generalizations, or escape the most dangerous errors in philanthropy, social economy, and legislation. Social questions thus concern all; are important to all; should interest all; and because they cover the whole (practical) domain of human activity.

II.—THEORY—BUCKLE.

THE question—To what do we owe our Modern Civilization—what is its initial force and moving spring?—is not a mere theoretical question. On the contrary, it is a deeply practical question. On its true solution, it not only depends whether we shall justly interpret the Past, but whether we shall steer a right and safe course for the Future. A correct theory will not necessarily guide us aright, but a hasty, one-sided, or exceptive generalization will, to a certainty, lead us more or less astray. Men do not adopt and pursue the right course necessarily, in virtue of social laws, as the heavenly bodies maintain and pursue their undeviating courses, in virtue of cosmical and mechanical laws. In proof that they do not, we need only refer to the fact, that no civilization has hitherto been more than partial,—that there have been large masses of the people which all civilizations have failed effectively to reach or raise. That, moreover, all the Civilizations which we name Ancient—which arose previously to the introduction and diffusion of Christianity—have perished. So fatally did they carry in them the seeds of dissolution that they became unable to resist the pressure of the surrounding barbarism. If our Modern Civilization is to survive, it must rest on a surer basis than theirs, it must embrace something which they failed to include. In no case were they more than partial—always leaving a large portion of the people beyond their scope or beneath their elevating power. Generally, the minority succeeded in raising themselves only by the depression of the majority. That these civilizations were temporary is indubitable, yet not more so as an historical fact, than that they were only partial in their scope and range.

Nor would it be difficult to show *why* they were partial, as inevitably as they were unenduring. A civilization that shall be all-comprehending must have a wider and deeper basis than they possessed. *No civilization will ever embrace the whole body of a people that does not rest on the due development and exercise of all the powers and susceptibilities of our nature.*

We lay this down as the great fundamental law of an abiding, all-embracing civilization. Now, omitting for the moment any reference to other defects in the ancient civilizations, there is this one conspicuous want—they made no sound or adequate provision for the cultivation and exercise of man's moral and religious nature. Greek and Roman culture was imperfect and partial even at the epochs of its greatest brilliancy and success, and the range of the resultant civilization was correspondingly partial, never making any approach to embracing the whole community. It was partial, and could not be otherwise, because, failing in the element in which it mainly failed, it rested on a selfish basis, and was due mainly to a selfish stimulus. That the master forces to which the elevation and exclusive ascendency of an upper and governing class is due are selfish forces must be self-evident, when that ascendency is maintained on the backs of a large body of proletaires or slaves.

But it is now loudly proclaimed that our modern civilization is due to another but quite a different element, also in great part wanting in the Greek and Roman culture, that it depends on the discovery of the laws of nature, and the general diffusion of a knowledge of these laws. Mr. Buckle, who is engaged on the most pretentious work on Civilization as yet undertaken by, at least, any English writer, is labouring to establish this conclusion on the basis of historical induction. His theory—propounded with an air of arrogant and dogmatic exclusiveness not to be exceeded—is thus set forth, in brief, in the first page of his second volume :—

"In the preceding volume I have endeavoured to establish four leading propositions, which, according to my view, are to be deemed the basis of the history of civilization. They are—1st, That the progress of mankind depends on the success with which the laws of phenomena are investigated, and on the extent to which a knowledge of those laws is diffused. 2d, That before such investigation can begin, a spirit of scepticism must arise, which, at first aiding the investigation, is afterwards aided by it. 3d, That the discoveries thus made increase the influence of intellectual truths, and diminish relatively, not absolutely, the influence of moral truths; moral truths being more stationary than intellectual truths, and receiving fewer additions. 4th, That the great enemy of this movement, and therefore the great enemy of civilization, is the protective spirit, by which I mean the notion that society cannot prosper unless the affairs of life are watched over and protected at nearly every turn by the State and the Church; the State teaching men what they are to do, and the Church teaching them what they are to believe."

Now we are not to say that this theory does not contain important elements of truth. No reflective or well-informed person would think for a moment of denying, that the success with which we have investigated the laws of nature, and availed ourselves of our knowledge of those laws to enlist her forces in our service, forms a main element in our modern

civilization. More than this, we may admit that it is the most prominent and conspicuous among the powers through which the exterior fabric of this civilization has been built up. That our modern civilization embraces much that none of the ancient civilizations had at command, and that its benefits have a wider diffusion than those of the ancient civilizations ever reached; all this may be admitted—indeed, no competent observer will ever think of denying so much—and yet it will by no means follow that Mr Buckle has propounded an adequate theory. All this may be true and yet that theory be only a partial and superficial generalization. All this may be true, and yet Mr Buckle be ignoring or discrediting the main element—the fundamental force—in our modern civilization, the power without which it never could have arisen, and in the absence of which—should our modern physicists succeed in displacing it—that civilization must inevitably decay, and break up, as all antecedent civilizations have done. These conclusions it will be our object to establish and illustrate in the few papers that are to follow. Not that we mean to confine ourselves to the theory as propounded by Mr Buckle, or to adhere to any rigid method, or pursue any formal argument. Indeed, we shall soon see that Mr Buckle is only labouring to elaborate and give prominent expression to views and sentiments which have obtained wide currency among our modern scientific and literary men. The tendency in these days is certainly to discredit the influence of moral truths and exalt that of positive science, but few conclusions could be more hasty or unwarranted than that this is a law in the development of civilization, or that it is an advance in its progressive evolution.

III.—UTILITARIANISM.

THE Utilitarian theory—zealously revived by John Stuart Mill in *Fraser's Magazine*,* and, which enlists Mr Buckle's heartiest and most fervid homage—is really no other than an endeavour to reduce Morality to an affair of calculation. The principle is essentially sordid. Assuming enjoyment to be the greatest good, and pleasure the highest end of existence, it sets pleasure or enjoyment before us as the one direct and exclusive object of pursuit; and, broaden it as you may, so as to comprehend our fellow-creatures, it never can get higher than "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

"Life," says Mr Buckle, "has two sets of functions, one set of them increasing the happiness of the body, another set of them increasing the happiness of the mind. If we could suppose a man completely perfect, we should take it for granted that he would unite these two forms of pleasure in the highest degree, and would extract, both from body and mind, every enjoyment consistent with his own happiness and

* October and November, 1861.

the happiness of others." . . . "Our appetites being as much a portion of ourselves as any other quality we possess, ought to be indulged, otherwise the whole individual is not developed." "The proper limit to self-indulgence is that one shall neither hurt himself nor hurt others."

"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. The "theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded," is, "that pleasure, and freedom from pain are the only desirable ends; and that all desirable things (which are numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme,) are desirable, either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." "According to the Greatest Happiness Principle the ultimate end, with reference to which, and for the sake of which, all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people,) is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyment. . . . This being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality."—*John Stuart Mill.*

Does not the Utilitarian Scheme thus make our inner (and what should be our higher) life, a huxtering affair—looking to the largest and speediest return in everything we do? But not only this; the criterion—taking it for what it is worth—is, in the nature of the case, utterly indeterminate. It proposes to test the morality of actions by their consequences, but you never can exhaust the possible consequences of any action. You know not how widely they will pulsate outwards over existing society; you know not how far they may be propagated downwards. Even though you could calculate both, within a given time, you know not how long the world may exist.

If there is no other standard of morals but Utility, there is none even for this life. But conceding to its advocates thus far, namely, to look at it in the light of a standard, what should be the first characteristic of a Standard of Morals? Why, clearly, a certain fixity or determinateness. But in Utility, regarded as a Moral Standard, there is none. None, either as respects the individual, or as respects the aggregate. What will yield most happiness to one man will not to another—what may yield the greatest amount of gratification to ourselves and others of the present generation, may drain away the sources of happiness from the next.

Thus it would be though "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" could ever become the pervasive and universal principle of human action. But it never has been, and never can be. If happiness be our highest object, we will, to a certainty, prefer our own to that of others. With *that* as the supreme object and great spring of activity, it cannot be otherwise. In a world where the means of enjoyment are limited—and the demand ever increasing faster than the supply,—in the crush of competition it soon comes to be, "Every man for himself." And is not this what is actually presented to us as the most prominent moral feature

of our modern social life? Is it not the general complaint that, with all our knowledge—all our science—all our command over the forces of nature—the tension and strain of our faculties is increasing? We are driven along in a hurrying crowd; we act under high pressure, and break up at an earlier age than our fathers. And all this in the pursuit of utility. Every one would gain the most he can, in the shortest possible time, in order to the largest measure of enjoyment.

So it is, and so it would be, though nothing were ever to come in to disturb this beau ideal of human life. But something is ever coming in, and rudely jarring on the "greatest happiness principle." Indeed, you would often think the opposite principle were the great inspiring stimulus of human activity, and that the end was—not to promote the greatest amount of happiness, but to produce the greatest amount of misery!

At doing what else are the utmost energies of the two sections of the "most advanced nation" of this most advanced of the ages, now put under extremest strain! No: even the people who have long pursued "utility," in the gross form of the "almighty dollar," are now waging deadly war on each other—in utter disregard of utility, in either its lower or its higher forms of expression,—in utter disregard both of profit and of happiness.

The testimony thus born to a higher principle of action, and a higher end in human life than utility, is as emphatic as it is decisive. And it has been witnessed to through all ages. Nor is the force of the testimony impaired by the fact, that never so much of human activity is due to a baser stimulus than that of even the lowest form of utility. The base is but the perversion of the noble—the base implies the noble; implies it in its very possibility, and by implying the noble vindicates for it its true place, even while usurping that place.

Utility the highest object of human activity! No, indeed, there is a principle of RIGHT, for which men have striven, suffered, and bled in all ages—a principle of WRONG which they have resisted to the death—and with a firmness and decision which calculation has never for a moment been permitted to mar or shake. They may have often been mistaken as to the matter of Right, as well as have often yielded to perverted motives in pursuing it. Right is none the less RIGHT for all that—none the less noble, but the more. That passion should pass itself off as principle is only the stronger testimony to the nobility of principle, and to the supremacy which is its rightful claim in the direction of our activity. That men should sometimes mistake passion for principle is only an illustration of the universally admitted fact, that we may not only deceive others, but are liable to self-deception as well.

The recognition of Right, apart from all calculation of consequences, implies a governing WILL—A SUPREME LIVING NATURE—to which Right conforms, and which Wrong traverses. But the principle of Utility implies no higher end in the Universe than enjoyment in the creature. Point-

ing to nothing above man, it is essentially atheistic, and wholly destitute of elevating power. Even as regards this world it can never be a standard or criterion of action, because you can never formulate Happiness into an arithmetical equation. And to the present scene it must be confined. As it recognises nothing above man, it cannot take account of anything beyond his present life.

IV.—UTILITARIANISM—PROVING TOO MUCH.

It will not be difficult to apprehend that, whatever other elements of Christianity the Utilitarian theory may be strained to embrace, it cannot —or not in beyond a limited number of instances—be made to include that of self-sacrifice. Mr Mill evidently feels this difficulty acutely enough, and it is thus he endeavours—whether shall we say—to evade, or to overcome it? "The Utilitarian Morality does recognise in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good." Such is Mr Mill's defence of Utilitarianism on its obviously weak side, and it is a defence than which scarcely any assault could be more fatal. These two sentences embody two blunders, and it is difficult to say which is the greater; for both the affirmation and the denial alike betray Mr Mill's entire ignorance of the nature, the function, and the moral significance of self-sacrifice. "Utilitarianism," says Mr Mill, "does recognise in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others." If Utilitarianism does so, we can only say that it is too beneficent by half, for it not only goes beyond Christianity, but recognises, what we have no hesitation in affirming to be, under a moral constitution, impossible. A system which required—or could admit of—any one "sacrificing his own greatest good" for the sake of others, would not only traverse our most distinctive notions of a moral system—but would uproot the very idea of a Moral Government. We need not either argue or illustrate this position; and, more especially, as the assumption is suicidal to Utilitarianism itself, for to speak of Utility would be the cruellest of mockeries, where one's highest good had to be sacrificed. That is a loss in the nature of the case, admitting of no compensation.

Morality and Christianity have another voice, and one more in harmony with the deepest instincts and demands of our nature. A moral system has ever been understood to imply an administration securing ultimate justice to all. But Christianity advances much beyond this point. It is intended and adapted to secure to those who embrace it much that justice could not reach,—a higher order of blessing, and by transmuting tempo-

rary evil into enduring good. It inculcates self-sacrifice, and not as the exception, but as the rule for all its disciples; but so far from their foregoing their highest good in that, it is the indispensable process, through which alone they can realise it. On this the testimony of our Lord is distinct and emphatic. "He that saveth his life (the natural life of self and sensuous gratification) shall lose it, but he that loseth his life for my sake and the gospel's shall keep it unto life eternal." "No man hath forsaken father or mother, wife or children, houses or lands, for my sake, but shall receive in this life an hundred fold, and in the world to come life everlasting."

So that in saying that Utilitarianism denies self-sacrifice to be a good Mr Mill is—if possible—more unfortunate than in affirming that the system has room for the sacrifice of ones "greatest good." Christianity does require of us self-sacrifice for the good of others, but it is only the sacrifice of that "self" which it is ruin and death to our higher nature to indulge. It is this self-sacrifice which developes and nurtures in us a higher life, elevating us from the pursuit of mere gratification or pleasure to the capacity and the enjoyment of blessedness. So vast is the range of this requirement in the moral system—so deep does it reach, so high does it rise—that even the Son of God himself, the spotless Divine Man, was not beyond its scope,—"Though he were a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things that he suffered." And so congruous is this process with the highest order of Divine IDEA, that it is pronounced to have been becoming in God to make Him "perfect through suffering."

Even though Mr Mill should protest—as very likely he would be ready to do—that it is only "our greatest good" in this world which Utilitarianism allows or invites us to sacrifice, and that the system takes no account of anything beyond; even that limitation will only save the system thus far, that it provides for the greatest amount of good being enjoyed by the worst and meanest of mankind. Otherwise it would not be possible, even in this world, for the nobler order of natures to "sacrifice their greatest good."

We are quite aware that Mr Mill holds self-sacrifice to be only a temporary necessity; for the realisation of the requirements of Utilitarianism would introduce a secular Millennium, in which the "laws and social arrangements should place the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole." Has Mr Mill inquired at all whether "laws and social arrangements" can ever effect a revolution so fundamental as this—whether it would not rather require a radical change in the constitution of the world and in that of human nature itself? And further, supposing it so completely effected as to make "duty and interest" always one, whether, in that case, there would be left any room for what has hitherto been known as morality among men; whether, in fact, there would be any scope for good in a world where there remained no temptation to evil.

No; Utilitarianism has its sphere, and morality its sphere; the sphere of morality being the higher, as its demands are imperative. The sphere of self-sacrifice or beneficence is higher still. We are to be guided by prudence, or the law of Utility, in things morally indifferent. It is a calculation of consequences. But where it is a question of right and wrong—without inquiring as to consequences. Utility is superseded by a higher law. That law covers and subordinates all beneath it, for we have as little right to balance enjoyment, (our own or that of others) as profit, against duty. This is the first, and a necessary, step in the subordination of selfishness. The power of morality, however, may still be only that of restraint. Christianity introduces a deeper force. It does not merely bridle selfishness. It destroys it; and the power it employs is that of love. Just laws, and equitable social arrangements have their own, and that an important sphere, but they will all fail in the absence of this. This is the only power adequate to bring the desires of the individual into harmony with the general good. It will never be our object to seek the welfare of others as we do our own, till we "love our neighbour as ourselves." So, it is Christianity that can do that for us which Utilitarianism—affecting to array itself in its beneficent garments—only presents before us as an Utopian dream.

V.—UTILITARIANISM IN ITS ULTIMATE CLAIMS AND DEVELOPMENT.

In our second paper we laid it down as the fun lamental principle of an equable and all-embracing Civilization, that it must rest on "THE DUE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE OF ALL THE POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF OUR NATURE." Utilitarianism glaringly violates this rule, by ignoring, not only the religious but the moral element; or by labouring to show that both may be advantageously dispensed with.

It is only consistent that Utilitarianism should deny to the religious and moral sentiments any original or underivative place in the human mind. "My own belief," says Mr Mill, "is that the moral feelings are not innate but acquired." The outcome of this doctrine is, as we shall see by and by, that as we may have a morality without a basis, so we may have a religion without a God! A morality, however, must rest somewhere, and it is at once amusing and instructive to see Mr Mill (unconsciously and helplessly) driven back on what it is the great object of his theory to disallow and subvert.

"The customary morality," says Mr M., "that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the

mind with the feeling of being *in itself obligatory*." Of course the question of Utility does not intrude on those who "accept the customary morality as *in itself* obligatory." That acceptance forecloses all other questions. Here, by Mr Mill's own confession, the test of utility is not applied. Or if it is applied by any one, it is with this unfortunate result, (and which indeed accrues from every attempt to analyse our moral sentiments, where the principle of morality "is not already in men's minds," invested with a peculiar "sacre'ness")—viz., "to divest them of a portion of their sanctity." Could we well have better proof that our moral feelings are not a compounded, but a simple, essential, original part of our nature?

If we want additional testimony to this—to the fact, and to the impossibility of building up a moral system without recognising it—Mr Mill shall himself supply it. If Utility be the test of virtue, it, certainly, should sanction all conduct which conforms to it. Yet, by Mr Mill's own confession, Utility, as a moral standard, must seek a sanction in something beyond itself. And where is he driven to recognise this sanction? In the "conscientious feelings of mankind." And he very *naïvely* adds:—"Undoubtedly *this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to.*" So it just comes to this—that the Utilitarian principle is nugatory within the sphere of the customary or conventional morality, and quite impotent beyond; and Mr Mill is driven to fall back on that old, familiar, but irreducible "Conscience," which, theoretically, it is his aim to discredit, and practically, to dispense with.

Mr Mill seems partly conscious of this weakness, and to save Utilitarianism, says, it fails, in such cases, only in common with every other system,—those who will not obey the Utilitarian principle, "neither will they be obedient to any other." He forgets, however, that—even by his own showing—Utilitarianism must go beyond itself, both for the sense of moral obligation, and for any efficient motive to obedience, while other moral theories embrace both.

It has been a common conviction among men that virtue—in its essence, as well as in its highest manifestations—is disinterested. Moralists place virtue and interest in contrast, as they have often been found in violent conflict in Life and in History. According to the Utilitarian theory, however, Virtue and Interest are one; not, in the long run, or ultimately only, but, now, directly, all through. Yet Mr Mill assures us that in the Utilitarian scheme, virtue is not only desired, but "desired disinterestedly for itself." And thus it is he makes it out to be so. "Virtue, according to the Utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end (happiness), but is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it *disinterestedly* it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as *a part of their happiness*." In those who love virtue disinterestedly, it has become a part of their happiness. Do they then love it disinterestedly? Is it not their highest interest to cherish it? And what is the process through which this

hope is realised? On what account—according to the Utilitarian doctrine —do they love virtue before it has become a part of their happines? Because of the happiness it is adapted to yield, for, according to this doctrine, happiness is the only conceivable end of human action. Rare proof of disinterestedness, truly! We just pursue virtue because we believe it to be our interest—that is, conducive to our happiness—to do so, and then cleave to it disinterestedly, when our faith has become a realisation. So prosper all attempts to degrade virtue into a matter of computation, and substitute Pleasure for the Highest Good!

The genesis and development of virtue is the converse of this. It is not virtue at all unless it is first pursued because it is felt to be Right, or agreeable to the will of God; and not only irrespective of present pleasure, or advantage, but often in the face of present hardship, pain, and loss. That this devotion should ultimately yield, and itself become, the highest happiness of which our nature is capable, is only the most conclusive testimony to the fact, that we are moral beings, and act under a moral government. A moral government, issuing in misery to those who fulfil its behests, were the most revolting of all contradictions. Christianity is open to no such charge. Under its auspices we begin with duty, irrespective of enjoyment, and duty becomes, ultimately, delight, because it is agreeable to the deepest wants and highest aspirations of our nature. The Utilitarian tries to reverse this order; he cultivates virtue on account of the happiness it promotes, and calls his love of it disinterested, when it has made him happy!

Mr Mill has proposed to substitute the principle of Utility for the idea of right in morals, and yet has been obliged to recognise and fall back on Conscience. Yet he goes farther, and boldly enunciates it as his conviction, that the world might get on, (and better than it has ever yet done) without any other religion, than that which his master, Auguste Comte, imagined might be developed out of human sympathy. In our first notice of the Utilitarian theory, we characterised it as an Atheistical, godless doctrine, and Mr Mill has now himself supplied us with the proof.

We must cite in its integrity the passage in which Mr Mill enunciates the ultimate development of his creed. When our first article on Utilitarianism was penned, we could scarcely have anticipated that he would himself have so explicitly endorsed the charge we brought against him. In his article in the November number of *Fraser's Magazine*—from which all the above citations are taken—Mr M. says:—

"In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not included. *If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion*, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it,

I think that no one, who can realize this conception, will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for happiness, and morality. To any ethical student who finds the realization difficult, I recommend as a means of facilitating it, the second of M. Comte's two principal works, the *Traité de Politique Positive*. I entertain the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that treatise; *but I think it has superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity*, EVEN WITHOUT THE AID OF BELIEF IN A PROVIDENCE, *both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion; making it take hold of human life, and colour all thought, feeling and action, in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy ever exercised by* ANY RELIGION *may be but a type and foretaste;* and of which the danger is, not that it should be insufficient, but that it should be so excessive as to interfere unduly with human freedom and individuality."

We have endeavoured by means of italics and capitals to bring out the real force and significance of this extraordinary passage, believing, as we do, that with the great majority of readers it will need no other confutation than that which it carries in itself,—that to be clearly apprehended will be enough. It is, however, of the greatest importance that it should be clearly apprehended; that it may be seen what kind of teaching is given forth in our popular literature, under sanction of the highest names. And, in this instance, it is in the influence of the name of Mr Mill, and the position he has justly attained as a thinker, that the greatest danger lies. Not in the force of the arguments he employs, nor in the beauty and felicity of his illustrations. Indeed, one could scarce obtain a deeper impression of the untenableness of the Utilitarian doctrine, than from the weakness with which it is supported in these papers. Mr Mill's heartless and ungrateful Goddess has treated him as Delilah did Samson—made him weak as other men!

Were Utilitarianism propounded merely as a theory, however—even with all the influence which the intellectual and literary reputation of John Stuart Mill can give it—we should certainly not have bestowed on it so much attention. It is from the hold which—positively or negatively,—directly or indirectly, it has taken on, not the thought merely, but the action of the time, that we have been led (at the outset almost of our inquiries into the causes determining our Modern Civilization) to enter so fully into an exposure of its true nature and bearings. Cowper said of the people in his day—

"Pleasure and gain, two gods, divide them all."

But the votaries of the two have become united in ours. We are all in the hot pursuit of gain, in order to the realisation of pleasure and enjoyment, in some form or other. And John Stuart Mill would elevate the pursuit into a religion—nay, in effect, pronounces it the only religion consistent with human wellbeing!

VI.—THE TRUE LAW OF CIVILIZATION.

"Oh, is there one in twenty,
With his own lot content,
Though God hath bread in plenty
To all the nations sent?

Till heart to heart is plighted,
In faith on Heaven above,
Earth's harvests must be blighted,
For want of mutual love.

Were men to one another
As kind as God to all,
Then no man on his brother,
For help would vainly call.

On none for idle wasting,
Would honest labour frown;
And none to riches hasting,
Would tread his neighbour down.

No man enough possesses,
Until he has to spare;
Possession no man blesses,
While self is all his care.

For blessings on our labour,
Oh, then, in hope we pray,
When love unto our neighbour,
Is ripening every day."

THERE is only one law which can secure an equable and continuous progress in Civilization—a progress *extensively*, towards embracing the whole people, *intensively*, elevating more and more the whole people. We shall find that law very readily to suggest itself if we reflect what it is that makes Civilization possible. Civilization is possible because men, under the simplest social organisations, can produce more than is necessary to sustain the body in health and vigour. Were the exertions of man in society, all required to provide for his bodily necessities, it is obvious he could make no advance in what we call Civilization—could not rise above the animal level. But it is otherwise. He exists under a more beneficent and bountiful constitution. Man in society—under all average conditions—can produce more than is sufficient to meet his bodily wants. The measure of this free complement of power is, in the case of any community, the measure of its power to advance in Civilization. But, whether it will, proportionately advance, as a matter of fact, will—as well as the direction that Civilization will take, the type it will assume—depend on how this power is applied. The advance in Civilization will be corresponding,—*the progress will be equable and general, only where this com-*

plement of free power is applied to make provision—and proportionately, to their relative importance—for the higher wants of our nature. We are distinguished from the animal creatures around us by *having* such wants, and nothing could well be clearer, than that we may rise above the animal level only, and in proportion, as we make provision for them.

This law is quite in harmony with that laid down as fundamental in our second paper, viz. —"that a Civilization that shall embrace the whole body of a people, must rest on the due development and exercise of all the faculties and susceptibilities of our nature." Indeed, it is only another form of its expression. A due development of the powers and susceptibilites of our nature is a development of each corresponding to its place and function. It is a necessity that we should live—that everbody should have food, clothing, and shelter,—but that necessity met, there is great scope in regard to the application of the complement of free power at the disposal of any community. It may be applied to increase the comforts of life—a legitimate application, so far, as that will conduce to health and vigour; and not without moral effect, where other conditions of moral health and progress are observed. It may be applied to the culture and improvement of the mind—to securing a higher education for the young—a longer term and a wider curriculum. It may be applied to the production and diffusion among the people of literature and works of art; to the training and support of religious instructors, and the maintenance of the ordinances of religion. The due direction of this power thus implies, not a narrow, but a liberal estimate of the wants of our nature. Society suffers if the development of any faculty or susceptibility is not provided for. But, as respects each of these, in proportion to its place and importance. From defect in the highest, society suffers most—most permanently, most fatally.

But this complement of free power may be applied, mainly, to meet acquired bodily wants and sensuous tastes and cravings—to the production of articles of luxury of diet, dress, buildings, furniture, equipages. *And, proportionately, as the complement of free power is so applied in a community, in the like proportion will the due and proper advantages of Civilization be limited, as respects its members. There will be exactly the same amount of privation as there is of abuse, and that, however large (proportionately to the mere necessities of the community), the complement of free power may be.*

If there is any law of which the evidence is superabundant, it is of this. It is proclaimed and authenticated everywhere. Society brims over with the proof; as it is oppressed and afflicted with want, preventable disease, and over-work of body and mind. It rings out in our ears from the laboratory, from the market-place, from the workshop, from the littered desk of the daily journalist, as well as from the garret of the poor seamstress, plying her needle through the dreary midnight hours! Why should hurry and worry—instead of being abated—only increase with

the increase of our knowledge and mechanical power. The solution of so strange a phenomenon is found in the law we have stated. It is because we do not apply our surplus power to providing (relatively to their place and value) for the higher wants of our nature. The Malthusian doctrine is a half-truth, or, rather, a narrowing and degradation of a great truth. There is *not* a constant tendency in population to press on the mere means of subsistence, but there is a settled correspondence between Need and Power, in all states and stages of society. That is, Need is always commensurate with Power, and Power commensurate with Need, where man does not guiltily destroy the balance. To this last, all want and privation, in the aggregate, are traceable, and there cannot be a misdirection of our social power, as compared with the needs of our nature, without inducing these,—cannot, in any state of society. *Power is never in excess of legitimate Need.* The augmented strain of our modern life is at once the exponent of displacement, and the indicator of its measure. *The Nemesis of this misapplication, this abuse of power to low ends, reveals itself, not alone in privation of the proper means for meeting the higher wants of our nature, but in rendering it harder for a portion of the people to live, than it would be in the absence of such surplus power altogether—harder than when each had, without mechanical aid, to wring out the means of subsistence for himself, from a reluctant soil and an ungenial climate.*

This melancholy issue—attendant, as yet, on all modern manifestations of Civilization, and gaining on, rather than yielding, to our advances in knowledge and mechanical power—an issue, traceable, in many cases, to no direct fault of those involved in it, perplexes and startles the thoughtful observer. It is well calculated to do so. Yet, how little does it prompt to adequate inquiry as to the true cause. By the great majority, indeed, it is taken as a mere matter of course, and all they do is, to go on as before—heedlessly, increasing the evil, or hopelessly conflicting with it.

Why is it so?—why—when the means of securing comfort and abundance to all are in our hands, as they were never in the hands of any former generation; is there yet this egregious and widespread failure? Why should there be so many, not the better, but the worse, for all our knowledge, skill, and mechanical power? This is not a mere speculative question. It is a problem as practical as it is pressing; yet one whose true and comprehensive solution does anything but lie on the surface. It concerns, not one here and there, but the majority; not one class, but all classes. The most intelligent, cultured, energetic, and successful, scarcely less than the helpless, the ostracised, and the down-trodden. Yet the one class go on—or rather, are driven—almost as blindly, almost as helplessly as the other. Our men of science, our professional men, our journalists, our business men, our legislators, our Ministers of State; all go on under a crushing weight of over-work. Cavour cannot find time for more than two meals a-day, and sinks in the meridian of life. So do thousands of all ranks and conditions of men. The evil has grown so

rapidly, and presses so intensely, that the present generation—especially of our distinguished men—threatens to become extinct, whilst we have among us many hale survivors of the last.

Yet we are a practical people! yes, too practical by half. So practical that we will not give ourselves the trouble to ascertain the basis on which the sound and safe in practical life must rest. No, no; that would be theoretical;—that would be to go into abstract questions—into 'metaphysics'—which we hate. But, what if the cure is no otherwise possible? Likely enough, in a disease so deep-seated, and of such long standing,—no otherwise possible than by probing it to the bottom—tracing it to its sources, and dealing with it there.

This is what we are now attempting to do, and it is from a deep sense of the urgency of the inquiry that we ask intelligent and thoughtful readers to accompany us. Let us—ere we close this paper—gather up our findings thus far, that we may the more clearly see the conclusion to which they shut us up.

A healthy, enduring, all-comprehensive Civilization, can rest only on the due (and relatively proportionate) development and exercise of all the faculties and susceptibilities of man's nature. This implies and requires, that power be applied to making provision for our higher wants, proportionately as it is released from the necessities of our lower. The misery and want that are found among us—the violent strain on the minds and bodies of so many of us—are the index of the misapplication of our power; they measure the extent to which we fail in its due normal application.

The evil is not diminishing, either with the increase of our knowledge, or with the increase in the amount of this power itself. On the contrary, it is increasing. Its development has been most rapid of late, when the increase of our knowledge and power has been most rapid. If it is to yield, it must be to other influences than that of our knowledge of physical nature, or of the power with which it arms us. The corrective is not here. The progress of mankind depends on something higher than either the "success with which the laws of phenomena are investigated," or "the extent to which a knowledge of these laws is diffused." This is one great means of advancement, no doubt, but, instead of being the ruling and guiding force, it requires itself to be guided, else it may conduct us downward, and not upward. Under its operation, if unchecked and uncorrected—Desire and Craving being stimulated much faster than the means of gratifying them can be produced—we should see mankind engaged only in the hotter and hotter pursuit of "fugitive, false good."

VII.—THE MASTER-FORCE IN CIVILIZATION.

"If Lord Stanley thinks that the eclipse of religious conviction would not be detrimental to political and social improvement, I recommend him to look over history, and try whether he can produce a single instance in which any great political or social problem has been successfully solved without the aid of sincere religious convictions to control the selfish passions of mankind."—*Professor Goldwin Smith. Letter in Daily News.*

AN equable, all-embracing, and enduring Civilization is developed and realised through the training and culture of Individuals. Society is made up of units. Society is purified, refined, elevated, in proportion as the individual man—in proportion as the largest number of the individuals composing it—are rendered more intelligent, pure, loving, and beneficent. Whatever—in any grade of society—hinders this elevation of the individual, obstructs proportionately the progress of civilization. Whatever promotes true manhood in the individual, promotes true Civilization in Society. Civilization signalises itself—not directly in "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," but in the highest measure of well-doing and well-being. But well-being can never be realised save through well-doing, and all well-doing is individual. Our fellows—and Society in the aggregate—influence us, but the choice and determination lie with ourselves. Society can acquire nothing—beyond a mere surface-gloss, which will inevitably betray its unreality—save through the component individual units which compose it.

This may seem very simple, common-place, almost a mere truism. Yet, if we mistake not, it will be found to settle no less a question, than that as to the primary element and master-force of Civilization. For what is it that purifies, refines, elevates the individual? Is it the mere knowledge of physical or inductive science? Is it taste, or the æsthetic susceptibility on which it grounds? Is it general intelligence or culture, which embraces other fields besides those of inductive science and taste —which embraces the life of man and history—the moral sphere, as well as the Physical and Imaginative? These are all instruments of Civilization—of elevation and refinement. Each is good in its place—powerful in its place; but they may all fail. The examples are numerous of men of great scientific acquirement, of men of keen æsthetic susceptibility, of men of the widest general intelligence, being gross in their moral habits—leading an impure, dissipated, morally contaminating life—a life such as cannot be led without bringing social degradation on some—perhaps on many of their fellows—a life which, therefore, cannot be led without marring civilization—a life which, while it is led, and in proportion as such lives are led, civilization must remain partial, imperfect; blurred and blotched with contrastive degradation.

Defect in religious and moral principle, and in the self-control which

such principle guarantees, is, of all other defects, the most socially injurious. Other defects, e. g., limited intelligence, or want of taste and refinement, may appear in large numbers of a community, and yet, if they are not general, may little retard its progress, and little affect the general well-being. Such persons, when their conduct is regulated by religious principle, may be useful members of the community, and do much of its common, everyday, indispensible work. Moreover, the influence of religion is largely compensatory. Implying, in itself, the highest form of culture —viz., the culture of the moral feelings and moral activity, it, at once, promotes all other forms of culture, and, in a measure, supplies in their default. But this is true of religious and moral culture only, not of culture of the intellect or of the æsthetic susceptibility. No other form of culture will compensate for defect in moral principle, or neutralise the evil of the loose habits attendant on it. There can be no breach of morality which is not socially injurious, and, because morality is the most fundamental and imperative condition of social well-being. But so far is the well-known aphorism of Burke, that "vice, in losing all its grossness, loses half its evil," from being true, that vice becomes thus only more insidiously, more deeply, pervasively, mischievous. Vice neutralises the influence of the refinement with which it may be associated, and being, in its nature, grovelling, must tend to induce grossness. On the other hand, there need be little anxiety about the diffusion of taste and refinement in a community, if only its moral health can be preserved. Intelligence, scientific acquirement, taste—each is good in its place; but one thing is higher than all. Only one thing can be relied on to secure the progressive and abiding elevation of the individual, in all that constitutes, distinguishes, and differentiates man. That one thing is a practical sense of our responsibility to God throughout the whole of our activity; in other words religion. All else, all mere knowledge, all other forms of culture, take hold only of parts of the mind. There is none of them but leaves loose and uncontrolled some of the moving springs of our activity, and some which may become master forces. But Religion commands the whole, or, at least, it is its aim, scope, and nature, to do so. It must ultimately attain the supremacy over all, else it is a failure and a delusion.

And it stands to reason that it should be so; that what is broadest, embracing the whole activity, what is deepest, going down to the ultimate springs of action, should mould, regulate, and control the whole; should be the master-force in determining what Man Social is to become. What else can subordinate every passion and pursuit, inimical to the well-being of our fellows? Utility?—If John Stuart Mill's last paper (on Justice) has any practical issue, it is, to make it almost superfluously clear, not only that there can (as things are) be no security that justice shall be done, but that it is hopeless to determine what *is* just in almost any relation. And it would be so, were there no sense of right and wrong in us, independent of what we discern to be profitable or pleasant.

On the habit of self-control, based on moral principle, all reliable social advancement, all stable Civilization, depends ; Self-government in the individual, is the only thing that can guarantee political freedom. To have a free constitution, you require first to have free men. But the primary constituent of freedom is awanting where men are the slaves of lust or passion. The well-being of Society requires that such men be put under restraint. A preponderance of such makes a community fit material for the despot; and, existing in more limited proportion, they yet in like proportion, mar Civilization—obstruct its progress, and preclude its universality.

And, indeed, in what does Civilization begin? What differentiates the civilized community, from the savage horde? Is it not a practical preference of future good to immediate gratification, foregoing a present gratification which is certain, for a future good, which is more or less contingent? Civilized men act for future results, in respect to which they often experience disappointment. Yet they continue to act for such, notwithstanding, else Civilization could not be sustained. Ceasing to do so, Society would soon relapse into the savage state. Civilization has therefore a species of faith as the very basis on which it rests. In that state, man acts for the unrealised, and as yet, unseen. In the absence of religious motives he will do so. But in that case he has regard only to his own apparent interest. Of this we have impressive illustration in modern competition. Perfectly free trade to be healthy and compatible with the good of all, demands a high moral state in the communities where it obtains. When you dispense with legal checks, in the absence of the appropriate moral ones, the weak must suffer. Will the highest secular knowledge, or the highest skill in applied physical science, prevent this? So far from it, they only furnish to the astute and clever selfist, subtler, and more various means and instruments for accomplishing his designs. We see this signalised, not only in scientific murderers, like Palmer, but in every one who uses chemical knowledge for the adulteration of food, or the telegraph for supplanting his rival trader.

It remains to be seen how freedom will operate where religious motive is not paramount. And, already, indeed, it does not remain altogether unillustrated. The now Confederated States of North America give us a prominent exemplification. They have revolted from the Federal Government, in order that they may keep 4,000,000 of their fellow creatures in slavery—that they may rivet and seal their perpetual degradation. The blessings of such civilization are for the White alone, and it can be maintained only by entailing the curse of bondage on the Black. If reminded that these men are not irreligious—that they are Christians, we need only reply, that they themselves give the most emphatic testimony to what the religion of Christ induces and requires in our relations with each other. They feel that as Christian professors they can justify slavery only by denying the claim of the black man to be a brother.

It is consistent that they should. As Christianity proclaims the brotherhood of all men, it demands a brotherly treatment of all. It alone supplies the motives that will ensure this. If left perfectly free to act we will treat no man as a brother whom we do not regard as a brother. Hence, under the surface Civilization of these days, there runs—in defect of the deeper Christian motives,—a strong under-current of selfishness, thinly veiled by politeness and professed regard. How many bland swindlers and polished cheats have we, and only all the more successful in proportion to their accomplishments and intelligence! Civilization, in the absence of religious principles, would soon become a whited sepulchre, hiding "dead men's bones and all uncleanness."

VIII.—THE RELATIVE POSITION AND INFLUENCE OF INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL TRUTHS.

SIMPLY premising that under moral we include religious truths, we now proceed to examine Mr Buckle's position, that "the influence of intellectual truths increases, and the influence of moral truths, relatively to these, diminishes, with the progress of civilization." We have seen that what advances the individual in the scale of being, or what promotes the due culture, exercise, and development of all the powers and susceptibilities of his nature, proportionately, promotes civilization. How is it then, in this relation, with the individual? Does the influence of moral truths, or of moral considerations, diminish with his advancement? or is not the fact precisely the opposite way? In the living, conscious, active being man, we have exemplified the subordination of laws—the higher ruling the lower. The organic laws, or those of vitality, subordinate and hold in check purely chemical laws, the motive forces and powers of the organism are directed by the intellect, and the entirety of our active being, intellectual as well as bodily, acknowledges the supremacy of conscience, or the moral sense. The more truthful, fair, upright—in a word, conscientious—a man is in all his doings and dealings, the more do we reckon him a true man. Other things—bodily vigour, expertness of hand, knowledge, taste, &c. —constitute, each its quota, to the completeness and integrity of his nature; but this is supreme. This caps and crowns the whole. This gives unity to the being and decision to the whole activity. It is here we find a motive force, which is not only unfailing, but capable of indefinite increase. The progress of the individual may be due much to the discovery of intellectual truths, but more to the power of the moral impulses, and this for two reasons. 1st, The primary spring of our activity is found in the emotive, not in the intellectual part of our nature. We can conceive

of a purely intellectual being—capable of apprehending and discovering truth—but without any impulse towards other, or extraneous activity. But all impulses to activity are, from their very nature, relative. They are not more surely experienced in the ME, than they regard the NOT-ME. All impulses to activity embrace an element of Desire, and the direction of activity is determined, very much, by the character and strength of our desires. 2nd, Purely intellectual truths—whilst they are relative, as well as our moral impulses, embrace the relations of things to the intellect alone. The intellect, considered purely by itself, is satisfied by their recognition as truths. Its demands go no farther. They can become motives, only by passing into the moral region. But motives to what? That will depend very much on the moral convictions, *i.e.*, on the previous influence of moral truths on the mind. Suppose, for example, that a man, by the discovery of a new combination of chemical agents, effects such an improvement in bread-making, as, by a trifling outlay on a simple oven, &c., would enable the poor to prepare for themselves a more wholesome and nutritious loaf than the bakers supply, at a great saving of cost. Suppose, to give full publicity to the invention, would be equivalent to proffering the families of the poor an addition to their income of, say, L.2 a-year. A benevolent man would throw the invention open at once; a selfish man would protect it by patent, charging almost as much for each oven as the saving it would effect. The intellectual truth has, in each case, become a motive, but to conduct, how different in its effects on society! Yet, the truth apprehended, and *its intellectual apprehension*, is, in the case of each, precisely the same; the change takes place in that region of our nature where moral influences have play—where moral truths are recognised—where moral motives have power. With contrasts of this nature in actual life, the world has long been familiar. Robert Haldane devotes his fortune (a splendid estate) to the training of young men for the ministry and missions to the heathen; his contemporary, Lord Kennedy, dissipates his on the turf, spreading folly and demoralization through the community. Dr Chalmers consecrates his great talents to the service of God, and from that time forth a new direction is given to the history of a church and a nation. Lord Byron devotes his genius to his own glorification, and ends his literary career by writing "Don Juan." But we need not multiply examples. Indeed, like contrasts will readily occur to every one from the field of his own observation and experience in common life.

But the reason, the only reason, assigned by Mr Buckle why, with the progress of civilization, the influence of moral truths must diminish relatively to the influence of intellectual truths is, that the former are "more stationary, and receive fewer additions than the latter." That moral truths should receive fewer additions than intellectual truths results at once from their own nature, and the nature of their function. They are of the nature of principles, as contradistinguished from mere facts, or those fixed combinations of facts, which we term laws. As principles,

they are immutable, but, so far from being, on that account, practically stationary, it is therefore they are capable of an indefinitely extending application. The really pertinent question then is—Does their sphere narrow or widen with the progress of Civilization? The right direction in which to seek an answer to this question may be indicated by asking another. Do the relations of men in society become more simple or more various and complicated with the progress of civilization? Do their voluntary relations increase or diminish—are they widened or circumscribed? Mr Buckle is a zealous advocate of liberty. The progress of liberty is equivalent to affording men in society greater and greater scope for acting as they choose. In these circumstances there must be something to regulate choice—to restrain selfishness and passion. Something must come in the place of that Force or that Law, which in ruder states of society circumscribes and limits individual freedom. Is it the mere intellectual apprehension of truths, or may these become motives, one way or the other, according to the moral convictions which rule the individual and society? The power that comes in place of force and of law as society advances, is, we are told, Public Opinion. Largely it is so, we most readily grant. But what is Public Opinion? Is it made up of intellectual convictions simply? or of those pervaded and consolidated by moral convictions? Our physicists, and speculatists of the positive school, would indeed, fain eliminate the moral element from it, but what else is it which gives Public Opinion its force,—its authority. It is not that certain facts are truths merely, but that certain conduct is right, and that the opposite is wrong. Is not this true of all the advances in Public Opinion?—is it not, indeed, their distinctive mark? Religious persecution has ceased, because it was felt to be wrong. Slavery has been extinguished for the same reason. The Corn Laws were abolished because they were proved to be unjust. Parliament was reformed, because the limitation of the Franchise was felt to be iniquitable.

The sphere of Public Opinion is ever widening, as the sphere of Force and of Coercive Law is narrowing. An extended knowledge of physical laws influences Public Opinion, and so does a purer taste. But a conviction of RIGHT is the most influential, as it is the most imperative element. The discovery of the "laws of phenomena," impels us to activity just in proportion to the good we expect to get out of our knowledge The direction our activity will take in turning our new knowledge to practical account, will, therefore depend on what we regard as the "GREATEST GOOD." Were the moral element eliminated from Public Opinion—as John Stuart Mill and Mr Buckle so earnestly desire—we should regard gratification, enjoyment—in a word—PLEASURE, as the greatest good, and pain as the great evil to be shunned. Taste and refinement, instead of acting as correctives of this low estimate, tend rather to fortify and strengthen it, as prompting us to avoid and avert whatever is disagreeable. The influence of this feeling has been distinctly to be seen for some

time, on our social manners, on our criminal legislation, and on our religious convictions. We shrink from giving pain, and from its contemplation as a punishment, even when we feel that it is deserved. In our social intercourse, our sense of duty is often not strong enough to make us utter disagreeable truths; we need not ask how it would be if all such sense of duty were extinguished.

But the social tendencies just referred to, serve to set in light the proper relative position of intellectual and moral truths—that as Civilization advances, the proper sphere for the latter does not narrow but widen—that the well-being and progress of society demand, not that their power should be relatively diminished, but correspondingly enhanced. As in every true man the influence of moral and religious motives becomes more deep, comprehensive, all-pervasive of his activity—of his very being—just as he advances in manliness, so must such influences become more deep, universal, all-pervasive in Society, as it advances in true Civilization. As Force and Law retire from the sphere of social life, social well-being demands that individual sense of duty, (which can live and thrive only in an atmosphere of sound and beneficent moral feeling), should fill and occupy their place.

IX.—DOUBT AND FAITH.

"BEFORE the investigation of physical phenomena can begin, a spirit of scepticism must arise, which, at first aiding the investigation, is afterwards aided by it." Such is Mr Buckle's theory of the genesis, function, and development of Doubt or Scepticism. Let us now look at this deeply momentous question, not with a view of direct controversy with Mr Buckle, but simply towards ascertaining the true state of the case.

"All things are double," saith the son of Sirach, and one (if not always, each,) of every pair implies the opposite. The Relative implies the Absolute. The Negative implies the Positive; bitter, sweet; pain, pleasure; evil, good; and Doubt, Faith. There can never be a negative without a positive, and the negative can never be broader or deeper than the positive. The depth of the shadow is always proportioned to the intensity of the light; and it is strictly and always dependent on that intensity. How faint the shadow cast by the moon, compared with the shadow cast by the sun!

Doubt has a great function. It bears a testimony, not else to be borne. Are we now afflicted with a Scepticism—a Pyrrhonism—more sweeping, all-devouring, than the world has ever before known? It only testifies to the wider sweep, the profounder reach of Faith. Doubt implies faith,

—implies faith preceding it, wherever it extends. Wherever doubt fixes, there faith has been before it. In view of these facts, we may look with the less surprise on the unprecedented sweep of Modern Doubt, with the less alarm on its unwonted prevalence. In both its pressure and its range it is the index of contemporary Faith. Nor this alone; it reacts on Faith as well as indicates it. It purifies, deepens, and strengthens that which it would subvert. The dependence of Doubt on Faith is yet farther seen in this, that its type, in any age, will be found corresponding to the prevalent type of Faith. Levity or seriousness will characterise Doubt, according as the Faith of the age is shallow or deep. Thus, the depth of tone, and moral earnestness of the scepticism of our time, as compared with the levity of the eighteenth century infidelity, only corresponds to the superior depth and earnestness of the living faith of the time. These conditions, which Doubt certainly observes, and cannot but obey, deserve to be marked, equally by the enlightened believer, as by the confident sceptic. To duly understand and appreciate them would relieve the one from much groundless anxiety, and check in the other, the weakness of much premature and vain-glorious triumph.

If we would judge rightly of Doubt, then, we must first recognise Faith. Faith stands contrasted to distinct knowledge and exact science. Its soundings are deeper, as its reaches are higher. Its domain is outlying. It deals with the Intangible, the Unseen; with the unstoried Past, the illimitable Future. Faith is thus, from its nature, liable to error. It has a vast open side, by which it is ever in danger of passing off into credulity. Doubt, in its initial stage, is a call on Reason to test the validity of Faith. What we regard as Faith may be only Credulity; and it is the normal (and inestimable) function of Doubt to explode credulity. But a function, delicate, in proportion to its value. A mental exercise full of peril, as the truth, and the interests at stake, are momentous. Doubt will attend a living advancing Faith, as the shadow attends the moving body. Faith may be but a dim instinct, a blind following, till it pass through that sifting, verifying, process. We do not say that those who have never doubted cannot believe, but they can give no account to others or themselves of the grounds of their Faith.

Thus prepared to find the activity of Doubt commensurate with that of Faith, if not to recognise it as a necessity that it should be so, we now inquire—What it is that will keep Doubt to its normal function, and preserve it from attacking what it belongs to it only to ascertain and purify? A difficult inquiry, truly; one demanding, in order to a clear answer, a distinct discrimination of the sphere and functions, respectively, of Faith and Reason. A task this not to be formally entered on here; not to be attempted in more than the barest indication.

The sensuous understanding is the instrument of exact science; and, in the case of the well instructed, Faith here gives place to knowledge, as science extends. In the uninstructed, Credulity covers Nature, so

far as Nature elicits any mental exercise at all. Nature abhors a vacuum, and, in the infancy of science, superstition held in possession vast fields from which it has now been wholly dislodged. Not merely so; superstition has retreated from a much wider space than science has yet occupied. Before the instructed eye its half-luminous mists have cleared away from her deepest recesses and her far horizon. The temper of scientific men now is, to admit nothing but distinct knowledge—to accept nothing that cannot be proved.

A sound and healthy state of mind where the sensuous understanding is the proper organon. But, are we, therefore, to conclude that it is superstition or credulity to accept *anything* that cannot be proved? That conclusion would be warranted only by our being perfectly sure that there is nothing in the universe but what can be weighed, measured, or computed. But so far from being sure of this, we know that there are things which cannot; know it in the most intimate form of all knowledge—it is matter of consciousness. Who shall measure the force of love or of hatred, sound the depths of sorrow, or limit the compass of enjoyment! Here is something which we know refuses to come within the compass of our scientific formulæ; something—much—of what makes up the daily inner life of ourselves and our innumerable fellows of the human family. We cannot deny it, we dare not doubt it; or we may as well doubt our own existence. And this, which is so deeply real in ourselves,—may there not be such Reality elsewhere? Similar consciousnesses to ours, but of higher powers and wider scope? Is it credulity to conclude there may be such, or to believe there are such, as it is credulity to believe, for example, in the existence of centaurs or satyrs? If we make it a question of experience, in the sense of the sceptic, we find that the one conclusion is quite in harmony with our experience, while the other is not.

We here arrive at a point of view from which Existence is seen separating into two vast domains—the domain of Nature, which is the field of Science, and the domain of Consciousness, which is the field of Philosophy and Faith. In regard to the first, it is a sound canon to hold our knowledge always subject to scientific correction, and accept conclusively only what is scientifically established. But, apply this canon to consciousness, and what ensues? That we can have no certainty beyond our own, and no *scientific* certainty even there. If we will accept nothing save the conclusions of exact science, we must, as regards the highest order of existence, that of rational being, be for ever shut up within the narrow sphere of consciousness and observation. In regard to Nature, science carries us much deeper and much higher than observation, but in regard to living consciousness, it can never carry us further. Yet here is a world to which our deepest instincts point; to which our highest and noblest aspirations tend. Whether we send our thoughts backwards or forwards, we soon pass the bounds of the observed and

the provable. Yet dare we conclude there is nothing beyond? The mind recoils from such a conclusion, and in that very recoil falls back on Faith; demands it. Here the function of Doubt is not to pre-occupy the mind; it is that of inspector and guard. It puts Reason on the alert to keep out pretenders and turn out intruders. When it goes beyond this; when it denies to Faith a sphere, it transcends its function, becomes abnormal; becomes, in fact, a disease. We must accept something beyond and beneath what our science can ordinate—something which cannot be proved—else our science wants a basis. And whatever we accept can be matter only of Faith. Faith here is not antagonistic to Reason; on the contrary, Reason reposes on it, and feels that it must. Finite in its range, as inhering in a finite subject, it can deliver itself from endless contradictions no otherwise than by accepting what only Faith can recognise. Reason has still a funtion here, but it is not destructive. It is only discriminative and critical. It is to protect Faith from being imposed on by the Absurd and Contradictory.

But must not the range of faith become limited, as that of science extends? Not within its own appropriate sphere. On the contrary, as the horizon of science extends, that of faith keeps widening still beyond. Faith is twin-sister to sympathy; and the progress of science, and the consequent advance of society, do not more certainly widen and deepen the scope of human experience, than that experience calls aloud for a corresponding expansion and deepening of Faith. Our Modern Doubt is but the measure of this need. It is its anxious, or its querelous cry. The wider and deeper sympathies and yearnings of humanity must be met by something other than humanity or nature supplies. Remove or displace their only sure resting place and refuge—the bosom of a Divine Father—and every nook and cranny of the world shall ring with the wail of our despair. The poet's ear has caught this deep wail of our times and he has imaged it in—

> "An infant crying in the night:
> An infant crying for the light:
> And with no language but a cry."

X.—A DIGGING FOR THE ROOT OF MORAL SCEPTICISM.

Of the mistakes in which the settled Sceptical or infidel spirit originates, the grossest is, that by rejecting or discrediting the Scripture Revelation, we rid ourselves of the difficulties attaching to belief in a Divine Government of the world. It is not the Scripture Revelation that has raised such difficulties; they are found in the constitution of

the world, in the condition and relations of many of the animal tribes, and especially, in the condition of man. They culminate in the existence, and dire effects and issues of moral evil; which remains an universal, stubborn, irreducible fact, not less after we have discarded the Scripture Revelation than before. Not less, do we say? Nay, much more. The Christian Revelation may, on the one hand, have deepened the pressure of this great enigma, by disclosing to us the depth, the virulence, the all-devouring malignity of moral evil, but, on the other hand, it ought to be remembered, that it supplies the only key to the moral anomalies (as they appear to us) which exist, altogether apart from the facts and declarations of the Scripture Revelation, in the constitution and state of the world. If the Scriptures declare, illustrate, and enforce the clear and necessary supremacy of one thing above all, it is the supremacy of the moral system. But the more clearly and fully we realize what a moral system is—what moral being and moral government, by their very nature, involve—the more do anomalies disappear from that constitution of things amidst which we are placed. And they do not simply disappear; under this fresh light, they are seen as the types, adjuncts, or elements of the Moral System.

Speculative Scepticism arises from ignorance of the true nature and prime conditions of a moral system; and practical Scepticism—or a state of chronic rebellion against the essential conditions of a moral life—if it have not absolutely the same root, has one in close affinity with it. The difference lies mainly in this, that the one springs more out of the exercises of the intellect, the other from the pressure of the desires and the will. But be the Scepticism more of the one sort or of the other, it either disallows moral restraints, or misconceives of their essential character and necessary implications. In both cases there is a failure in the highest exercise of the rational faculty. Hence it is, perhaps, that the "sinner" and the "fool" are constantly used in Scripture as interchangeable designations. Doubt has its function, but chronic Scepticism or infidelity is a disease—a perversity of the Moral Reason at least, —if it have not a still deeper rooting in the heart and will.

Settled religious Scepticism, thus originating either in ignorance of the true nature and requirements of a moral system, or in practical rebellion against its laws and limitations, becomes a matter of the deepest social importance. It is so, because our whole voluntary conduct in society depends on what we accept or believe as truth, and on what we recognise as matter of moral obligation. And, as we have before had occasion to remark, the urgency of such clear personal guidance becomes ever greater as the range of personal liberty is extended. Hence, if the "influence of moral truths" is found, in any case to diminish with the progress of society, this, so far from meriting to be recognised as a law of that progress, is to be taken as clear indication and warning that progress has taken an unhealthy direction.

One of the prevalent forms of Scepticism—and one lying very near the root of the malady as a chronic evil—is an abiding and practical non-recognition, or denial, of the wisdom and beneficence of the conditions under which, at least, the great majority of men have to live and act. If so much is not said, yet are these habitually regarded as unfavourable—as against our interest, our progress, our advancement, our well-being. This state of feeling is—wherever it obtains settled possession of the mind—neither more nor less than practical atheism. But it is, generally, in great measure, due to ignorance of the distinctive nature of moral action, and the true object—as regards those placed under it—of moral law. Such misconceptions are rooted deep in human thought, and imbedded in human speech. Innumerable terms of contrast embody them—"Favourable" and "unfavourable," "advantageous" and "disadvantageous," "facilities" and "difficulties," &c. Few recognise the necessity of difficulty and hardship, as well as of advantages and facilities. Yet, until this is done, we have got no true idea of life—are ignorant of the very alphabet of moral knowledge.

For, let us just only consider what sort of a being man is—that he is not created full-grown—that he is a creature whose powers are to be evoked, developed, and disciplined. He begins life as an animal; and, without hindrances and difficulties, as well as opportunities and facilities, he would continue to live and demean himself as an animal. He is raised, and can be raised, only by means of checks to the current of animal appetite and desire,—through temptations to be resisted, on the one side, through difficulties to be overcome, on the other. As matter of fact, do we not see that, in countries where his natural wants are supplied with least difficulty, he rises least, or has sunk nearest to the animal level. It is not an evil to have difficulties to contend with; on the contrary, it is a blessing; it is a necessity of our being. No one will ever become a man without them. The question then becomes one of kind and measure, and it were an impeachment of Providence, to say that God leaves difficulties absolutely insurmountable in the way of any man. At the very worst, there is no one who cannot either vanquish the adverse conditions amid which he is placed, or die, carrying the appeal into that higher court of the Immortals, where—if every inequality is not compensated, every wrong will be redressed.

All obstruction or frustration of the true development of LIFE in any man, must spring from one of two sources—from himself or from others. The more the matter is investigated, the more will the fact come out into light, that it is not circumstances apart from conduct—his own or that of others. So far otherwise is it,—so far is nature or destiny (as the modern philosophic jargon has it) from being blameable, that the whole normal mechanism of the world and of society is one wondrous system of adaptations for the development of true manhood—for the nutriment and nurture of fullest and highest life. Nay, so skilfully and speci-

fically is this mechanism contrived and applied, that it is for ever counteracting and neutralising the frustrative and hostile, whether arising in ourselves or from others. In short, it will be seen, that what is fitliest denominated a Special Providence, hems in and acts on every man from his birth, or earlier, on to his final exit;—that this Providence is ever doing the best for every man, battering down the real hindrances that lie in his way, and beating off assailants. Put aside what man has done, and does in frustrating and traversing the divine plan, and not only would the constitution of the world be found in cunningest adaptation to the wants and requirements of the human race, but every man's position and social environment the best for him.

This much is clear then, Nature is not against man but for him. The constitution of the world is not chargeable with being in defect, or in antagonism towards him; or, in either, no farther than is necessary, and best adapted to make him MAN—to evoke, develope, strengthen, and mature all his distinctive powers and capabilities. This is not more shown in what is prepared for him, than in what is left to him, and required of him to do. The land is before him to go up and possess it; but he must have courage and energy, for there is jungle as well as prairie. If he would reap he must till and sow; if he would build he must quarry and hew; he must spin, and weave, and knit, and sew, if he would not revert to the primitive leaf and skin covering. But this MUST is not only beneficent; it opens up a limitless vista of progress and capability. Rightly understood and obeyed, it will carry him to all heights of achievement and realisation. It walls him off from wild Nature, and presses him onward to the possession of the whole realm of Civilization, with its so various and illimitable wealth.

And the law is not general merely, or is so general rather, that it embraces all particulars. The natural limitations are the best for the race; the specific (Providential) limitations, as well as facilities, are the best for every man. What God does for every man, is the very best that can be done *for him*, and His deep skill, and wondrous means and resources are in sleepless operation, controlling, neutralising, and transmuting even the hostile agency and influence of his fellow-men. The failure (where there is failure) is in the individual will; in declining the life-conflict which must be accepted by every man who would realise his true humanity, and not merely drift along on the moral level of the beast.

XI.—DUTY.

'Nevertheless, Evangelicalism had brought into palpable existence and operation in Milby Society, that idea of duty, that recognition of something to be lived for, beyond the mere satisfaction of self, which is to the moral life, what the addition of a great central ganglion is to animal life, No man can begin to mould himself on a faith or on an idea, without rising to a higher order of experience, a principle of subordination, of self-mastery, has been introduced into his nature; he is no longer a mere bundle of impressions, desires, and impulses, and whatever might be the weaknesses of the ladies who pruned the luxuriance of their lace and ribbons, cut out garments for the poor, distributed tracts, quoted scripture, and defined the true gospel, they had learned this—that there was a divine work to be done in life, a rule of goodness higher than the opinion of their neighbours; and if a notion of a heaven in reserve for themselves was a little too prominent, yet the theory of fitness for that heaven consisted in purity of heart, in Christian-like compassion, in the subduing of selfish desires. They might give the name of piety to much that was only puritanic egoism; they might call many things sin that were not sin; but they had at least the feeling that sin was to be avoided and resisted; and colour-blindness, which may mistake drab for scarlet, is better than total blindness, which sees no distinction of colour at all.—*Scenes of Clerical Life.*

DID you ever reflect how almost all the evil there is in the world, comes of people preferring their own ease or pleasure to doing their duty! If you never did, cast the thing over in your mind now; it is more than worth the trouble. There is the family—and if things are not right in the family, they will never be right in the wider spheres of the parish, the town, or the commonwealth. Take a family then; what is the worst form of injury any one can suffer—that of parental neglect—to be traced to? Clearly to a preference of personal ease or gratification to care for the well-being of the child. Were there such care—sustained by the industry, temperance, and frugality it implies---the children of the poorest would be in a very different state from that in which we now so often find them. They would have their trials and hardships, no doubt, but would these be morally more perilous than the temptations and dangers that beset the children of the rich? Few, capable of rightly estimating both, will be prepared to say that they would. As a matter of fact, all the worst—if not all the real evils--from which children suffer, are traceable to vice or indolence in the parents. Do they grow up ragged, dirty, wild; uneducated, untrained, uncared-for? Are they condemned to live in miserable hovels, to breathe impure air, to eat a scanty or unwholesome meal? Are they left to consort with vicious and corrupting companions, to acquire bad habits, to become a danger, a pest, a burden to society? In all such cases it will be found that the parents are either careless or vicious; that they have no adequate or constraining sense of duty; that self, in one form or other, predominates. Grant, that much parental incapacity is due to ignorance, what, in circumstances like ours, does ignorance imply? Clearly, this same fatal absence of a sense

of duty. Were that duly operative, parents would not allow themselves to remain ignorant. The means of knowledge, in this and all other relations, are ample, and brought, so to speak, to every one's door. But, perhaps, the very fact, that they sustain the parental relation, is due to an unlicensed indulgence of animal appetite. In such cases, now so numerous, the very foundation of the family institution is destroyed. And why? Because low gratification overbears the sense of duty; yea, the very sense of self-respect, which even a pure instinct of humanity inspires. Whatever most afflicts us, disgraces us, mars our civilization, neutralises and transmutes its blessings, is traceable to the want of a sense of duty;—the social evil in all its forms, drunkenness, extravagance, bankruptcy. Wherever we find an evil from which society suffers, there, at its root, do we find gratification first—duty postponed, or nowhere.

Do we look at wider social relations,—at the neglect or oppression of the poor by the rich,—at the preference of splendid mansions, gay equipages, luxurious establishments to expenditure for improving the homes of the people, and, in general, for ameliorating their condition? Do we look at the dissipation by landlords—in luxury, in gambling, in the various fashionable forms of pleasure—of the revenues derived from the land, whilst no suitable house accommodation is provided for the labourers, and they are left to find it where they may or to consort as beasts? It is ever the same cause,—the sense of duty is in abeyance, and the craving for gratification predominant.

We need no deep research—no process of abstruse reasoning to conduct us to this conclusion. The fact is so simple, direct, and obvious, that, but for its striking relation to modern social theories, it would not be worth while formally to set it forth. But, in view of Buckleanism, which makes knowledge the grand regenerator of Society—in view of Utilitarianism, which makes pleasure the one end of life—this great pervasive principle has a deep and telling significance. That our social evils are clearly traceable to the absence of a proper sense of duty—are every day becoming more and more so—is surely a fact adapted to reveal pretty clearly what those theories are worth.

Is Knowledge the appropriate and sure corrector of those evils? Then they should now be disappearing at a rapid rate indeed. The increase and diffusion of knowledge are altogether unprecedented, yet our social evils, instead of yielding to this power have rather grown along with its growth. This coincidence nowise warrants the conclusion that they are caused by knowledge, but it does show that knowledge is not alone necessary in order to their cure. In order to that, we need something adequate to induce right action. People require, not merely to know truth—not merely to know what is right,—they must feel it obligatory to do what is right. The sense of duty must be paramount. It must regulate the pursuit of gratification. The love of ease and pleasure must be combated, and nothing less than a sense of duty will nerve to the combat.

The idea of a life of warfare, of struggle, of self-denial is not, *prima facie*, welcome to any one, yet that such is the normal type of this actual human life of ours, is true notwithstanding. In no age or country has man been allowed practically to forget that it is so. Conflict may have been degraded; have been transferred from the soul to the intellect and from the spirit to the body. In times of civilization and culture we have it in the form of party and polemical warfare. In barbaric times, in literal, deadly, fighting, carried on as the great business, if not the highest end of life. Still in this inextinguishable spirit of combativeness—through all its phases, down even to its most brutalized debasements—we have a great testimony. A testimony to the deepest moral fact and requirement of our nature—a testimony to the fact that conflict is a necessity of this present mortal life of man. Not a necessity alone. Conflict is noble, when of the right kind; and through it only can a title to true nobility be earned. In the light of this, much is cleared up, else difficult to account for. We can see how war has been deemed noble through all ages of the world's history; how the Homeric combats—little above the level of those of wild beasts—could be invested in such a noble vehicle of poetry. In all this there is the great, deep, inextinguishable testimony, that man's life has a higher object than mere pleasure or enjoyment. To find man's feelings and his imagination so much higher than his deeds—to find that, unless where sunk to the most debased condition, never have those come down to the level of these—is not this a decisive testimony to the grandeur of his destiny? Even when arraying bloody war in all the glories of imagination, what does this hiding the horror of its ghastly details, suggest—what, but that a higher warfare is proper to man. If there had not been a "good fight" to be fought, the bad could never have been made to stir such a sense of the grand and noble in any human soul.

A great moral warfare is legitimate, is urgent, therefore is it possible to present warfare with the sword as noble? That warfare is first of all inward—with our natural love of ease, and self-gratification. Only through the spiritual conflict—conflict of the spirit with the evil tendencies of self—can there be the right training for waging war with the evil that has to be combated and beat down in the world. Clearly no otherwise; for it is with the injustice and the cruelty which spring from human indolence and selfishness, that the "good" warfare has to be waged. But we will never combat these, either in the right spirit or with the right weapons, until the causes whence they spring are dried up in our own bosoms. Then we are prepared to war, not with the persons of our fellow-men—not primarily, with their opinions—but with the sin that is in them, and the evil that they do. For this, Christianity, and it alone, trains, equips, and arms. And, in a subordination of our love of ease and pleasure, to the demands of Duty, this training must begin. A practical sense of duty is its primary, indispensible requirement.

Yes; in the dawn—in the ascendancy of the sense of duty, as the ruling

force in the mind, is found the beginning of the TRUE AND PROPER LIFE OF A MAN. Failure here, is failure in the very end and purpose of our being. A sense of duty is the first mark that differentiates the ELECT from the REPROBATE. The stones of the spiritual edifice are LIVING STONES, and all who fail to be so alive, must

> "Be cast as rubbish to the void,
> When God hath made the pile complete."

A sense of duty, duly obeyed and honoured, will make service a delight, will conduct at length to that mount of beatitude, where—

> "Serene will be our days, and bright,
> And happy will our nature be;
> With love as an unerring light,
> And joy its own security."

XII.—IS THE NEW TESTAMENT MORALITY PRACTICABLE.

BY many lines of inquiry we have been conducted to the conclusion—that, granting to all other agencies and influences their due value, it is only by the acceptance and observance of the Christian Morality in our individual and social life, that our social evils can be cured, and a state of permanent and all-pervasive social health established. But we have here to confront a difficulty—to meet an objection—with which we have not had hitherto to grapple.

A theory is zealously propagated by some, who, in these days, claim to be our advanced thinkers, to the effect, that the standard of life, as laid down in the New Testament, is a lofty ideal, but only an ideal, not fit to be put in practice.* That the renunciation by the Apostles of "worldly ambitions and interests, and the indifference they inculcated, to human needs, etc., arose from the impression which had become deeply fixed in their minds—that the end of the world was at hand." That, grounding thus on a misapprehension and mistake, it is inapplicable to ordinary human life, and incompatible with the requirements of society, in a world which abides and anticipates an indefinite futurity. The notion that to act on Christian motives, and live up to the Christian standard, is obligatory, lies, we are told, at the root of that oscillating, indeterminate, and morally disastrous life of compromise which so many professed Christians lead,—"living confusedly in two worlds—fluctuating distractedly between Cæsar and God—their body and limbs, business and pleasures under the same law of a

* Ethics of Christendom, *Westminster Review*, January, 1852. Kingsley's Novels and Poems, *National Review*, January, 1855.

morality quite secular, the soul and its eternal affairs sitting apart in a love quite spiritual." "Which of us," it is asked, "has not felt this distracting antagonism? How many has it not driven to a rejection of all real belief in the Christian revelation? How many more has despair of explaining it, deadened into an apathetic acceptance of Christian doctrines as fatal as their rejection—nay, shall we not say more fatal because more final."

Now there is doubtless a measure of exaggeration in these representations, yet the question raised is most important, and most intensely practical. If there is to be incertitude here, it will carry in it the most serious and far-reaching consequences, both to the individual and to society. The question, therefore, is not to be shirked. On the contrary, it demands in every relation, to be fully investigated. Let us look first at the alleged extent of the evil.

These writers assume it to be commensurate with that whole section of the Christian world which accepts the Christian morality as the authoritative rule of life, whilst the distracting influence is felt, and operates in generating a fatal scepticism, widely beyond. The pulpit proclaims the one standard, and we pretend, and perhaps ineffectually try to live by it, yet practically recognise and act on a quite different one "in the forum and the street."

Now we readily admit that this is to a great extent true. But it is a very hasty—and, as we hope to show, unwarranted—conclusion, that the case is so because the New Testament standard of morality (professedly received as binding), is impracticable. Before such an assumption is accepted and proclaimed, it might be well to inquire whether the standard has been rightly understood—whether, rather, it has not been greatly misapprehended. Nothing, at any-rate, is more common than to meet with the grossest misapprehensions (and consequent misrepresentations) of the Christian morality among the class of writers from whom we have quoted. Thus, for example, Mr. Buckle says,—"Every Christian professes to believe that it is good to be ill used and buffeted; that wealth is an evil, because rich men cannot enter the kingdom of heaven; that if your cloak is taken, you must give your coat also; that if you are smitten on the one cheek, you should turn round and offer the other. These, and similar doctrines, the early Christians not only professed, but acted up to and followed. The same doctrines are contained in our Bibles, read in our Churches, and preached in our pulpits. Who is there that obeys them?"* Another writer of the same school tells us, that the Apostles inculcated indifference to "human culture and affections," as well as to "human needs"—an assertion which every one, who has any just notion of what either true culture, or the deepest human affections are, knows to be grossly, and even ludicrously incorrect. Indiffer-

* *Fraser's Magazine*, May, 1859. See also "On Liberty," by John Stuart Mill, pp. 74, 76, 87, 93, passages too long and desultory to be quoted here.

ence to human affection! The New Testament writers lay more stress on "love," than any other class of writers whatever. They declare it to be the deepest spring and source of all right activity; they proclaim it to be the fulfilling of the law; they pronounce all exterior obedience and service to be, in its absence, vain. And what culture equal to the course of moral discipline they set forth and enforce—a discipline embracing, not only all conduct, but all thought and feeling—a discipline dealing primarily and directly with the heart.

Do they discourage knowledge or inquiry? On the contrary, does not this single precept—"prove all things, hold fast that which is good" —oblige every man to cultivate both, to the utmost practicable extent?

Three conditions, at least, must be fulfilled ere the moral teaching of the New Testament can be properly understood. 1st, A man must be able to apprehend its true principle, under the special modes of putting and illustration adopted by Christ and his Apostle. 2d, He must distinguish between what He and they enjoin or prohibit, and what they simply pass by as not necessary, or as being beyond their object to prescribe and enforce. 3d, Having a clear apprehension of these distinctions, he will be prepared to make a third, scarcely less essential, viz., that between the morality of the New Testament, and its popular presentation from the pulpit, and apprehension in the pew.

1. When Christ tells us, that if any man will come after him, he must first "*hate* his father and mother, wife and children, &c.," or says—"If any man sue thee at the law and take away thy cloak, let him have thy coat also," no one who cares to know the import of his words (we will not except Mr. Buckle) would, for a moment, conclude that we should be best obeying him by acting according to their literal import. The object of such a putting is not to define duty, but to impress it on the mind and conscience. Often, in the first instance, to startle from the moral lethargy induced by arid conventions, because, until that is done, no impression whatever can be made. Once we have hold of the principle of Christian morality, we shall have little difficulty as to the modes of its embodiment, or the various means taken to enforce it. And that principle is surely set forth with the most explicit plainness—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." It was so under the old dispensation; it is so under the new. After enumerating a long list of Christian virtues, St. Paul adds —"If there is any other precept, it is briefly comprehended in these words—thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." "*Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore*, love is the fulfilling of the law." And yet John Stuart Mill can endeavour to persuade the world that the "ideal of the Christian morality is negative rather than positive, passive rather than active, abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good; and that 'thou shalt not' predominates unduly over 'thou shalt.'"

2. The second distinction requiring to be made is, between what the New Testament enjoins or forbids, and what it simply assumes as already matter of universal recognition, or as not coming directly within its scope and object. For example, the Divine Existence is everywhere assumed in scripture; so are also the common sentiments and moralities essential to the existence of civil society. It is from inattention to the plain principle just enunciated, that it has been objected that the New Testament nowhere inculcates patriotism. Such objections proceed on a misapprehension of the primary and main incidence of Christian teaching—which is on the individual in his *personal* relations to God and his fellows. Christianity leaves all due authority, parental, municipal, regal, in the full use of all its proper and necessary means and instruments. A simple case will show the absurdity of any other conclusion. Were a child to smite his father on the one cheek, would it be Christian duty in the parent to act—not, say, according to the letter, but—in the spirit of the injunction, "turn to him the other also!" In perfect consistency with the principle just stated, Christianity leaves the duties of the citizen where it found them, only enforcing them by higher motives and sanctions. This accounts for there being no formal condemnation of slavery in the New Testament. Social evils are there attacked, not directly, but through the inculcation of principles whose adoption and observance would infallibly destroy them. The case is similar with respect to science, literature, and art. These pursuits, and elements of culture, are left to the natural operation of human faculty and susceptibility. And very safely and securely, seeing it is the nature of Christianity, and of the spiritual life which it evokes and nourishes, to quicken, expand, and elevate all human faculty and susceptibility. The history of literature, science, and art, among the Christian nations, furnishes as abundant vindication of the course taken in this respect by Christ and His Apostles, as does the history of the evolution amongst the most advanced and most Christian of them of personal, political, and religious freedom. Every genuine form and instrument of culture—every legitimate pursuit of the human mind—owes its highest stimulus, as well as its best material, to Christianity. The Christian morality lays its interdict on nothing which it is good for man, AS MAN, to acquire, possess, or enjoy. On this negative side, it challenges the fullest scrutiny. On the other hand, it omits nothing proper to the great and primary object of the Christian revelation—which is, to recover, guide, and discipline man in his religious and moral nature.

3. But is this the current apprehension of the Christian morality amongst those who accept it as their rule of life,—amongst those whose duty it is to expound and inculcate it? We have seen that the morality of the New Testament is grossly misconceived of by those who take exception to its being recognised as a standard of duty; but its spirit—in its double aspect of injunction and inhibition—is also misapprehended by a

large proportion of those who professedly accept it. They fail clearly to apprehend its proper incidence, as well as adequately to feel its obligation. And this is greatly due to an imperfect realization of its scope and objects on the part of Christian teachers. This, again, is very much the result of adherence to a rigid doctrinal system, and to traditionary conventions, along with an inadequate knowledge of the state and wants of current society. The Christian teacher requires fixity of principle, no doubt, but it is not less important that he should have an open eye to every new development of human knowledge, and of social life around him. For, as we shall see in our next paper, his capacity, not only to apply properly the Christian morality, but even to understand it, depends very much upon this. The Christian teacher, as is well remarked by Dr. Arnold, "ought fully to understand the nature of the society which he is to endeavour to influence; the relations of its several parts to one another; what may have disordered those relations; the views which the several classes entertain of each other and of themselves; and how far these are founded on prejudice or on truth." How little adapted the formal education our Christian teachers receive is to induce these qualifications, must be only too painfully obvious to every one who reflects on the matter. They would require to come more directly and practically into contact with industrial, commercial, and social life, in order intimately to know the present state and wants of society. But, in the absence of such knowledge, the Christian morality can never receive justice at their hands. One main reason, why so many have come to regard the morality of the New Testament as an impracticable ideal is, that the moral teachings of the pulpit are incommensurate with—are very much apart from, the moral wants of the time. The persons referred to do not find the Christian morality, either realised in its breadth, or applied at the exigent points of contact. This nowise excuses their gross and flagrant misconceptions respecting it, but it, in great measure, serves to account for them.

Were the Christian morality studied, clear of these three grounds of misconception, and with adequate mental and moral preparation, we should anticipate the result without any apprehension. We should then run no risk of a conclusion, such as we have been combating—a conclusion which divests the New Testament of all authority, and leaves Christians, as well as others, to regulate their lives, and shape their course by the current conventions of the time,—a conclusion which would not only discredit, but extinguish the martyr spirit, and with it all aspirations after a higher and a purer life than current opinion requires or sanctions.

XIII.—MORAL TRUTHS—IN WHAT SENSE STATIONARY, IN WHAT PROGRESSIVE.

THE Christian morality presents to us a standard, not of mere "ideal," but of practicable excellence; yet, at least, two qualifying elements, so to speak, must enter into a just estimate and appreciation of it as such. Morality, to a being like man, though absolute in its essence, is practically progressive. Its great elements or principles are fixed, but their apprehension—as to clearness, scope, and depth of impression—is variable. Hence, the standard, whilst the same, intrinsically, does not present itself as the same, either to all men, or in all states of Society. The foundation-principle of the Moral Law recognises this variation of capacity, and susceptibility; recognises and lays hold on it—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with ALL thy heart and soul," &c.; "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." And the Christian law, in all its outgrowth of detail, makes provision for, and meets, this advancing power of apprehension, and growing capacity for obedience.

It is the standard, as apprehended or seen by any one, that takes practical hold of him; and the law according to which the standard rises in the apprehension of the individual, precludes its appearing at a hopeless altitude. Moral insight is not like mere intellectual insight. It depends on other conditions; or rather, on the same, with others superadded. It implies capacity and attention, but it still more intimately depends on obedience. Light comes through obedience. We see more and more clearly, the more faithfully we act up to our present light. The standard rises with our moral stature, and is ever seen to be borne aloft and to beckon upwards. At every step the prospect widens, and another and higher crest of the mountain emerges.*

* This subjective element as it bears relation to, and affects the standard of morals, is entirely ignored by Mr. Buckle. The perverse impercipience of his treatment of the influence of moral truths among civilizing agencies, may be judged of from the following specimens. The extracts are from his chapter entitled, "Comparison between Intellectual and Moral Laws, as Respects the Effects Produced by Each on Society." "There is unquestionably nothing in the world which has undergone so little change as those great dogmas of which moral systems are composed. To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to love your neighbour as yourself; to restrain your passions; to honour your parents; to respect those who are set over you: these, and a few others, are the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons, homilies, and text-books which moralists and theologians have been able to produce. But if we contrast this stationary aspect of moral truths with the progressive aspect of intellectual truths, the difference is indeed startling. In reference to our moral conduct there is not a single principle now known to the most cultivated Europeans, which was not likewise known to the ancients. In reference to the conduct of our intellect, the moderns have not only made the most important additions to every department of knowledge, that the ancients ever attempted to study, but,

This law of the case makes obedience at once hopeful, practicable, and progressive. It gives unity to it under all degrees of light; at all stages of advancement—individual and social—obligation is ever felt to be commensurate with our apprehension of duty. But the apprehension becomes clearer and broader, proportionately to the heartiness with which we are striving to fill and occupy the present sphere of duty.

Two effects arise out of this law, each contributing to a deeper vitality and an advancing vigour in the moral life of society. The first respects the external relations of those who are in the van of moral progress. To be far a-head of one's fellows in conscientious realisation of duty—in its scope and obligations, will bring many severe tests and trials. To act up to a high moral standard, is the more difficult the farther beneath, or divergent from it, those are to whom you sustain social or domestic relations. Virtue becomes comparatively easy when in the family, in the social circle, in the community, convictions identical with your own, are found generally to obtain. But rarely will those who have regard to a high and comprehensive moral ideal, find anywhere such facility. The true Reformer still needs to have the martyr-spirit; and, in fact, it is only by suffering for the higher and broader truth that its supreme worth and obligation can be shown.

The second result respects the inner experience of those striving after a progressive moral life. Thus it is secured that this life is never allowed to stagnate. Fresh light is ever giving a fresh stimulus to a higher activity.

This is the meeting point of the Real and Ideal,—where the progressive conversion of the one into the other goes on. The moral Ideal is ever to become the Real,—exists, or is apprehended, to no other end. The moment it comes to be regarded as a mere 'Ideal'—admired for its beauty, but deemed practically unattainable—it ceases to be moral. It becomes purely æsthetic. It elicits sentiment, but with no corresponding or responsive activity. Such an Ideal, divorced, as it is, from all practical power becomes morally mischievous. There is a fatal rent between the active and susceptive powers of our being, whose tendency is ever to widen, until all the practical influence of a high moral standard ceases. Sentiment soars and revels in a world of its own, while the active life creeps uncertainly or tortuously along on the dull, common earth!

Through this progressive realization of truth and duty—both Habit, in the individual life, and Custom in society, are kept from becoming tyrannous. Unless the moral perceptions be gradually broadened, unless

besides this, they have upset and revolutionised the old methods of inquiry . . . . and have created sciences, the faintest idea of which never entered the mind of the boldest thinker antiquity produced. . . . Since civilization is the product of moral and intellectual agencies, and since that product is constantly changing, it evidently cannot be regulated by the stationary agent; because, when surrounding circumstances are unchanged, a stationary agent can only produce a stationary effect."—*History of Civilization in England, by Henry T. Buckle*, vol. i., pp. 163, 164, 165.

the moral standard is seen still to rise and expand, Habit will, ultimately, carry the individual, and Custom society, back under the dominion of those natural forces, from which—operating in their subordinate function and place—they had helped to deliver them. The popular adage regarding fire, that "it is a good servant but a bad master," is equally true of both. They are handmaids to virtue, and are most valuable aids and auxiliaries while kept to their proper sphere and place. But allowed the ascendancy—admitted to rule—they crush out that very life, of which they ought to be the support and fence And thus may we see that the course of safety, individual and social, lies in the mean between a dogged adherence to usage and custom, on the one hand, and the elimination of every moral element from public opinion, on the other. The Conservatives would condemn us to one extreme, John Stuart Mill and his disciples would carry us over to the other,—but, having this in common, that they are both alike fatal to the true and progressive moral life of society. "Extremes meet" much oftener than we dream of.

The extrusion of the moral element from public opinion—even the weakening of that element, relatively to other forces—would be a process socially disastrous beyond any other that is possible in an age of refinement and advanced Civilization. And, the greater the exterior Civilization and refinement, only the more disastrous would this process be. Rome, during the decline of the Empire, presents us with a most impressive illustration of this. In such circumstances the moral sentiments do not formally disappear; retaining their form they gradually lose their essence. They are still recognised as matter of sentiment (have a certain social and exterior homage accorded them) after they have ceased to be felt as matter of obligation. They keep some hold on the imagination long after they have quitted the conscience. But the process—though it may be a slow one—is one of certain death. As we see in trees; first the pith dies, then the central wood; yet there will be life under the bark, and blossom on the branches, long after all within is rotten and hollow.

And thus we may see a reason, why the nations in which God is carrying on a great process of moral education—fostering and developing a moral life—should never be permitted to be long at rest. A settled state of quiescence and security would neutralise this process. We see how the long reign of Custom—a state of intellectual, social, and political fixity—has extinguished almost every spark of moral life in the Chinese. The civil war, which has now for many years been going on, spreading over the empire, and, contemporaneously with it, those repeated conflicts with the western and progressive nations, may be the initiatory process—harsh but indispensable—towards once more awakening a moral life in that vast, and long dormant, community. So, too, may we not believe, that our conquest of India, and the fearful conflicts with its peoples which our presence and rule there have induced, are the first rude shocks towards a great intellectual and moral awakening?

And thus are we permitted to draw hope for the world from those terrible events which have burst forth—at so many points, and so unexpectedly—in these recent years. They are indications that the reign of moral torpor and intellectual stagnation is near its close. But these conflicts are the issues, as well as the signs and harbingers, of moral life. Indeed, wherever there is agitation the stimulus is moral, directly, or in the way of reaction. Wherever there is agitation, it is either from Good struggling for the mastery over Evil, or from Evil having reached the point beyond which it cannot, by reason of the very constitution of things, go on any longer—the point at which its self-destructive forces are brought into play.

But, without earnest and advancing moral convictions, good men would not have heart or courage, either to resist or assail—they would "jouk and let the ja' gae o'er." More than this, in the absence of fresh and earnest moral convictions—under the conduct which must, in that case, inevitably follow—everything entitled to the name of goodness would soon perish. Passivity,—neutrality,—does not consist with moral life in a world where evil abounds,—"He that is not for the right is against it." The warfare of Good with Evil grounds on so profound a necessity that, in this relation, even the Prince of Peace Himself, came "Not to send peace on earth, but a sword."

And if we would trace this moral earnestness—this felt and expressed necessity of advance, of conquest, of war with evil, this intolerance of stagnation, to their source, we shall find that source to be the Christian faith. For, as a matter of fact, do not whatever of intellectual activity, of energy, of advanced and progressive civilization is found among men, cluster around Christianity. Have not all these been now, for many centuries, more and more concentrating where Christianity most exerts a direct or derivative influence. Mohammedanism is spent, as we know to our cost, by the blood and treasure we have expended to prolong the feeble, waning life of the "sick man." Braminism is effete, Buddhism has ceased to be an energising power. How,—if Christianity is only a phase of naturalism,—how does it happen that it alone, of all religions that have arisen among men, has power, either effectually, to conserve the gains of the Past, or to stimulate in a still advancing progress? All other religions have become impotent for any purpose we can recognise as a social good; and whatever force is now operating in the world, towards bettering the condition of man, as well as all agencies and institutions having this as their end or object, are traceable to Christianity—derive from it their vitality and vigour.

That spiritual and moral truths are, in the most pregnant and practical sense, progressive, is a fact "writ large" in the history of Modern Civilization. It is a great mistake—but one into which our sceptics are very apt to fall—to limit the influence of the Christian doctrine and morality, either to the "religious world," or to that sphere of human

activity which embraces religious agency and observance. Christianity exerts its most direct and potent influence on those in whom it becomes the germ of a new life. But it exerts a secondary, derivative influence, widely beyond. Its power is like that of the sun, and many who remain dark within, unpenetrated by its fervid beam, yet shine in beauty in its reflected light. It is the "river" in the vision of the prophet, wherever it comes, causing everything to LIVE. Scepticism, while denying its claims, has, notwithstanding, drawn from Christianity much, both of its scope, and its power of denial. Science, that, as respects religion, now bears itself so arrogantly, resembles the youth that raises his hand against his foster-mother.

XIV.—MR. BUCKLE'S PHYSICAL FATALISM.

In our eleventh paper we said—"This much is clear, Nature is not against man, but for him. The constitution of the world is not chargeable with being in defect, or in antagonism towards him; or, in either, no farther than is necessary, and best adapted to make him MAN—to evoke, develope, strengthen, and mature all his distinctive powers and capabilities." Now, as respects the largest and most productive portions of the world, Mr. Buckle has arrived at a conclusion diametrically the opposite of this, and based, as he assumes, on generalisations more profound and comprehensive than any hitherto attempted. "The evidence," says he, "that I have collected, seems to establish two leading facts, which, unless they can be impugned, are the necessary basis of universal history. The first fact is, that in the civilizations out of Europe, the powers of nature have been far greater than in those in Europe. The second fact is, that those powers have worked immense mischief; and that while one division of them, [viz., the extreme fecundity of nature in tropical climates] has caused an unequal distribution of wealth, another division of them [the grandeur and imposing character of the scenery and phenomena] has caused an unequal distribution of thought, by concentrating the attention upon subjects which influence the imagination. So far as the experience of the past can guide us, we may say, that in all the extra-European Civilizations, these obstacles were insuperable; certainly no nation has ever yet overcome them."*

Mr. Buckle denounces the adherents of Calvinism, because "they require us to believe that the Author of Creation, whose beneficence they at the same time willingly allow, has, notwithstanding his Supreme Goodness, made an arbritary distinction between the elect and non-

* History of Civilization in England, by Henry Thomas Buckle. Vol. I. p. 138.

elect; that He has from all eternity doomed to perdition millions of creatures yet unborn, and whom His Act alone can call into existence; and that He has done this, not in virtue of any principle of justice, but by a mere stretch of despotic power." Mr. Buckle says that this doctrine owes its authority among Protestants to the *dark*, though powerful mind of Calvin; and that Augustine, who systematised it for the early Church, appears to have borrowed it from the Manicheans, yet Mr. Buckle is himself the zealous propounder and advocate of a theory of physical fatalism, at least as rigid and relentless as the theological dogma which evokes, on his part, such indignation and contempt. The wide processes of induction which he pursues in his chapter on the Influence of Physical Laws, are all towards supplying proof "of the extraordinary, and, indeed, irresistible force, with which the powers of nature have controlled the fortunes of man."—(p. 86). His generalisations (with some significant exceptions), range over the fields occupied by the ancient civilizations, including those of the aboriginal Americans. We select one or two of his most prominent examples. Of the people of India, he says, that—"condemned to poverty by the physical laws of their climate, they have fallen into a degradation from which they have never been able to escape,"—(p. 71). "*In India, slavery, abject, eternal slavery, was the natural condition of the great body of the people; it was the state to which they were doomed by physical laws, utterly impossible to resist.* The energy of those laws, is in truth, so invincible, that wherever they have come into play, they have kept the productive classes in perpetual subjection."

In Northern Asia man is kept to a state of hopeless barbarism, by the severity of the climate and the sterility of nature; but the opposite conditions are equally, if not more fatal. In Brazil, "amid the pomp and splendour of Nature, no place is left for man. He is reduced to insignificance by the majesty with which he is surrounded. The forces that oppose him are so formidable, that he has never been able to make head against them, never been able to rally against their accumulated pressure." There has, indeed, been introduced a certain amount of European civilization, but it occupies a mere strip along the coast. In the interior, the old state of things continues to obtain. "The people, ignorant, and therefore brutal, practising no restraint, and recognising no law, continue to live on in their old inveterate barbarism. In their country, the physical causes are so active, and do their work on a scale of such unrivalled magnitude, that it has hitherto been found impossible to escape from the effects of their united action. The progress of agriculture has been stopped by impassable forests, and the harvests are destroyed by innumerable insects. The mountains are too high to scale, the rivers are too wide to bridge, *everything is contrived to keep back the human mind.*"—(p. p. 95--96). We could go on, *ad libitum*, with quotations to the same purport, but we suppose these may suffice to

illustrate the claims of Mr. Buckle's Philosophy to replace the "superstition" and "empiricism" which have hitherto occupied the domain of History.

The point at which we have arrived in these somewhat desultory papers enables us to deal very summarily with this theory. We not only admit the influence of Nature, and of physical conditions on man, but (while denying such influence to be in any case necessarily crushing and degrading) we affirm both to be specific and great. According to Mr. Buckle, the two causes that, in tropical climates, seal the degradation of man are, (1), That, so great is the fecundity of nature, as to allow no scope for his energies being evoked in providing for his wants; (2) That the aspects of nature overwhelm his imagination, and prostrate his mind in superstitious terror. We may admit there are two such *tendencies*, and yet hold that the degradation of man, under the specified conditions is due, not, as Mr. Buckle assumes, primarily and inevitably, to the o'ermastering power of nature, but to something abnormal in man himself. It is not so much that nature is in excess as that man is in defect,—not so much that nature is on too great a scale, but that man is too little,—he is dwarfed by quite other causes than the tyrannous and resistless pressure of her powers. In these countries man is in a state far beneath that for which he is fitted by his faculties and capabilities. And it may be that he is so from the want of something, which, though nature can neither supply him with it nor deprive him of it, is yet the thing needed to enable him to cope with her forces, and subdue them to his service. On Mr. Buckle's own showing, man, in tropical climates, wants energy, and he wants knowledge. Endow him with these, and he will overcome both the tendencies which Mr. B. pronounces irresistible. The question is a question of fact; and in India (one of Mr. Buckle's decisive examples) *we are at this moment in process of overcoming them.*

And what is that agent which is adapted, at once, to infuse energy into the natives of tropical climates, and deliver them from crushing and degrading superstition? It is that one power which it is Mr. Buckle's object in all his inquiries and generalizations to relegate to a subordinate place among civilizing forces, and which it is his current practice to discredit or ignore. Christianity is that power. In tropical climates, the great body of the people are poor, spiritless, prostrate, enslaved. They are not properly MEN. It is Christianity that can make them men, by infusing the elements of true manhood, endowing with individual convictions, presenting new objects of desire, and giving such a sense of the value of those objects—such a passion for their attainment, as shall quicken into activity, and insure exertion.

The Bible is equally adapted to deliver those oppressed and degraded peoples from superstition—from the terror and prostration the gigantic features and forces of nature induce. The Bible gives the key to Nature.

It presents God as king over nature—as, by his power, setting fast the mountains—as riding on the whirlwind—as ruling the floods. It presents Nature—in her gigantic and minute agencies—as under the direction of His Providence. All the creatures are fed by His bounty. But, for man's wants he has made provision, higher and more various, as his powers and capabilities are higher. Above all, in the Bible God presents himself to us as a Father, asks man to be reconciled to Him—to confide in Him, and all shall be well. Evil shall be neutralised, or transmuted into good; and gradually, and growingly, shall he accomplish the destination of the race—"To replenish the earth and subdue it."

And, then, Nature—instead of being, even in tropical climates, too much for man—will be found beneficent in her exuberance. That so little exertion should be needed there to provide for the wants of the body, only harmonises with those climatic conditions which indispose to great exertion. To provide for intellectual and spiritual wants, entails less of bodily labour. The culture of the intellectual and moral being is promoted by conversation, by reading, by discourse, by reflection. For these, the hundred-fold exuberance of production, and the easily satisfied needs of the body, both as to food and clothing, will allow of abundant leisure. And thus, the inhabitants of tropical climates, when socially elevated and free, will find the elements of highest wellbeing and blessing, in that very bounty of Nature which Mr. Buckle has so strangely misinterpreted and defamed.

XV.—AUTHORITY.

WE have had repeated occasion to remark that the present civil war in America is ill understood (if it is not altogether misunderstood) by our public men and public writers, generally. To us it has all along appeared deeply significant. This terrible conflict—due to the rebellion of the South as its immediate occasion—is no mere fitful, accidental ebullition. On the contrary, it belongs to, and furnishes the most outstanding and extreme manifestation of one of the deepest and most pervasive tendencies in modern society. It is license against law, wilfulness against Authority. In the Southern States two systems, presenting, respectively, the extreme embodiment of principles the most intensely opposite, have been hitherto mechanically held together. Extremes meet, often in the sense of one producing another; and no more impressive example of this has occurred in the history of the world than is now presented in the Southern States. We have there, on the part of the dominant class, at once the most extreme assertion and the most extreme repudiation of Authority.

The whites assert, and claim to exercise in perpetuity, absolute power over their four millions of slaves. With the same breath they do this, and repudiate Authority over themselves. Nor is their conduct either so strange or so inexplicable as it, at first sight, would seem. Both claims spring from a common root—that root being LAWLESSNESS, or the repudiation of constituted, legitimate Authority. The Southern Rebellion, over which the sacred names of liberty and self-government are invoked, is of no very rare or exalted stock. It grounds on the same claim as that of every despot and every freebooter—the claim to be above law, and do as we please.

Self-assertion—passionate will, conflicting with authority, of which we have, in the Southern rebellion, the extreme exemplification—is one of the deepest and most pervasive social characteristics of our time.

The struggle for liberty—civil and religious—maintained now for more than 300 years, and which has in our day assumed such wide dimensions, could hardly have been carried on without some danger to another principle, as sacred and necessary to the well-being of society as that of liberty, viz., the principle of Authority. In the conflict with tyrannous Power there is danger of its being practically forgotten,—that Liberty requires Law as its guarantee and guard; and still more that law implies an Authority possessing the right and the power to enforce it.

"The right divine of kings to govern wrong," is a villainous figment. Yet is there a divine right of government. No particular Government is entitled to cover its defects, as no individual ruler is entitled to screen his errors, under such a plea. But, that government is an ordinance of heaven, is shown by the most conclusive of all proofs—that of its being a necessity to the very existence of society. The people have the right to determine the form of their government, and to say by whom they shall be governed; but, possessing and exercising these rights, they are not at liberty to give or refuse allegiance, to obey or break the laws as they please. "Order is heaven's first law;" and order implies Authority, —Authority, combining the right and the power to enforce obedience. But, it may be asked—and not impertinently—why argue a point so clear? Who questions Authority?—WHO questions authority? It may rather be asked—who does not? In our day authority is questioned everywhere, in all quarters; of all kinds; in all relations.

Foremost, we have Mr. Buckle passionately asserting that "Liberty is not a means to an end, but is an end itself;" while, under the name of "Protection," he as passionately denounces Authority—in the sacred and the civil sphere—as the "great enemy" of civilization and progress. We have John Stuart Mill striving at one and the same time to eliminate the moral element from public opinion, and to secure, at the hand of the civil power, entire immunity from punishment for the blasphemer. "It should be clearly understood," says Mr. Mill's expositor and admirer, Mr. Buckle, "that every man has an absolute and irrefragable right to treat

any doctrine as he thinks proper—either to argue against it, or to ridicule it. It matters not what the tenet may be, nor how dear it is to our feelings. If his arguments are wrong, he can be refuted; if his ridicule is foolish, he can be out-ridiculed. To this there can be no exception." Of course, the most malignant and the most depraved are to have full swing in ridiculing Christianity, and in blaspheming its Divine Author; no matter how great the outrage on public decency, or how revolting to the feelings of all good and virtuous men!

Such is the theory of liberty we are now challenged to accept, and our practice is largely instinct with the same spirit. Whilst the "high priests of literature" are thus indoctrinating the public mind, the accredited priests of religion are undermining and assailing the Authority of the Bible by every mode of attack. Reverence is dying out, and must die out—as Divine authority is ignored or disallowed. In our hatred of tyranny we are menacing Law. We have thoroughly delivered ourselves from superstition, but in our passionate assertion and exercise of liberty of thought, the divinest form of religion receives no better treatment than ignorant and blind credulity. The same spirit pervades all social and all domestic life. Between landlords and tenants, between employers and employed, there is now nothing but a money-bond. There is no watchful care, on the one side, and no devoted attachment, on the other. Self-assertion is rampant everywhere—the pursuit of selfish interests, and of the gratification of selfish desires. In families, the maintainence of authority becomes ever more difficult, through wives knowing better than their husbands, and children setting up the conceit of knowledge against the wisdom of experience.

Thus our necessary progress—the assertion of the right of the people against the tyranny of the despot—the advance of the young beyond the old in knowledge and culture—the progress of enlightenment and free thought in all departments of inquiry, all contribute to put the principle of Authority in peril. And one of the greatest and most difficult problems of the time is—how freedom and free progress, in all relations, can be conciliated with Authority.

Where intelligence is limited and communities non-progressive, the religious sentiments, under dexterous priestly manipulation, exercise great power. The dictates of Authority are endorsed by awe and fear, and the dormant intellect raises no questions. Under such mental and social conditions we have credulity and superstition, yet, along with them, submission and obedience.

But this state of things has entirely passed away from among all communities of the Anglo-Saxon stock—is rapidly passing away among all the Western nations. Once gone, it is as little to be recalled as the distaff or bridle roads, and its return no more to be desired. But in society there is no gain without its price; no advance without fresh risks incurred, corresponding to the step taken. Dogged conservatism is alike foolish and

wicked; yet we are not without note of an opposite danger, when so many among us need to be taught that rebellion and revolution are not things to be admired simply in themselves, and without reference to their occasion and object.

But, how is this danger to be met? Only, we believe, in one way—only through the ascendency of moral law over the minds of the people. Amid the breaking up and dissolution of old forms of thought, forms of Government, Churches, and Priesthoods, even legitimate authority runs great risk of being involved in the wreck; and can be saved only by a clear recognition of the authority of God. From Him all legitimate authority is derived—From Him, as Supreme Sovereign, is it that all other authority draws its sanction. If his authority is ignored, or disallowed, we have little to look for but anarchy in lower spheres,—insubordination in the family; a conceited individualism in the Church; capricious change in the State, issuing, ultimately, in the supremacy of the mob. The necessity for this homage to moral law—this practical recognition of Divine authority—increases as freedom extends. Divine authority is not only supreme of right in all human affairs—it is also the complement of human authority; and that would be a normal and healthy progress of freedom where, as human authority was limited, Divine Authority came in to occupy its place.

And to this homage, to an Invisible Authority, men become more and more susceptible as civilisation advances. When uncultured, rude, and ignorant men can scarcely rise to any conception of Invisible Power. In this state they are scarcely impressible otherwise than through the senses. The power of abstraction—of recognising invisible force—comes slowly, and still more slowly that of recognising an invisible Personality. But, in proportion as it grows, so does the capacity of being governed by law. In the rudest state of human nature, what rule there is, is the rule of the strongest. It is by pure force. The first—the most rudimentary—spiritual element that attaches itself to this, is that of hereditary authority. When the son of the chief is received as chief, though he may not be the strongest; something beyond mere Power is recognised in the ruler; there is the germ of the idea of Right. But this new element—distinct from mere force in the chief—this element of right implies Law; that there is something besides Power to which we owe obligation. At the next stage in the developement of the capacity to realise abstract or spiritual truth, men become capable of being governed by law, as it appeals to reason and the moral sense, and not simply by fear of the literal strong arm. They become *capable* we say; for whether they will yield actual homage to law apart from the fear of punishment, depends on the disposition. The mind must be in harmony with the law, ere obedience can safely be released from the pressure of force. So that it is necessary that there should be, not only the capacity of recognising Right, apart from the

compulsion of force, but a love of right *as* right. In this alone do we find the guarantee of a freedom, that shall be consistent at once with safety and indefinite progress. In this alone will be found the effectual check to that ultra-democracy—that supremacy of the mob—which many view as the dread goal to which political change is inevitably carrying modern society.

A healthy state of moral feeling is the guarantee of due homage to every legitimate authority. We will not refuse to "Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," if we "render unto God the things that are God's." With the sun in the centre, the whole system moves in harmony; not only the primary planets, but the smallest satellites and asteroids are kept in their proper orbits; even the comets, in their most erratic courses, own and obey the compelling power.

XVI.—HERO-WORSHIP.

FREDERICK, styled "the great of Prussia," had hitherto coquetted with philosophy, and spun webs of philanthropic gossamer. Suddenly he resolves on the invasion and seizure of Silesia, *because* Maria Theresa—a young woman of 24, recently married, and expecting soon to be a mother—had, by the death of her father, just become the occupant of the Archducal throne. Thomas Carlyle, who long since set himself to impress it on this generation that hero-worship is the only type of worship now remaining possible to us, is, as all men know, at present engaged in writing the life of Frederick. In his third volume, he thus summons us to the undraping of the statue, representing the young philosophic King at this crucial point of his history:—

"It is almost touching to reflect how unexpectedly, like a bolt out of the blue, all this (the news of the Emperor's death) had come upon Friedrich; and how it overset his fine programme for the winter at Reinsberg, and for his life generally. Not the peaceable magnanimities, but the warlike, are the thing appointed Friedrich this winter, and mainly henceforth. Those "*golden* or soft radiances" which we saw in him, admirable to Voltaire and to Friedrich, and to an esurient philanthrophic world—it is not those, it is "the *steel-bright* or stellar kind" that are to become predominant in Friedrich's existence; grim hailstorms, thunders and tornado for an existence to him, instead of the opulent genialities and halcyon weather, anticipated by himself and others! Indisputably enough, to us if not yet to Friedrich, "Reinsberg and Life to the Muses" are done. On a sudden, from the opposite side of the horizon, see, miraculous Opportunity, rushing hitherward—swift, terrible, clothed with lightning like a courser of the gods; dare you clutch *him* by the thunder mane, and fling yourself upon him, and make for the Empyrean by that course rather? Be immediate about it, then; the time is now, or else never!—No fair

judge can blame the young man that he laid hold of the flaming Opportunity in this manner, and obeyed the new omen. To seize such an Opportunity, and perilously mount upon it, was the part of a young magnanimous King, less sensible to the perils, and more to the other considerations, than one older would have been."

Such is the new creed in its full moral outcome and development, and we confess that our sorrow is greater than our wonder to find it such. One might become cheaply eloquent on its equal mischievousness and meanness, and it were a facile process to show that this doctrine of Opportunity might be made to excuse, if not glorify, any atrocity, whether of cupidity, lust, or crime.

It may be of more practical importance, however, to trace the full-grown tree to its early germ. It is of no sudden growth. It is a plant which has long been cherished and tended by Thomas Carlyle, and which has its roots deep down in his ethical system. Carlyle is known as the apostle of the worship of force—force of character claims his homage, however directed. This is really the religion which our great countryman has been now for thirty years promulging, and of which the foundation principle was enunciated in his famous parallel between Goethe and Shakspeare, viz., that moral and intellectual greatness or endowment, are "fundamentally one and the same." It is exceedingly instructive to mark the service rendered by this principle in the justification of Frederick. In order to compass his object, he has found it necessary, not only to rush into war with the young Archduchess, but to enlist the treacherous complicity of the Austrian General, together with the guilty collusion of other influential parties, including among them a representative of this country. Of the political morality of this dark transaction, Mr Carlyle has only this to say:—

"That the dice on both sides seem to be loaded; that logic might be chopped upon it for ever; that a candid mind will settle *what degree of wisdom (which is always essentially veracity), and what of folly (which is always falsity)*, there was in Friedrich and the others; whether, or to what degree, there was a better course open to Friedrich *in the circumstances;* and, in fine, it will have to be granted that you cannot work in pitch and keep hands *evidently* clean."

In the essay already referred to, Mr Carlyle notes as one "similarity between Goethe and Shakspeare (for the great is ever like itself) the majestic calmness of both;" their perfect tolerance of all men and all things; adding —"This too proceeds from perfect clearness of vision; he who comprehends an object cannot hate it, has already begun to love it." The assumption that intellectual and moral discernment and endowment are one and the same has thus its practical embodiment in the maxim that "whatever is, is right." Cleverness is virtue; power and worth are identical; and the one criterion of political morality is success.

This doctrine of the relation of insight and love is—notwithstanding the high authority from which it proceeds—only a one-sided doctrine. It drops out of view an essential element of the question. He that com-

prehends an object cannot hate it?—provided it be not hateful. But if it be hateful, the clearness of the comprehension will only make the hatred more intense. Carlyle's doctrine abrogates moral distinctions, for it is the mere intellectualist who is tolerant alike of "all persons and all things." A keen moral discernment is not more in love with good than it is intolerant of evil (as witness in the highest Example). The love cannot rise, but the hatred must deepen. They are co-relatives. There is no capacity of love without a corresponding capacity of hatred; nor can we ever love anything but we shall be prepared and ready—with corresponding intensity—to hate its opposite, if that opposite is presented to us.

Intellectual power is, as Carlyle says truly, the power of seeing, but moral endowment is something more than this. It is something more than the capacity of admiring, or even of loving. It involves the capacity of disapproval—the faculty of abstinence—the power of rejection. The one has relation to truth, the other to action. And, so far are the two from being identical, that the possession of the one nowise ensures the exercise or even the possession of the other. There may be great power of apprehending truth of certain kinds, without any very clear perception of right, and with still less of disposition to pursue it. These have long been familiar truths—accepted by general consent as ethical common-places. It has become needful to re-assert and insist on them, only because a powerful writer—who carries many along with him in blind unquestioning faith—grounds his boasted new Evangel on their practical rejection.

Perhaps the eyes of some, who have been fascinated by this "worship of force," may be opened to its true nature when they see it thus brought out to its naked and appropriate issue. When MIGHT is glorified and RIGHT goes to the wall, we have hero-worship in its full development. The system which begins with the assumption that mental power is virtue, culminates, quite legitimately, in the conclusion that it is only needful to discern and seize your opportunity in order to raise yourself to the level of the gods!

That Thomas Carlyle should have taken a course conducting to such an issue is, to us, matter of profound sorrow. Yet since so it is, and the error is not one of accident or of haste, it is doubtless well that the high priest of this new Evangel should himself have enthroned the idol and conducted the rites. It will (let us hope) open the eyes of many to the beauty of the old faith of self-renunciation and humility:—

"Howe'er it be, it seems to me,
'Tis only noble to be good;
Kind hearts are more than coronets,
And simple faith than Norman blood."

XVII.—THE CONDITION-OF-WOMAN QUESTION.

THERE is one question which—in view of the many unwonted and unwelcome features of our social life—the thoughtful amongst us feel often prompted to ask. Amid all our advances, Science, Civilization, and power over Nature, is it becoming easier to lead an unselfish, loving, noble life? This is no mere passing or exceptional question, though it may just now press with unusual emphasis, by reason of the deep and extended suffering which has overtaken large sections of our people. It is a question inevitably raised by what has become the chronic condition of great numbers —and of the female sex in particular.

We do not ask whether our unprecedented conquests over Nature, and command of her powers, have wrought greater happiness to a greater number. That is a subordinate and dependent question. Our material power will not long bring greater happiness, if it fail to bring greater nobleness. And, therefore, the most important of all questions that can be proposed in relation to it is —Has it made the nobler life more easy? We do not say, (be it observed), that a noble life can ever be set free from difficulty, for difficulty is implied in there being nobleness. But difficulties may be greater or less; and our conquest over Nature is constantly shifting their incidence, and changing their character. How do these affect Life, in the highest sense, and in the most important relations? Is a pure, unselfish life easier to be chosen, pursued, and carried to a noble issue now, than it was in other, and what we are inclined to consider, less fortunate days? In view of many of the outstanding features of our social state—we dare not say that it is. That many do not find it easier all will acknowledge. But, a large portion of those are vicious or imprudent—sufferers by their own fault—and we dismiss the rest under the convenient generalisation, that they are, (simply, in some way or other) unfortunate. We might ask now, as we have asked before—do the fortunate find it easier? Are not facilities also temptations? And are there not among the most wretched of the miserable, many "victims of facility?" As the means of gratification are multiplied, and the facilities for realising it increased, the pursuit becomes the keener. As, apparently, gratification—various, rich, piquant—can be reached by a short cut, the numbers increase, who, (at all conceivable and inconceivable, tangents), dart off in pursuit; careless alike of who may be knocked over and trodden down in their course, or who left to pine and starve behind! Is this an imaginary picture? Is it not rather but a faint etching of a wide-spread reality.

The number who actually desert those directly dependent on them by the closest natural ties is not small; the number of the strong who consume on selfish gratification what should go to feed and clothe wife and children is much greater. These, however, are still branded by common

consent as criminal or disreputable. But what shall we say to our thousands of strong-armed, clever, hardy young men who, year by year, push away to the ends of the earth, leaving thousands of young women who ought to be their mates behind? The Abbé Domenech, in his "Seven Years Residence in the Great Deserts of North America," tells us that, when the aged Grandfather is about to be left behind, his relations and friends assemble to bid him adieu. They then place a vase full of water near him with some meat, and some wood to feed the fire by which he is laid. "My children," he says to them "I am too feeble and too old to walk; our nation is poor, and you must travel to the land where you will find food. My days are numbered, and I am a burthen to my children. I cannot follow you, and I desire to die. Be of good courage, and do not think of me for I am no longer good for anything, and I shall soon depart to the land of shadows, to join my father and wait for my children." Our women—lone and left behind—are in the position of the old Indian, with many points of contrast in their surroundings, yet with how many of correspondence in their fate? What can we do for them?—what shall we do with them?—are the questions passed from lip to lip, and re-echoed on every hand, as shown in the last census returns, they exceed by half-a-million, the number of males in these islands. The cry of their need and their misery rings in all ears. The Press groans under the mass of schemes, appeals, and discussions which their case evokes. There is a call on the public to assist them to emigrate, but a high authority (S. G. O.) interposes the warning that many of them will be good for nothing in the Colonies. There is among our aspiring young men an increasing disinclination to marry, and our young women claim to be allowed to work alongside of those who refuse to work for them. But here too man presents to them the cold shoulder, and elbows them away.

It is hard! yet no one knows how to effect other than the faintest abatement of the evil. We can only rescue or help the units, while the thousands are left to struggle pine away and die, or become victims of the lust of those who should have welcomed them to home, and love, and all womanly duty. Such a state of things cannot have come on us without cause—cannot exist without responsibility, cannot, with our productive means and appliances, go on and become aggravated—without deep blame attaching somewhere. A first and large share of the blame is chargeable to our expensive style of living, lies at the door of all who lead or follow in the race of fashionable extravagance.

It is one question, whether you can afford it—though many do not much trouble themselves about any very accurate practical adjustment of the answer to that. But there is another question—though one that is, we fear, very seldom put—Can others afford that you *should* afford it? All extravagance is withdrawing from some one the means of betterment, either for body or for soul. But its mischief as a privative of good is not so great, perhaps, as that which accrues from it as a stimulant

to evil. Thousands are, through the force of imitation and example, drawn into the race, who *cannot* afford it; and thousands more are deterred from taking up house, because they find their means, relatively, too limited, and feel that they would lose caste by living on a humbler scale. But the mischief does not stop here. The same influence operates deeply, widely, most disastrously on the education and training of our young women—in many cases tending not to fit but unfit them for the spheres which are open to them—to unfit them for being real helpmates to the hard workers of the other sex, whether at home or in the colonies. Little do our wealthy, our successful—even our religious classes—realise the measure of their responsibility in this relation.

But there is, more specifically—amid the modern dislocation of the ties that formerly bound class to class—amid our growing freedom, and with it our growing selfishness—a deadening of the sense of man's responsibility. Woman was created because "it was not good for man to be alone," and the maintenance of the sex, in at least equal numbers, is the emphatic providential proclamation of the same truth throughout all ages. But the service of the sexes is reciprocal, and when man isolates himself, he does not merely suffer an injury, he inflicts a wrong. True, no rule can be laid down, applying rigidly to any individual, yet may we clearly descry a social canon. Liberty is ever amenable to law, and every one, in the social adjustments of his life, is bound to have respect to those social laws, which at once claim to be Divine, and so clearly authenticate that claim in social fact. But such responsibility has been little, if at all, felt hitherto by those on whom it more immediately presses. Indeed, nature provides a more direct stimulus. But in our advanced and refined civilisation we do nature systematic violence.

But lastly, blame attaches, most directly and most heavily, to all who, having the power, interpose direct obstructions to marriage, in the way of those who would marry could they but find homes wherein to live. But this question has been so often discussed by us, that we need only to mention it to identify the more direct incidence of this responsibility

We pride ourselves on our advancement, but with respect to many things, bearing most intimately on social weal, we have gone sadly back. We do not say that the Tudor laws—such as those that forbade the amalgamation of farms, and required at least four acres of land to be attached to every cottage meant for the accommodation of a family—now could, or ought to be restored. Yet, there was a noble spirit of justice in them, though, it may be, rudely embodied. We fail to justify our greater freedom, when that freedom fails to carry along with it a spontaneous discharge of social duty, correspondent to that which laws, such as those referred to, were meant to secure. Extending social freedom demands a corresponding deepening of the moral sense as bearing on all the relations of life, else the weak will inevitably suffer from the relaxation and limitation of Authority and Law.

XVIII.—THE CONDITION-OF-WOMAN QUESTION—WOMAN IN RELATION TO MAN.

THE question of the proper position and function of Woman, with relation to Man, is one which in this inquiry we cannot escape. It lies directly in our way, and demands to be dealt with. We cannot decline it, and as little can we discuss it superficially; for that were all the same as to discuss it unfaithfully. Our readers must, therefore, bear with us if we have to carry the inquiry into somewhat wider and deeper relations than they may have been accustomed to regard it as involving. We put aside, then, at once and decisively, all such idle and irrelevant questions, as—Whether woman's powers are equal to those of man—and, because the proper question is not one of equality but of adaptation. The powers and susceptibilities of the sexes are not in any proper sense commensurable. The one is the complement of the other. It was not good for the man to be alone, therefore God provided an help meet for him.

Sex, in its animal characteristics and implications, may be here simply assumed. It is the one condition of the reproductive preservation of species in all the upper grades of the animal kingdom. It is with reference to man, as a being possessed of higher than animal powers, that we have now to do with the relation of man and woman—with their intellectual, affectional, and spiritual reciprocations. For sentimental description we have as little leisure as capacity. Those of our readers who have a taste for that sort of commodity, will find it *ad libitum*, in the novelists and poets. Under the present constitution of human nature, it is, in one respect, irrelevant to remark that woman is to man a danger as well as a boon. Yet of the fact there can be no question; and it is one pointing to the deepest elements in that moral economy under which we are placed. It is just an exemplification (though one among the most significant) of the great principle, that every privilege bears in it a testing element, and that our highest blessings may be, through abuse, converted into our deadliest bane. The danger now referred to had signal illustration, in the initial moral lapse known as the Fall. "The woman, being deceived, fell through transgression," carrying her husband with her; and we have all become involved in the consequences of that fall. How? to what extent? are questions which have given rise to acres, yea, square miles of theological controversy; and, generally, as bitter as it has been fruitless and profitless.

But there are other bearings and aspects of the Fall, and especially, of woman's position and part in it—questions of standing practical interest and moment—which have hardly been discussed at all; scarcely even looked at. We have had no end of disquisition and controversy about

the federal and representative character of Adam. Scarcely any about the symbolical significance of the *circumstances* of the Fall. In the Mosaic account, the woman occupies the most prominent place, and, we are inclined to think, the most significant place, too,—She is the subject of the temptation. She yields, she leads Adam into the transgression,—yet by a not uncommon perversity, divines have kept the man almost exclusively in the field of view, and made him the great subject of all their theorisings and discussions.

This has been unfortunate. It has been, we may say, morally disastrous; for while minds of immense capability and ingenuity have busied themselves with questions which do not admit of solution, by logical or any other intellectual process—features of the Fall which are being daily and hourly reproduced, and which form the most conclusive, because practical, visible, proof that *we sin with* Adam and are fallen in his first transgression—are entirely overlooked.

St. Paul characterises woman as the "weaker vessel," and in the symbolism of the Fall woman represents the weaker side of human nature —that through which it is tempted and yields or falls into sin. "The woman saw that the tree was good for food and pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, and she took of the fruit thereof." There were—the gratification of the appetites—the higher order of sensuous gratification—and gratification purely intellectual. Were these three elements of temptation peculiar to the first trial? So far otherwise, through these three channels man is ever being tempted and led into sin. And woman, if she is drawn aside from, or deserts her proper position, will be the medium of temptation. Man is not, like the mere animal, left to pursue unlicensed gratification.—

> "Against God's will much may be done
> But nought enjoyed; *and pleasures none*
> *Exist, but, like the springs of steel,*
> *Active no longer than they feel*
> *The checks that make them serve the soul,*
> *They get their vigour from control.*"

We are to observe limits in our gratification. There is no pleasure or enjoyment but has its excess or abuse—a degree of indulgence which unmans; and to pass into such indulgence is, in every case, to pass the barrier which moral law has set up. It is a manifestation—ever being renewed—of the first weakness. And woman, unredeemed, is still the tempter. Indirectly, by the sensuous fascination of her beauty; directly, when she stimulates the pride of life, ambition, cruelty, revenge. History, biography, literature, are full of such examples. Life abounds with them. The Fall is ever being re-enacted in contemporary English homes. Eves are still tempting, and dragging down their husbands and their offspring into hard and hopeless conflict with the choking thistle and the prickly briar!

In the act of Eve we have all that is essentially distinctive of a fall from the rational to the animal. We have gratification sought in disregard of duty—in disregard of the will of God, expressed in moral law. We have the preference of falsehood to truth—the deepest and most fatal of lies—that that may be good and safe which God has disallowed—that God cannot have forbidden what he has made us capable of desiring. There was the pursuit of gratification directly, selfishly, instead of through duty, service, and love. The woman lost sight of God, and His claims, of her husband and his claims, and acted on her own promptings and cravings, ("the desires of the flesh and of the mind,") as her fitting guidance. It was the rupture of all the higher relations of her being; and wherever the same process is repeated the first sin is made our own. And thus to act remains the peculiar temptation to woman; and for her there is properly no salvation but through overcoming it. The victory implies recovery of reverence for God, and of regard for her husband—submission to the Divine law, and to concurrent action with her husband, under that law.

Woman was formed and constituted man's help-meet—in the higher as well as in the lower sphere, and she WILL BE help-meet or seducer; she *will* perform the one function or the other. The Goddess-ideal attempted to be realised in the modern fine lady, is a mere hot-house creation, the glitter and bloom of which come off at the first brush of contact with real, earnest, outer-world life.

Farther, in the three features of the temptation, as it prevailed with the woman, we have symbolized the three great classes of those who pursue unchecked gratification. The voluptuary desires what is "good for food;" the mere man of taste, what is "pleasant to the eyes;" the mere intellectualist, what is adapted to "make one wise." How many in our day live only to pursue one or other of these forms of gratification! Perhaps the world never more homologated the great leading features of the Fall than now; never, certainly, with such means of rising above it—of being redeemed. "The lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life," are rampant on every hand. But we do not usually reflect that the irreverent pursuit of knowledge may be as perverting, (if not so degrading) as the pursuit of sensual gratification. Never had we such means of pursuing knowledge over new and ever-widening fields, but never was the pursuit marked by such utter and ostentatious contempt of all Divine checks, warnings, and limits. Many of us would not only be as "gods"—comprehend and account for all "good and evil,"—our ambition is of an exclusive cast, and would dispense with the presence of the Divinity even in the field of His own creation!

It is neither un-significant nor un-suggestive that women have been among the most forward to proclaim themselves atheists, both in our literature, and in our Courts of Justice. But we merely indicate this. A

more prevalent, more insidious, and less recognised danger attaches to woman unredeemed, and especially in the most intimate relation she can sustain. If woman do not lead man to God, she will, to a certainty, lead him away from God. But to lead man to God and cherish in him the sentiment of worship, is woman's natural, as it was one of her highest functions. It was because she was so capable of being the medium of Divine impression that she became the medium of temptation. The sense of this highest of womanly functions finds exaggerated expression and development in the position the virgin mother has been placed in by the Roman Catholic Church.

Reverence is, for woman, more especially natural and easy to exemplify, not only in virtue of her greater susceptibility than man to whatever sentiments have an emotional birth, but from its being her abiding habitude of mind towards her husband, wherever the conjugal relation is sustained in affectional and moral health. As the open-hearted child finds much in the true father to be the medium of carrying its mind up to our Father in Heaven, so does the true wife find in the true husband not a little to aid her conceptions of God and be the medium through which they rise to Him. Perhaps in no respect, spiritually, was woman more indispensable to man than in this, that without her, no sensible exemplification of Reverence would have been presented to him; the Reverence he so much needed to temper his spirit of inquiry. But the two together with their respective powers, susceptibilities, and functions—are, if we may so speak, fully equipped for worship; man with his discriminating eye and grasp of intellect, woman with her open susceptibilities and natural reverence. The highest, fullest, richest tones of this normal, healthy, conjugal life, are the clear deep tones of worship; and there is no sure guarantee for the abiding union of hearts unless that union is maintained in God. Such a thought may be far from the mind of this generation, but Sir Cresswell Cresswell should help to bring us back to it, for the deepest plague-spot in our domestic life will never be otherwise erased. It is gratifying to find a popular poet taking such firm hold of this great truth, and giving it such distinct and beautiful utterance—

> "In Godhead rise, thither flow back
> All loves, which, as they keep or lack
> The appointed course, and bound assigned
> Are virtue or sin, Love's every kind,
> Lofty or low, of spirit or sense,
> DESIRE is or BENEVOLENCE.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The love of marriage claims, above
> All special kinds, the name of love.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Therein, Benevolence, Desire
> Elsewhere ill-joined, or formed apart,
> Become the pulses of one heart."

Whenever benevolence is over-topped by Desire, the integrity,—the identity of love is gone. It merges into passion; becomes ever more exacting; and, if denied its gratification, will destroy its object. Yet how much that passes under the name of love, both in fiction and in life, is only consuming desire!

> "Happy who in their lives are seen
> At all times in the golden mean,
> Who, having learned and understood
> The glory of the CENTRAL GOOD,
> Know how souls never match or merge
> But as they thitherward converge,
> Nor loves outlast the thorns bright flame,
> Unless God burns within the same."

It is here we find the key to the true "position of woman;" and unless we so recognise it, we may beat about, restless and unsuccessful, till doom's-day—though we should "beat the bounds" of creation. The guarantee, that benevolence towards man should keep its due place in the heart of woman, is to be found, and found alone, in reverence towards God keeping its due place there. But whenever reverence to God is displaced, benevolence succumbs under the force of desire. It may be intellectual, it may be sensuous, it may be sensual; but be it one or other, a subtle poison has insinuated itself which will disturb, impair, and becloud the normal health of the marriage life.

> Lovers once married, deem their bond
> Then perfect, scanning nought beyond
> For love to do, but to sustain
> The spousal hours completed gain.
> But time and a right life alone
> Fulfil what is that hour foreshown.
> The Bridegroom and the Bride withal,
> Are but unwrought material
> Of marriage; nay, so far is love,
> Thus crowned, from being thereto enough,
> *Without the long compulsive awe*
> *Of duty*, that the bond of law
> Does oftener marriage love evoke,
> Than love which does not bear the yoke
> Of legal vows, submits to be
> Self-reined from ruinous liberty.
>
> *Coventry Patmore.*

Such views may lie far apart from the thinking of most men, and still more of most women of this generation, but they must become familiar ere life can be purified at its fountain. Our modern home-life wants harmony, wants congruity, wants repose. It is a life of dislocation and unrest, of conflict and pursuit, in which quiet domestic delights, the more they are needed are felt to be only the more unattainable. The whirl

of excitement—the rivalries of competition in all pursuits and professions—are evils universally felt and fretted under. All are complainers, but none know where or how the cure is to be found. As things are, our men cannot help themselves, and, where life is a fight for bread and clothes, still less can our women. Yet things are no better in the main—often worse—where the means are ample. Home repose—a loving, pious, family unity—is as rare among the wealthy classes as among the poor. And it will continue so until we recover true wifehood and motherhood, not alone in their secular, but in their sacred elements. There will not be home-repose save where there is an "angel in the house." When the heart of the wife and mother is right with heaven, she will—even amid our many modern excitations and distractions—shed around her the true atmosphere of "Home."

The marriage union—often so lightly entered on—is, of all human relations, that involving the most delicate, profound, and various responsibilities. It is of Divine origination; and its elements do not lie more deeply embedded in our constitution than its responsibilities link us directly on to heaven. There is a shadow and a blight on every home without God.

XIX.—THE SABBATH.

Dr Arnold—in his earnest strong way—says, in one of his letters:—"St. Paul would have been utterly shocked, could he have foreseen that eighteen hundred years after Christ had been in the world, such an institution as the Sabbath would still have been needed; yet, seeing that it is still needed, the obligation of the old commandment is still binding in the spirit of it." On another occasion, he says:—"Believing that our need of a Lord's day is as great as ever it was, and, therefore, that its observance is God's will, and is likely, so far as we can see, to be so to the end of time, I should think it most mischievous to weaken the respect paid to it."

How did Dr Arnold think that the distinctive observance of the Sabbath should have been long ago superseded? By the habitual elevation of the thoughts, feelings, sentiments, and speech, if not the every day avocations of men, to the Sabbath level. That is, beyond doubt, the intention of Christianity; and the effect of it, in proportion as it is realized and lived out; though, with this realized in the highest possible measure, it might still be a question whether the Sabbath could be safely

dispensed with. But no such question practically concerns us; nor will such a question, in all likelihood, so concern any people for ages to come. The Sabbath is threatened with us, and has been all but abolished on the continent, from other, and, indeed, quite opposite causes. The distinction between the Sabbath and the common working days of the week is not effacing or effaced, by reason of the elevation of our common habitual sentiments and avocations to the Sabbath level, or, in other words, to the Christian standard, but by reason of their distance and divergence from it. In proportion to the distance we are from dispensing with a seventh day, devoted to religious services, through our whole every-day life becoming pervaded by the spirit of such service, is our danger of losing the Sabbath even as a day of rest. The Sabbath has been all but obliterated on the continent; it is in process of obliteration in England, it is menaced here in Scotland (where it is protected by a public sentiment nowhere else found), not by the mantling tide of a purer, deeper, more pervasive spirit of religion, but by a deepening, extending, more exacting spirit of pleasure and worldliness.

The craving after pleasure, and the passion for gain, are both increasing in our day, as any one may satisfy himself who has the opportunity of observing the course of business, of social life, and of travel, on a large scale. Facilities for business, for social pleasure, but especially for travel, are now presented, such as there was never an approach to at any former time; and the Sabbath, both as a day of rest and religious observance, is menaced in proportion. The extent to which the Sabbath rest is encroached on, directly and indirectly, by travelling alone—is as enormous as it is unprecedented. Go where you will, out of Scotland, and the number of pleasure-seekers quite astounds you. On the Thames—on the great lines of Railway connecting the Metropolis with the fashionable summer resorts and watering-places, crowds on crowds urge their way beyond the utmost capacity of the means of conveyance. Cross the Channel, and you find this vast pleasure-seeking crowd everywhere. In Paris, in Brussels, above all in Geneva (once the seat and model of religious strictness) you see the Cafés, the Restaurants, the gardens, the great public promenades, crowded with the gay, chattering, ever-shifting throng. It is a splendid holiday sight, no doubt; and there were little to offend were there no God above, and no reverse picture below. The former may be ignored, the latter cannot. For you have not to go into back streets, —where you may see the cobbler in his stall and the tailor on his bench, knowing no relaxation beyond any other day; but all around and along —in the crowded centres, or, as by some broad highway, you seek a suburban quiet—there are hundreds of masons, paviors, carpenters, and carters, toiling on from early morn, and all through the burning hours of the Sabbath noon. Over against the holiday crowd—gay, bright, joyous—is the dark shadow of grinding, unremitting toil. Look on this picture and on

that. The one projects the other. The one deepens in its shades as the other becomes more gorgeous and more luminous. As the pleasure-seeking crowd increases, ever increasing numbers must drudge as ministers to those wants and cravings, which become only ever the more urgent as the means of gratification increase. The vast amount of those means does not in itself tend to alleviate, but rather to increase the evil, and because this craving for pleasure is only made the more ravenous, the more it is fed. If there is not something to limit the pursuit of pleasure other than the natural and economical limits to gratification, that pursuit will only press more cruelly on an ever-increasing number of the people as the means of gratification are increased and extended. That check now lies nowhere save in the recognition of invisible authority. Sumptuary laws are obsolete. States,—even those with despotic Governments—have now discovered it to be their interest to facilitate, and not to obstruct travel, as the greater the number of strangers that visit a country, the more money is brought within its borders; the more is trade promoted and wealth increased. But the pursuit of this transitory phantom pleasure, as it becomes hotter, and draws more into the chase, ever requires more labour to produce for it, to purvey for it, to attend on its eager exacting votaries, and to pass them along. It does this, while itself makes no productive return. Every day a vast amount of food, drink, service, &c., is absorbed and swallowed up, leaving no equivalent. Day after day the same urgent demand is made, and corresponding supplies are drawn in, and disappear.

Now though the Sabbath may interpose but an imperfect check to this pursuit, it is a sensible one; and it is the only one that remains. Disregard it, and no moral element remains to correct or temper the pleasure-seeker's pursuit; while to the toiler there is no clear and grateful alternative of periodical rest. There is no reminder, for the one or the other, of Invisible Authority. Eliminate the Sabbath from our modern life, and it is as clear as anything can be, we shall soon become a people "without God in the world."

We have among us a class of writers (whose zeal is more signal than either the depth of their philosophy or the scope of the facts they recognise) who are never weary of assailing our Scottish Sabbath. The shafts of ridicule they direct against it are as various as their tastes and capacities; but their arguments are nearly all variations and expansions of the assumption that the mass of our people revenge themselves on the strictness with which Sabbath observance is enforced, by a double license of indulgence in drunkenness and impurity. Now a question like this embraces many more elements than the writers who treat it in the approved style of flippant ridicule, are either able or care to understand. There is first the question of fact—and on this primary point, those best acquainted with the sentiments and usages now obtaining among the great body of our countrymen, know that the pictures of the

Scottish Sabbath drawn by this class of writers are not a faithful representation, but a gross caricature. There may still linger in a few families a too rigid and repressive discipline, gendered of the spirit of bondage, but to the great majority of our countrymen the Sabbath need not be a day of gloom. To make oneself clean, dress, and repair to Church, should be a grateful alterative from the working-day life of those who have to earn their bread in sweat and dust, or in a noisy stifling atmosphere. Our preaching may still be open to great improvement in freshness, and practical human interest, but none need want the means of making the home-spent hours cheerful and delightful, for we have now endless supplies of delightful Sabbath reading, and furnished at a price level to the means of the poorest.

But the Sabbath—as it presents an opportunity—so may its observance react in the way of stimulus to vicious indulgence in those whose propensities take that direction. We do not say that its assailants have here no ground in fact, but it is fact of a character they are utterly unfitted to interpret. We have here no exceptional case. On the contrary, the like risk attaches to every moral precept and obligation. You can never introduce a higher means of good without introducing, at the same time, a more potent stimulus to evil. An alternative is involved in the very nature of moral means; and the opportunity of realising a higher good cannot be afforded, without opening up a new and corresponding possibility of evil. The risk of such evil can be escaped only by foregoing the good. Those who despise and repudiate the rich freight of social and spiritual advantages our Sabbaths bring to every one's door, will be the worse and not the better because the proffer has been made and rejected. The continental workman who labours on the Sabbath is not thereby degraded as his Scottish brother workman, * who desecrates the day is,—because he is not violating any recognised moral obligation. But what is the price he pays for that immunity? Nothing less than all the means and opportunities of elevation, of moral discipline, of spiritual growth which our Sabbaths present.

Then as regards a large portion of our people, who cannot heartily and joyously enter into its higher uses, it does not therefore follow that they derive no advantage from the enjoyment of its rest and the observance of its outward decencies. Its effect is humanizing; its outward obser-

* We happened to have lately an opportunity of observing, at one of the landing-places, the aspect of the passengers by the Clyde Sunday steamer. The number was limited, and, while extreme types of all the degraded and vicious classes were there, scarcely a presentable person of any class was to be seen amongst them. Then, instead of the serene, pure, and expansive enjoyment, which, according to secularisers of the Sabbath, the scenes of Nature *ought* to inspire, the great majority of those on board wore an uneasy, hang-dog—not to say, self-condemned, aspect.

vance averts a degradation which would certainly ensue from its desecration; that observance involving some practical recognition of an Invisible Authority, and of a higher end in life than the pursuit of profit or pleasure.

XX.—DEMAND AND SUPPLY—THE HIGHER LAW.

THERE can be no question but that Supply-and-Demand is, as Thomas Carlyle phrases it, the great Commercial Gospel of this age; and, "How shall I make the largest share of the common good mine, in the shortest possible time, and with the least possible exertion?" the paramount life-problem with the majority of active men. Both have got an impetus in these days altogether unprecedented. And faith in the principle just noted, stimulates activity in the hot pursuit of gain, and draws that activity into the channel of trade, rather than of productive industry. The law of Supply-and-Demand acts directly on Trade, and only indirectly on production, as we are now beginning practically to discover. During the Anti-Corn Law agitation, the accepted and unquestioned belief was, that you had only to clear obstructions from the channels of trade, and create a demand, in order to induce the requisite supply. Indeed, the great fear of the farmer and his "friends" was, that the supply would be only too abundant. Those fears have not been justified. Since the abolition of the corn and provision laws, the average price of our great staples of food has ranged as high as before, and butcher meat has been higher of late years than when the British farmer had a monopoly of the market. The case is the same with respect to those minor, but important articles of food—fish, butter, cheese, eggs, vegetables, and the greater proportion of fruits. Everything people eat is dear, everywhere, though we have the world for our market. In other countries you find it the same. Wherever there is steam communication there is an equalisation of prices, and the cost of the means of subsistence is high. This fact has not been unobserved. It forces itself on the attention of every one who travels, of every one who has a family to maintain, indeed, of every one who has to eat and live. Its social significance has, however, been only very dimly, if at all, apprehended. It points to an important correction, or rather limitation of the doctrine of Supply-and-Demand, and which this failure in our Cotton Supply is well adapted to signalise and illustrate.

With the facilities of communication and commercial intercourse now enjoyed with all parts of the world, Demand may generally be trusted soon to bring any article to the place where it is wanted, provided an adequate Supply can be obtained; but it does not by any means so readily ensure that supply. There are certain natural obstacles to all sudden increase of natural products—whether they belong to the animal, vegetable, or even mineral kingdoms—which are not to be immediately overcome. Animals take time to grow, to increase in numbers, and to have improvements effected in their breeds. Ere you can have a great increase of any kind of crop, fruit, or vegetable, you must have labour and manure skilfully applied to the soil; and of one, or other, or both, there may be but a limited available supply.

Every increase of natural product, or raw material, implies an increased application of labour, and that is generally found to be an irreducible obstacle to rapid increase. For example, there are at the present moment many suitable fields for the growth of Cotton—the Cotton Supply Association has recently, if we mistake not, enumerated some five-and-thirty localities where the plant can be advantageously grown—but in very many, where the soil and climate are most suitable, increased production is limited from an inadequate supply of labour. Enterprise and Capital are also needed, but they can be much more readily transferred to new fields than can available labour. These are what we may call natural limitations of the principle of Supply and Demand, in relation to natural products, and they cause Supply to be much less promptly obedient to Demand, where such are in requisition, than when it bears on trade or on manufacture. The market is directly and sensitively amenable to Demand. Manufacture is not so directly in contact with it, but here a rapid increase of production can more readily be secured through the incomparably more extensive application of machinery to manufacture, than to the growth and production of raw material.

But there is a deeper element in the case, and one which our recent progress in locomotion, and other great facilities to an exchange of commodities, have tended very much to develop. We refer to what, for want of a more definite name we must call the moral element. If it is not an original impulse of the human mind it is one which very early manifested itself—that of the desire to gain by trading. If the risks are greater, the returns of trade are quicker and larger than those of productive labour. And then, as the Irishman phrased it "there is the dignity of the thing." The merchant has been in modern days (until very lately, at least,) of more social consideration than the farmer, and the shop-keeper than the labourer. One does not require to dirty his fingers so much in trade as in labour, and it *seems* an easier life—also more genteel, or less ungenteel (one or the other according to your point of view). Hence the number of

traders, merchants, shop-keepers, everywhere. Go wherever you may; into whatever town, at home or abroad, nothing strikes one more than the number of shops;—where can they all find custom? There is everywhere redundance of mere distributors, and the material influences and moral tone of society in these days continue to induce an increase of the class.

The social implications of the haste to be rich, so characteristic of our time, are very wide and deep. Within its scope of action, or within range of its influence, come many things which would, to a surface observer, betray no feature of relationship. In the first place, there is greater scope for the function of the merchant than there ever was before in the history of society,—the world is all before him. In the second place, he can do business, convey his goods, and have a return of his capital, with whatever profit the transaction may bring—with incomparably greater rapidity. Steam and the telegraph have immensely facilitated—and proportionately stimulated trade. In the third place, the material of commerce has been immensely increased. The quantities of the old staple are vastly augmented, and an amount of new material has been introduced. As examples, we may instance the vast and ever growing business in stocks and shares.

Yet the field is too narrow for those who crowd into it, as the intensity of modern competition bears sufficient witness. This intense competition is felt to be a great social evil—the parent and promoter of many of our most outstanding and obstinate social evils—a fruitful source of social weakness and moral obliquity. It is already a great evil and we cannot shut our eyes to the peril of its becoming a still greater. The facilities and stimulants are so great. So many things conspire to make men impatient of the old mode of life—by honest, humble, persistent industry. We are now wafted on by the steamboat, and whirled along by the train, and the hurry of our locomotion is but the symbol of our moral life. There is bustle, haste, eager rushing forward, everywhere; we chafe and fret if we have five minutes to wait. But the processes of Nature do not yield to steam compulsion. Spring is as far apart from Autumn—sowing from reaping—as in the days of sailing ships and stage coaches. The function of the producer must continue to be one not only of much toil, but of sober expectation and of much enduring patience. It does not suit the temper or the tendencies of these times, and no one continues at it who can possibly get away. The reluctance of merchants and manufacturers not merely to become producers, but to apply their capital to production, has been strikingly illustrated in the present cotton famine. Cotton manufacturers have refused to risk anything in producing a substitute for the American supply. On the contrary the charge has been loudly preferred against them (and in the case of some we fear, not with-

out truth) of selling their stocks of cotton wool for a high profit, and leaving their work-people to become paupers or starve. And it is in perfect harmony with the accepted doctrine of Demand-and-Supply that they should act thus.

It is in perfect harmony with that doctrine that they should so act. But this terrible cotton crisis—still deepening, still extending its baleful range—is well adapted to compel attention to the inadequacy of that principle, not only to secure social well-being, but even industrial and commercial prosperity. Free trade is an inestimable boon to the world, but it is not the primary condition of national prosperity. Trade cannot long prosper unless production prosper proportionately. Its prosperity depends ultimately, and not remotely, on the abundance of raw material—depends, therefore, on the proportionate numbers of those who apply themselves to the production of that raw material. This is a truth so obvious that it might seem scarcely needful to be stated—certainly, would not need to be, were it not practically disregarded. That it is so, is a fact becoming growingly manifest.

The reason of the fact is seen in the great vice of the time—seeking to acquire wealth without earning it. Wealth may be really, honestly, earned in the professions, in manufacture, in many branches of trade; but, of all occupations, there is in that of the farmer (and of those engaged in producing the staples of human subsistence, and raw material generally,) the least temptation to acquire it dishonestly. Many trades subsist on the vices of the community; many on the ill-regulated desires and wasteful habits of the multitude; many on the ignorance and gullibility of the people. In trade there is much gain that can nowhere accrue but from another's loss; and, beyond a certain point, the more intensified competition becomes the greater is this proportion. But in the production of the raw material you cannot have a return without labour, diligence, and care. You cannot be dishonest; you are in direct contact with Nature, and you cannot by sharp practice, make her bleed at will. This is no doubt one reason why so many dislike productive industry, and make their escape from it whenever they can,—one reason amongst others why the proportionate number of those occupied in agriculture is year by year decreasing. That the case should be so, does not indicate a sound industrial and economical state. It will not do to say that it results from economy of labour, through the increased application of machinery to farming, for manufactures and trade have been facilitated in this way, much more than in proportion. It is due in part to the disadvantages and discouragements attaching to the condition of the agricultural labourer. But it is due also, and in still greater measure, we apprehend, to the deeper cause under notice. Our farming has advanced of late years, but not as it ought to have done. We have looked more to

apt to be far too little impressed with the value of the exact and prompt discharge of his appropriate duty, by each one of some hundreds of men. Yet is our safety, our very life dependent, on so many judgments, memories, wills, every time we accomplish a day's travel by rail.

And this brings into view another aspect of the case, which it is of the greatest practical importance adequately to realise. Responsibility is not only increased, proportionately to the increase of our power over the forces of Nature, it is also proportionately diffused. In the course of a day's journey by rail, we pass, say, one hundred stations, and, besides the guard and driver, the safety of the train is dependent on three or four persons at each. Through a slight mistake or neglect on the part of any one of these, two trains may be made to dash into each other, the terrible result being the instant sacrifice of many lives, protracted and untold suffering to many more, who escape death, but are mangled and maimed for life. But railway responsibility embraces many more within its scope than officials, charged with the despatch, stoppage, and guidance of trains. Managers and Directors are most intimately responsible for the rules they lay down, for the wages they give, for the hours of daily service they exact, for the competency—physical, mental, and moral—of the persons they employ. Nor can the body of Shareholders be held by any means irresponsible. Responsibility attaches to them, so far as the *morale* of the Directorate is dependant on their suffrages—whether it is vigilant and liberal, or lax and grinding. A Directorate over-anxious for the increase of dividends, will subject the public to proportionate risks, for either the employés of the Company will be over-wrought, or duty involving great responsibility will be entrusted to incompetent hands.

And this brings into view yet another speciality of the responsibility arising out of command over the forces of Nature. Where men are entrusted with the direction and guidance of their fellow-men, responsibility increases with station and position. The responsibility of a Corporal is small compared with that of the Colonel of a regiment; the General-in-Chief is responsible for the disposal and direction of the whole army; the private soldier is responsible only for himself. The latter fulfils almost all the requirements of his position, if he obeys orders, and holds unflinchingly by the post of duty. When you descend to the ranks in an army, how little depends on the individual—save as his participation of the *esprit de corps* gives firmness to the phalanx. The demands on the private soldier are demands chiefly on the lower qualities of our nature —those we possess in common with animals of the higher grades—force, firmness, flexibility, under the handling of directive mind.

But when the function of man is, not to apply his own force mainly, but to guide the forces of Nature, all this is changed. Not only is responsibility increased in proportion to the amount of power under guid-

ance; it attaches most directly, and presses with most weight on those lowest in position—those in immediate contact with the power. The soldier in the ranks acts as a unit in a mass. He is supported right and left—"shoulder to shoulder." The railway official is isolated. He has to act as an individual. He must have all his wits about him—must be vigilant, prompt, courageous, in and by himself. The individual soldier is carried forward by the momentum of the corps. He can hardly flinch, and when he falls, another takes his place. But when the railway official fails in judgment, in vigilance, in presence of mind, in courage, the service being single-handed, being momentary, must be individual, must be instantaneous, else the opportunity is gone, and failure may entail the most tremendous consequences. In the private soldier it is the lower or physical qualities that are mainly in requisition. The mental and moral are demanded proportionately as you ascend. In the commander they must all combine, and he is fitted for his functions in proportion as they do so in richest measure and nicest balance.

We do not say that all this is exactly reversed in the case of those who are charged with the direction of the forces of Nature. But the higher qualities are certainly not less needed in the (socially) inferior, than they are in the superior position. If there is serious physical, mental, or moral defect, it will be less perilous in the Director than in the guard or pointsman. In a director the defects of the individual may be supplemented, his errors corrected, by the discernment and wisdom of his co-directors, but this corrective influence operates less and less as you descend, till—in many cases—at the critical moment, the responsibility rests on the individual employé, single and alone. In short, in the case of those who handle *men*, responsibility concentrates more and more in the individual as you ascend. In the case of those who guide and direct natural forces, responsibility concentrates more and more in the individual as you descend.

These facts are not only charged with various momentous lessons, they make on us certain imperative demands They demand a higher education and a deeper moral sense—in the working man—the employé as much as in the managing director, if not more. Mechanical invention is thus a direct stimulant to education—a great instrument for the elevation of the people. An instrument doubly operative, relieving (or which ought to relieve) them from much drudgery, on the one hand, requiring and calling forth higher and more various powers, a better training, a deeper and more practical moral sense, on the other.

Our progress in command over the forces of Nature, demands of all a deeper, more immediate, more practical sense of responsibility. This is the demand of Nature, we should rather say, the clear voice of God, and disregard or failure in compliance, entails the most tremendous penalties.

If we become more greedy, selfish, grasping, where Nature is so bountiful, we are counter-working the very system of the world. If our hearts get narrower as her treasures expand—if, in proportion as her riches are made diffusive, each one only seeks the more to monopolise the largest share of them, we shall not only miss the blessing, wherewith so beneficent a constitution is fraught, there will be—and that in mercy too—a rigorous exaction of the penalty.

Our railway employés, and working steam-boat engineers are drawn, and will be drawn from the lower social grades. We shall not have many Wyndhams, with a fancy for being engine-drivers; and, probably, the safety of the travelling public would not be much advanced though we had. But the case being so, we may see by how stern a Nemesis we are held to our duty. If we do injustice to the people—positive or negative; if we deny them the means, or the opportunity, for proper education and training, we cannot enjoy the same immunity as in the old days of the handloom and bridle roads. Every step in advance in material civilization, brings men into new and more responsible relations with each other. Neither the knowledge nor the virtue of the past will suffice for our requirements. We must be better than our fathers—else the tremendous powers we now wield shall be, not only neutralised for good, but converted into instruments of destruction. In our engines of war they are being so, literally and directly, to an extent that is appalling. But that is by no means the worst transmutation they will undergo. No, nor even that which every now and again shocks and appals us in some dreadful railway catastrophe. The most disastrous results of all, lie in less observed spheres. When the forces we wield, are converted into instruments of selfishness, ambition, lust,—counter-working, as we then do, the beneficent designs of Providence, and the very constitution of Nature and society, the evils entailed must be great and wide-spread in proportion to the capacity of the instruments to confer and diffuse good. These evils may not lie on the surface, or appear in distinct connection with their causes to the eyes of common observers. But they will gradually be developed—will, to a certainty, reveal themselves and make themselves felt—in extending pauperism, in the isolation and antagonism of social classes, in the degradation and demoralisation of large sections of the people, in infidelity to trust, in recklessness, in secret, premeditated, deadly crime. "None of us liveth to himself,"—the social laws proclaim that we dare not. If we neglect or disregard the interests of others it is—as society advances—at an ever-augmenting peril. When we study to do good to others as we have opportunity, Nature is benign. When we live for ourselves and strive to monopolise the common good, Nature becomes stern, compulsive, retributive; and the golden fruit, we so eagerly clutched, is turned to apples of Sodom in our lap.

XXII.—HUMAN EDUCATION.

ONE of the distinctive characteristics of this age is Zeal for Education—for the education of the whole people—for an education more thorough, appropriate, practical, for all. Nor is this zeal misplaced. There cannot be a doubt but that inadequate or bad education is at the root of all personal and relative ill-doing. Our zeal for education is not misplaced, yet, to a great extent, it is a zeal not according to knowledge. Our notions of Education are too limited as to its scope, period, means, and instruments. We cannot be too anxious about educating all, but if we mistake the true nature of education, or ignore some of its essential constituents, our efforts will, in a great measure, issue in disappointment. It is the object of education not only to replenish the mind with knowledge, but to fit faculty for work; above all to evoke the power, and form the habit of self-direction and self-government. These are all wants of our nature, rising in urgency and importance,—wants which must be met, else there can be no true manhood. But when we reflect how limited a portion of these is met by our common school education, even after its best type, we shall not be surprised at its comparative failure. Knowledge is but one instrument of culture. Instruction is dependent for the main part of its practical value on its being combined with training. And this training is practically inefficient unless it confer on the higher motive powers of our nature, thorough mastery over the lower. But this implies that education should make the mind of its subject normally amenable to all the influences that, from whatever quarter, bear upon it; whilst, at the same time, giving us the full use of all our powers, each in its own sphere, and in due subordination to one another. So regarded, our whole life is an educative discipline; and whatever affects us, or in any way bears on us, an educative agent. We are, in these days, in much greater danger of over-rating than of under-rating the practical value of knowledge. But we have fallen into a worse mistake; we have lost sight of, or come altogether to ignore, the influence of our Ignorance as an instrument of education. So much so, that the bare indication of such an idea will evoke a stare of astonishment. Yet, is it not the fact, that our ignorance, or, in other words, the limitation of our knowledge, is one of the most powerful instruments of moral training and discipline?

There are few questions that might be more profitably entertained by this generation than that of the relation of the UNKNOWN to human progress and wellbeing. The sphere of the Known is ever extending, yet the

sphere of the (apprehended) Unknown is not sensibly diminished,—is, in fact, rather extended, in consequence. Nay, as the sphere of the Known is enlarged, does not the border land of the Uncertain (lying between the Known and the Absolutely Unknown, extend and widen. This state of things cannot, we apprehend, be shown to be, from the nature of the case, inevitable, and still less is it accidental. The little sphere (of space and time) on which, to human eye, the light shines clear, and the objects are seen distinctly, is surrounded everywhere by a penumbra of haze and shadow, merging into the impenetrable darkness of the Unknown. But the Unknown and the Unknowable are not commensurate. On the contrary, by our scientific and archæological researches, and by our inventive ingenuity, we are ever widening the Known, and pushing back the limits of the Unknown. Yet the border land of the dubious (between the Certain and the Unknowable) seems now wider than it ever was before.

This is not a necessity. It is an arrangement, so to speak—an established relation between the constitution of man and that of the universe; much of our ignorance is due, no doubt, to the limitation of our faculties, but much also to our strict isolation in space. With powers of locomotion, fitting us to traverse the etherial spaces, what an enlargement of knowledge should we not attain, even without any enhancement of faculty! We should not remain long uncertain whether the moon was habitable, whether the sun be a luminous or an opaque body, whether the belts of Jupiter are strata of clouds, or whether the polar regions of Mars be like our own, abandoned to eternal winter. If the planets are inhabited worlds, and each fixed star the centre of a planetary system—what revelations would be opened up to us of strange races and orders of being, and through this simple power of locomotion alone!

But God has denied this to us, and the fact that he has done so suggests one, and that, perhaps, the most important of the two great educational functions of our Ignorance. The other function of our ignorance, viz., that of its acting as a stimulus to inquiry and research, is obvious to all, and the divine arrangement under which it so operates is beautifully signalised in the fact (above noticed) that the sphere of the Uncertain is ever extending, proportionately with the sphere of the Known. And we can see the high moral (as well as intellectual) purpose which this subserves. Were the sphere of the Uncertain to diminish, in proportion, as that of the Known extends, the moral conditions under which man lives and acts, would in time become entirely changed. A period would arrive when, in the progress of knowledge, the Known and the (to man with his present powers) Unknowable, would embrace the whole sphere of being and its relations. Farther progress in science and knowledge would then be impossible (unless man was to be re-created). Inquiry and research would cease. The exercises of minds of the highest,

as of the lower, order of power, would be confined to the acquisition of the Known. Interest in the Known would diminish, and eventually die out, when knowledge had ceased to be the basis and instrument of farther inroads into the region of the Uncertain and the Unknown.

It would be difficult—perhaps impossible—for us fully to realise to ourselves the difference between the moral conditions under which men would then act and those under which they now act. The whole region, (and how vast a region) of probabilities being swept away, there would be no more scope for the consideration, care, and choice which are induced by, and which ground on, the Probable. There would be no weighing of conflicting evidence; no room for hesitation, caution, deference to the judgment of others, or distrust of our own. There would be no scope for prudence, or even for charity, where all was either perfectly clear or absolutely inscrutable. Faith—if it could exist and act at all—would have its sphere entirely isolated from that of Reason. Deriving no support from knowledge or from probability, it would be incapable alike of being strengthened or weakened, increased or diminished, by any exercise of our intellectual powers, or by any course of action. But, thus wholly severed from both our intellectual and volitional activity, faith would cease to have any moral character or to exercise any moral influence. For, its having this character, and exercising this influence, depend on the scope it has for action, and the food it finds, in regions lying between the absolutely Certain and the absolutely Unknown. When vision shall be unclouded—knowledge perfect—then faith, as the highest authority tells us, shall cease.

The existence of the Uncertain, and its relation to the Unknown, are thus seen to play a most important part in our moral training and development. Remove the sphere of the Uncertain or Contingent, and you would at once sweep away all the essential conditions of our moral activity—all the main means and instruments of our Moral Culture. And, if this be so, it will follow that the efficiency of these means and instruments depends, in great measure, on the due proportion between the Uncertain and the Known. Were our progress in knowledge and science to diminish the sphere of the Uncertain, in proportion as it extended that of the Known, the efficiency of these would be seriously impaired. Moral Discipline depends on the scope there is for choice, not only between different courses of action, but also as respects the motives or reasons which induce to action.

And this may serve to account for (as it should reconcile us to) the fact, that the doubts and difficulties connected with the reception of the Scripture Revelation are increasing rather than diminishing, with the progress of knowledge and the extended prosecution of scientific and archæological research. Faith can never become easy—must not, in-

deed, become easier as knowledge is increased, else man would become a moral weakling, as he advances in intellectual and physical power. The matter of faith must be such as to act as a test of disposition, else it would cease to exert a moral power—such as to call into exercise trust, patience, diffidence, humility. As Pascal has profoundly remarked—"It seems to be the Divine intention to perfect the will rather than the understanding." "There is a due proportion of light for those who above all things, wish that they may see; and a proper mixture of shade for those who are of a contrary disposition."

For the same reason, it is essential to moral health, that there be, so to speak, a due equipoise maintained between the desire for certain knowledge and acquiescence in the denial to us of certain knowledge —between curiosity and reverence, between confidence and diffidence. And thus, may it be a higher virtue to acknowledge our ignorance, or incapacity to decide, than to advance to confident conclusions, where there is still, (even though it may seem but little) room for hesitation and doubt.

This is especially true as regards conclusions respecting the facts and credibility of the Scripture Revelation. One would expect that all who accept the Scriptures as being, or as, in any specific sense, embodying, a Divine Revelation, would, in cases of doubt, give the Scriptures the benefit of the doubt. But, instead of this, we find the course to be, in our day,—and that in numberless cases—the opposite. Instead of caution, we have confidence; in place of reverence, temerity. A reverent hesitancy has been displaced by a prone precipitancy; and hundreds of the most accomplished and cultivated Englishmen, professed believers in Christ, and ministers at His altars, seem only to accept with more avidity, and to rush with more eagerness to conclusions, in proportion as they tend to undermine or destroy the historical credibility of the Scriptures. This does not more tend to impair faith, than it is a sign of moral weakness, wherever it may appear. This demand for certainty where it is unattainable—this impatience of mystery—this absence of reverence and awe in the most sacred relations, forming so prominent a characteristic of the spirit of inquiry in our time, reveals a defect in the highest kind of training. There is not the due moral equipoise. Reverence is gone, or has become more and more subordinated to the passion for a knowledge that is beyond us, or for certainty that is denied to us. The less we live by Faith, the more impatient do we become of the conditions needful to afford to faith its proper scope and exercise. To know what we *can* know is a great thing—to apprehend clearly where we may have certainty, and where we must be content with moral evidence, is much. But our training and our culture are seriously defective, if we do not feel that there are regions where we ought to tread with reverence and with

awe, and mysteries on which we must be humbly content to wait for the revelations of a higher life.—

Who loves not Knowledge ? Who shall rail
  Against her beauty ? May she mix
  With men and prosper ! Who shall fix
Her pillars ? Let her work prevail.

But on her forehead sits a fire :
  She sets her forward countenance,
  And leaps into the future chance,
Submitting all things to desire.

Half-grown as yet, a child, and vain—
  She cannot fight the fear of death.
  What is she, cut from love and faith,
But some wild Pallas from the brain

Of Demons ? fiery-hot to burst
  All barriers in her onward race
  For power. Let her know her place ;
She is the second, not the first.

A higher hand must make her mild,
  If all be not in vain ; and guide
  Her footsteps, moving side by side
With wisdom, like the younger child :

For she is earthly of the mind,
  But Wisdom, heavenly, of the soul.
  O, friend, who camest to thy goal
So early, leaving me behind,

I would the great world grew like thee,
  Who grewest not alone in power
  And knowledge, but from hour to hour
In reverence and in charity.

XXIII.—RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

Religious education engages a great amount of ostensible zeal, and its importance cannot be over-rated. That importance, far from, as our physical sciolists assume, diminishing with the progress of science and

knowledge, only increases as that advances. Yet, amid all the popular zeal for Religious Education—notwithstanding all that is talked and written about it—the subject is both ill understood, and its practical importance inadequately felt. Even the true nature of religious education is grossly misapprehended. Religious education does not mainly consist in the communication to the young mind of what is called "religious truth." No amount of religious knowledge will make a religious man. The essential and distinctive element of a religious character is something deeper and more intimate than knowledge, (and which may consist with indefinitely varying measures of knowledge)—is Faith. Now the object of Faith is, primarily, not truth, but a Person; the object of Religious Faith is God. Nothing, therefore, deserves the name of religious education, that has not some adaptation to awaken and exercise faith.

Faith implies a moral nature. Its sphere is commensurate with that of moral activity. It comes into exercise in all our moral relations—wherever we are affected by action springing, not from mere physical forces, but from an affectional nature and a WILL. Faith finds its first and highest object in God, as our relations to Him are closer, more various, and more enduring than to any other being. But it is as a Being acting from affections and will, not as acting according to inflexible (what we call, natural) laws, that God is the object of FAITH. It is because God has a moral nature, that faith can find an object in Him; it is because we have a moral nature answerable to His, that we are capable of exercising faith; and the more clearly and fully we apprehend His moral nature, and the intimacy, breadth, and eternal moment of our relations to God, in the like proportion will our faith be vital and possess practical power.

The knowledge, therefore, which feeds and nourishes faith, is not scientific, but moral. God addresses us through our understanding in Nature—know and believe. In Revelation—whatever may be its medium—God addresses us through the heart and conscience—believe and know,—"*Crede ut intelligas.*" Accordingly, the leading lesson of the Scriptures, from first to last—from Genesis to the Apocalypse—in regard to God is, His independence of Nature; that, in the exercise of a free and absolute Will, He has created and governs the world. All the manifestations of Himself to men, which we have recorded in the Bible, were intended and adapted to impress this on our minds and hearts. This is the rationale of the Scripture miracles. They combine with the Scripture teaching in impressing on men the exclusive, absolute, universal sovereignty of God over Nature. "Jehovah our Lord is one God—doing according to His will in the Armies of Heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth." Nature addresses itself directly to the senses; as

interpreted in science it addresses itself to the understanding. But neither through the one medium nor through the other does it afford direct nutriment to Faith. Nature, as apprehended by the senses—apart from scientific interpretation—has nourished only Fetichism. Nature, regarded through an exclusively scientific interpretation, nourishes Atheism. If science acknowledges any Divinity it is that of an inflexible Law. Miracles impress those who know Nature only through their senses, but to the man of science they become a difficulty rather than an aid to Faith. And in this we may discover one reason why miracles have ceased. At our present scientific stand-point—in other words, with our present knowledge of the laws of Nature—they would perplex more than they would impress. The man of science knows as much of the inflexibility of law, and of the marvellous power of physical forces, as to make him doubt, on the one hand, whether there is any room for miracles, and on the other, whether there is any need for them. And thus we may see in the modes and media, chronologically realized, by which God has supernaturally revealed himself to men, an adaptation to the intellectual progress of the race. His earliest revelations were through manifestations impressive to the senses. Then the will was addressed by specific and detailed Law. And, lastly, the whole affectional and moral nature was appealed to in the life, teaching, and death of Jesus Christ. God would first impress men with his Power, then with His exclusive supremacy, and then, last of all,—yet on the basis of both the former—with the breadth and depth of His affectional nature. Jehovah is one; Jehovah is supreme and absolute Sovereign, but, and this is the ultimate revelation —that of the deepest essence of His moral nature—'God is love.'

Man divested of his affectional nature would, under culture, become a mere intellectual or calculating machine. Hence the corrective to an exclusively scientific culture is found in this element of his being. Here we may see the importance of Poetry and the Fine Arts being cultivated abreast of science; but still more distinctly the adaptation of Christianity to be the "last dispensation"—the ultimate form of religion for the race. Christianity, as—above all other revelations of God—disclosing the depth and breadth of His affectional being, is adapted to be the corrector of the scientific interpretation of His action through nature according to rigid uniform Law. The farther science is pursued the more clearly does it point to Unity and Power—so that miracles are no longer needed to signalise the one or the other—but the further we trace rigid Law, the less and less do we see of Character in the Power or Agent acting through it. Man, as his scientific culture advances, needs a corresponding culture of the heart—of the affections—and Christianity supplies the only adequate instrument of this culture. It is Christianity alone that addresses itself to all the elements and susceptibilities of man's affectional nature. Christ

appealed to this constituent of our being in its whole breadth, as it faces God, man, nature; from its highest susceptibilities all downwards—meeting all, excluding none. Faith in Him is, therefore, the one vitalising element of the religious life. But, more than this, it is under modern scientific culture, a necessity to the proper balance of the mental forces. Emphatically it is true here, "with the heart man believeth;" and in the absence of faith the heart will be neither fully drawn out nor adequately sustained. In its absence, both the intellectual classes and the active classes will almost equally suffer under an extending scientific knowledge—the one will be filled with pride and vain-glory, whilst the ever-augmenting power over nature put into the hand of the other, will be directed more and more to the production of means of self-gratification.

A religious education is thus the highest—the most urgent necessity of our time, and it must be a Christian education. It is in Christianity alone, as we have already said, that we have the full revelation and development of the affectional and moral character of God. Christianity commends itself to reason, when reason is in right exercise, but it is to the heart and conscience it makes direct appeal. If it fails to draw forth a response there, it fails of its great end. A mere knowledge of its facts and doctrines—however extensive and correct—is as morally powerless as any other kind of knowledge. Hence we may see that real religious education involves much more than Christian instruction—it implies affectional training and discipline. To the mere understanding, Christianity will ever be found to present insuperable difficulties—and which increase rather than abate in the progress of knowledge and science. Indeed, it seems as if things were now tending to this, that if Christianity is not received in the moral nature, it will not long be possible to receive it at all—and that only those who "do God's will," shall be able to recognise it as of God. "None of the wicked shall understand, but the wise shall understand."

XXIV.—WISDOM IS WEALTH.

THE question—Is it better that few or many in a community should be born to assured hereditary wealth?—is (like many other questions in social economy,) one to which no categorical answer can be returned.

No absolute dictum can be given forth; only a conditioned and qualified verdict. As yet, in all countries where wealth has been accumulated, only a small minority have been born with the silver spoon in their mouth; and to be so has, to most, brought bale rather than blessing. This is a fact, alike of observation and of history. Yet, persistent belief to the contrary—maintained in the face of this, onwards through all time—implies something more and deeper than that the multitude are everlastingly deceived by appearances. An indestructible human sentiment always points to a reality; and in this case there must be (under the proper conditions and limitations) a real and not merely an illusory—a general, not an exceptional good. Properly to rear, train, and educate any one human creature, requires a great deal of money—more than the majority of those who have large families possess, or can possibly earn. To be born to so much, were a good to every one—provided his parents and instructors were properly qualified for the work of education and training. Where they are not so qualified we doubt whether any amount of pecuniary means will serve to secure the end. And where this primary condition of well-being and well-doing, is not realised, we are perfectly sure it is better to be born to limited than to large means. In the latter case pressure of circumstances—the restraints and requirements involved in continuing to live on at all—perform for the youth, at least some essential portions of that educative and disciplinary process which his parents are disqualified for performing.

To possess the means of properly rearing, training, and educating every human being would be a good for all, but the most essential of these means are such as wealth cannot give. Moral and intellectual endowments occupy the first place amongst them, and in their absence it may generally with truth be affirmed, that the greater the wealth the greater the calamity to the young—the more baleful the star under which they are born. The limitation of hereditary wealth is, therefore, in our present state, rather a check on evil than otherwise, and the law which this limitation observes is one revealing a wisdom and beneficence never enough to be admired.

What is it, in fact, that does, in these days limit hereditary wealth to the few? The absence, in the majority, of those moral qualities which could alone render it a blessing. Men spend money instead of saving it, because their appetites and passions are under no proper control. This, in the greater proportion of instances, is what precludes those who do not possess wealth from acquiring it—what causes those born to it to lose it. Wealth is thus confined to the few, by reason of the absence in the many of the moral qualities indispensable to the proper use of it. As these are diffused, wealth will increase and be diffused. With our means and appliances it must be so, and in spite of all oppos-

ing laws and usages. Indeed, such laws and usages maintain their place, simply and solely, because the people have not sufficient moral power to break them up. Those who labour as producers will be able to conquer for themselves a larger and still larger share of the common good, just in proportion as they succeed in making a yet more essential and primary conquest—that over themselves. Without that the other would be of no value. Educational and moral preparation in the people must precede, or at least accompany, material concessions in their favour, else the latter will be, in great measure, made in vain.

Is then the maintenance of inequitable laws and usages justified, supposing the people are not so prepared? Most certainly not—not even excused. There is another side to the question. Wealth is one great means through which the moral condition of the people is to be elevated; and those who possess the power of influencing and determining its distribution, through social usages and laws, are responsible to the community for the way in which they use that power. Wealth is every day becoming a greater necessity in order to this—just in proportion as our means of producing it increase. The young now need a higher education, in order to well-being and well-doing, than they did during the ages when they were surrounded by less exciting and less stimulative social influences; and it costs more now properly to educate and train them. Consequently, the responsibility of the "upper ten thousand" constantly increases; and their guilt must be proportionately deeper if they continue selfishly to consume means, and selfishly to monopolise advantages, whose diffusion is urgently demanded by the moral and social interests of the body of the people. In our large towns, 40 to 50 per cent. of the deaths are of children under five years of age. Ten per cent. of our births are illegitimate. Many thousands die every year from preventible causes. Ere these and cognate evils can be removed, the people must be better housed, better fed, better taught, and better trained. The intellectually uncultured—the morally and socially debased—can be educated and elevated only by others doing for them what they cannot, or will not do for themselves.

Another fact must be kept in view. You cannot elevate *a class* by exceptional efforts. You may draw up individuals from it by a religious agency, or by presenting educational and literary facilities to the young, but you can elevate the class only by bringing it to share, in a measure, in all the advantages which our modern civilization confers. Common sense will teach us so much—that it is vain to look for identical moral results under two sets of conditions entirely different. We cannot expect people to enjoy health under conditions that breed and foster disease. We cannot expect them to show good taste and reach a high moral elevation without adequate stimulus and training. If we would

see them exemplify the home virtues, we must first provide them with dwellings in which these can be exercised and can live. But wherever we would effect an improvement—often ere we can secure a basis of reformatory operation—money is required. The more urgently, the more widely, it is so, the more guilty, and the more socially disastrous, does its selfish use, monopoly, waste, become.

First and heaviest among the items in our deep debt of undischarged social obligation, is that which accrues as the natural profit from the land. First, because its increase has been proportionate and due to the growth of our numbers, industry, skill, and enterprise; and, therefore, cannot be justly claimed as their patrimony by any class. And, secondly, because being the chief monopoly now remaining amongst us, it stands in double antagonism to the great current of progress. The land monopoly is now an economical anomaly, as well as a social injustice. By the land monopoly we mean those laws and usages, and that social spirit, which restrict the ownership of land to a limited class.

But though the landed proprietors stand first and highest in social responsibility, nothing would be more unwarrantable than to say that they stand alone. Every one who possesses wealth is responsible to the community, as well as to God, for the way in which he uses it. He is not free to invest it in that from which he may expect the largest return —whether of profit or pleasure—without regard to the interests and well-being of others. Society has not conferred on the wealthy and the powerful of these days, so many advantages without their corresponding responsibilities; the manual workers do not contribute so much to our elevation and enjoyment, without having great claims on us in return. Civilisation as it advances,—the greater and still greater division of labour—increases the dependence of the various classes of society, the one on the other. The points are correspondingly multiplied at which they must affect one another for weal or for woe. Nor can the ever-widening duties thence arising be shirked without incurring the inevitable Nemesis. The most energetic portions of the population will be drained away by emigration, while poor-rates, and the demand on philanthropy, will increase. If we will not voluntarily assess ourselves for the elevation of the people, they will certainly tax us by their degradation and their vices. Whatever measures we may take to keep all to ourselves, we shall not be able. If we invest our wealth in what we expect simply to yield us the largest return, without regard to the well-being of others, only the heavier will be the reversion claimed at our hands.

XXV.—CRIME AND CRIMINALS.

THIS subject—at all times important and now felt to be specially pressing—divides itself into two great branches, viz. :—The prevention of crime, and the treatment of criminals. With respect to the first of these—the prevention of crime—we have to take account of both indirect and direct agencies. The sure way to prevent crime would be to train every human being for the right discharge of all the duties arising out of his social relations. It is the interest of society that there should be the nearest possible approximation to this. It is the interest of society that both vice and crime should be minimised to the utmost.

The distinction between vice and crime is technical not generic. Vices and crimes have the same source, viz., undisciplined desires and bad passions. The distinction is warranted, not by a difference in nature between vices and crimes, but by their different effects on society. Crimes are acts which injure society directly; vices are acts and habits which injure the individual primarily and directly, society mediately and indirectly. It is on many accounts desirable that society should, as far as consists with safety, minimise the number of bad acts which it treats and punishes as crimes, for it is the interest of society that, positively and negatively—by agencies direct and indirect—it should keep down the numbers of the criminal class. The criminal class is a costly class, and one very difficult to dispose of. But the most efficient of all means directed to this end is, to give the young a right training, throughout all the grades of society. Crime is dried up at its source by minimising and holding in check vicious inclination. Under a corresponding state of the laws the amount of crime in a community will, generally, be found proportioned to the amount of vice. Where there is much vice there will be much crime. There are many modifying circumstances and influences, no doubt. Poverty has its influence, and wealth has its influence. But crime is not necessarily diminished by the increase of wealth, however it may be, in certain circumstances, increased by the pressure of poverty. Increased wealth, in a community, may even become a stimulus to crime—(as it has been of late amongst ourselves)—when the desire for its attainment is quickened, out of proportion to the honest means of acquisition. But this only tends to show the immense social value of all means and agencies adapted to instil right principles and train in right habits; and that not as

bearing on the depressed classes merely (still less on the criminal class exclusively) but on all classes. Our degraded classes, our criminal classes, and our crime, are fed by vice in the higher grades of society. But on this we need not now enlarge.

With regard to crime and criminals, these three principles may be laid down as dictated, not more by philanthropy than by the interests of Society:—

1. That none should be allowed to grow up criminals.
2. That as few as possible should be allowed to *become* criminals.
3. That the largest possible number of those who have become criminals should be reformed and restored to an honest industrial life.

If these principles need only to be mentioned to recommend them to every impartial mind, it will follow, that the law should, to the utmost possible extent, be directed to the minimising of the numbers of criminals. In this view, the maintenance of the Game Laws, in their present form, would stand condemned though they were objectionable on no other. The Clause of the Amended Public House Act, authorising the magistrate to commit to prison persons found "drunk and incapable" in the streets, on their failure to pay the statutory fine, is swelling our criminal list at rather an alarming rate. In the quarter ending November 30, there were 76 commitments to the Aberdeen prison under the Public House Act while the number committed for theft, during the same period, was 45. It is of great importance that dunkenness should be discouraged. It is quite proper that persons found "drunk and incapable" should be removed from the streets. Nor do we object to their being fined; nor to their being retained in custody for so long, if unable to pay a fine. But to commit a poor man to prison in such circumstances may prove a more serious matter than at first sight appears. If he should in consequence lose his place or the employment by which he earns his bread, it will be far from conducing to his good or to the advantage of the community. If this feature of the New Public House Act is to be retained there will require to be a lock-up for inebriates separate from the common prison. But if we should be careful not to stimulate the increase of crime by legislation, we should be still more careful not to do so by punishment; yet, until recently, there was little of such care. The way in which juvenile offenders were treated, tended directly to convert them into confirmed criminals. It did so by bringing them into contact with prisoners already hardened in crime, and by reason of the social stigma attaching to any one who had once been in jail. As regards juvenile offenders, under 16 years of age, this great and crying evil has been all but extinguished through the institution of Reformatories, and the bringing of our criminal law, thus far, into harmony with the ends of reformatory treatment. But the question has been raised—Have we

gone as far as we ought to go, and might with safety go, in this direction? Why stop short at sixteen? Why not extend the term of reformatory treatment to the age of 20 or 21? Where the education and training have been neglected, is not the youth of from 16 to 20 as much entitled to our commiseration as the boy or girl of 12? If the influences under which he has grown up have been mainly such as are adapted only to stimulate vicious propensities and foster criminal habits, had not society better still subordinate punishment to instruction and reformation? But we shall not at present further pursue these remarks of our own, but submit the views of a correspondent who, on this very important subject, is entitled to speak with authority. He says:—

"By the simple instrumentality of the Industrial School and the Reformatory, juvenile vagrancy and delinquency can be entirely prevented; and if persons can be kept free from crime till they are sixteen years of age, there can surely be no great difficulty in preventing their becoming confirmed criminals after that age, and till they reach 21. But the present mode of dealing with young delinquents is certain to make them confirmed criminals. If two young persons, of the ages of fifteen and sixteen, respectively, are convicted of the same offence, the one is sent to the Reformatory for five years, while the other is committed to Prison for a period not exceeding sixty days. The former is removed from evil associates, and trained to industry, and bears a premium in the labour market when he comes out of the Reformatory. The latter is not improved by the prison discipline, and when he leaves it with the indelible mark of shame on his forehead, he joins his old associates, and resumes his former practices; and after repeated imprisonments in Scotland, is sent to England, to undergo a sentence of penal servitude for five years.

"This servitude, however adapted to the English constitution, is not suitable for the Scotch. The food necessary to maintain strength under the depressing influences of hard work and prison rules, is greatly superior to what the convict has been accustomed to, and to what he can procure by honest labour when he returns to Scotland on ticket-of-leave; and as he cannot obtain by honest means what he has been accustomed to in England, he supplements the deficiency by those practices which prison discipline has not made him altogether forget. Now all this is wrong. The boy or girl of 16, should be treated nearly in the same way as young persons of 15; and if they were so there would soon be no habit-and-repute thieves of the ages of 17, 18, 19, or 20. There are now with us none such under 16, and why should there be any above that age?

"When a young person is led or drawn into crime he soon becomes known to the police, but he may commit a great many offences before

he is convicted of any; and when convicted, imprisonment, the punishment awarded, may harden and deteriorate, but it seldom deters or reforms. Now we would apply the same principle to persons above 16, and under 20 or 21, as to those under 16, and authorise the Sheriff, with a jury, to sentence any young person, convicted of certain crimes, above 16 years, to imprisonment for any period not exceeding 12 months, and to an intermediate period (of reformatory and industrial training) for five years."

Among current and salient social facts there are four in particular which combine to make it difficult for us effectively to deal with Crime and Criminals. 1st, There is the necessity of retaining the great mass of our hardened Criminals at home, through the refusal of our Colonies to receive them. 2nd, The hindrances in the way of the discharged convict finding "place of repentance" through the like repugnance to him on the part of the general community at home. 3rd, The gradual conversion of our punitive into a pampering system, through the increasing revulsion of the public mind from the infliction of pain. 4th, The continued feeding of the stream of criminality, by the vice and immorality still so pervasive of society. If we look narrowly at the matter, we shall find the root of our difficulty in the ill-balanced character of our civilization; in our material having out-run our moral progress. It will never be easy for us to deal with crime while vice and sin are harboured and winked at in genteel society. We may, by means of our Industrial Schools and Reformatories, reduce the class of hereditary criminals; and a most important and exigent effort that is. But unless society be also at the same time purified above, isolated and startling acts of crime will increase—even whilst the mass of hereditary criminality is being reduced—through the increased stimulus to selfish passion which our exterior civilization supplies, and the facilities it affords for the commission of secret crime. Has not this been, in fact, the course and tendency of crime during these recent years? The most aggravated crimes—that of murder, in particular—becoming rarer in the criminal class, but bursting out more frequently—on this hand and on that,—with strange and startling characteristics and aggravations, in general society. If the reader will run over in his mind the murders which, during the last 15 years, have most revolted public feeling and engrossed public attention, from the atrocity of their character or from the subtle and secret agencies by which they have been effected, he will find that the overwhelming majority of them have been perpetrated, not by habitual but by occasional criminals. Farther, on analysing their causes, it will be found that the greater number of them may be traced to cupidity and lust, while the dread of exposure impels to ulterior and often the most atrocious deeds. On the same page of a recent issue of the *Times*,

we find the two following cases. A clergyman of the Episcopal Church, under a charge of seduction, exclaims—"If I lose my case I am a ruined man; it is not the child I care about, but the scandal." A medical man, charged with perjury, and presumably guilty of manslaughter, in order to conceal the issue of the like guilty passion, writes thus—"Discovery would be utter ruin to my prospects, which are so fair as to promise a handsome independency in the course of a few years." Many of the most barbarous and revolting murders have been perpetrated to conceal the real character and guilty deeds of those who have left the path of virtue; and the crime of infanticide—so rife, and so alarmingly on the increase,—is due almost solely to this cause.

This increase of crime—of crime of the most aggravated kinds—among the instructed and reputable classes of society, concerns us more intimately, and more urgently demands our attention than any other phase or relation of the evil. Every instance of such crime rends the slender veil of exterior decency which Society maintains, affording a ghastly glimpse of the rottenness and corruption so widely pervasive within. With very many there is no horror at indulgence of guilty passion—no heart-revulsion at sin or vice—no horror at *being* bad, but at being *discovered* to be bad. If then there is found no diminution but rather an increase of selfish passion, the known indulgence of which brings disgrace, and along with this an extending and growing desire for social esteem, the number of revolting crimes, in quarters where we do not look for such, is not difficult to account for.

But this horror—not at sin, but at our being known to be sinners—has an intimate connection with that morbid sympathy with criminals, of which we have had of late some unwelcome manifestations. Few have any due horror of guilt, but there is in every one a revulsion from pain. So, the guilt is merged in the wish to avert suffering from the culprit. As the progress of our civilisation supplies us more and more with the means of obviating and alleviating pain, so we increasingly shrink from its endurance, and, perhaps, still more from its infliction. This has had a great deal to do with that lenient and indulgent treatment of criminals which has gone on and on, till we have suddenly awakened to a sense that they are much better lodged, fed, and cared for, than the majority of those who honestly toil for their bread. The alarm produced by the garotters—though out of all proportion to the occasion, and threatening us with some very undesirable consequences—will have this wholesome effect; it will serve to recall to our conviction the fact, that we cannot with safety separate guilt from punishment—that the pain we refuse to inflict on the criminal we shall have to endure at his hands.

But there is another connection, deep and intimate, between the state of public sentiment and our treatment of the criminal class. Because

of the prevalent horror—not at guilt, but at our being discovered to be guilty—we shrink from the known culprit. We shrink from inflicting pain on him, but we also shrink from having any personal relations with him. In proportion as we over-estimate repute as compared with worth, do we shrink from the disreputable. Hence very much of the difficulty the liberated convict experiences in finding his way back to an honest livelihood. Not only are we backward to believe in his reform; we have a dislike to him quite apart from our imperfect confidence in *its* genuineness. In short, we fear that through being in any way connected with him, some portion of his disrepute may attach to ourselves. If we were more genuine we should be at once more just and more truly compassionate. We should have less sympathy with the criminal when on trial and under punitive treatment, but more when his term of punishment has been completed—when he most needs our sympathy, and has the strongest claim upon it.

We may thus see how intimate the connection is between the amount and current characteristics of crime, on the one hand, and the treatment of the criminal class on the other, with the prevalent moral tone of society, —may clearly perceive that if we would really master crime we must strive to dry it up at its sources—the sin and vice which we hide from ourselves and others in reputable society. The criminal "difficulty" will abate in proportion as we become more true and virtuous. We shall at once diminish the number of our criminals, and shall deal with them in a truer spirit both of justice and humanity. But we shall never deal vigorously and justly with crime till we deal more vigorously and justly with the vice and sin from which it springs. We shall have a safe and practicable course opening up to us in proportion as we endeavour to purge society at the core; we shall not, and we ought not to have it on any other condition.

XXVI.—"WHITE LIES."

A WRITER in the *Saturday Review* of November 15, 1862, closes an article, headed "White Lies," in these words—

The great duty of truth, or the antagonism between a truthful and a false character, is not destroyed by the fact that *there are falsehoods which it is con-*

sistent with truthfulness to tell, any more than the difference between the red and yellow ray in the rainbow is obliterated by the fact, that the exact point where one fades into the other, cannot be determined. That white lies are no impeachment on truthfulness, is evident from the fact that the most truthful people commit them in case of need, and *that they must be committed* if the business of the world is to go on at all. The contrary doctrine is well calculated to turn a truthful man into a liar. To teach a child, in the name of truth, that all falsehoods are equally guilty, and that he is likely to pass through life without ever being *in duty bound to tell a lie*, is a lie which can hardly be called white, for, when a child finds out the real state of the case, he is apt to conclude that all falsehoods are equally innocent.

Now this does seem to us somewhat extraordinary doctrine; and to be put forth by an organ which claims to be the exponent of the views and sentiments of the most select and educated portion of the society and churchmanship of England, in the latter half of this nineteenth century. The doctrine is very definite, and very broad. It is a justification, not indeed of the "lie direct," but, in certain circumstances, at least, of the direct lie—of downright, conscious falsehood. The writer does not merely say that it may not always be necessary to tell the whole truth, that it may not always be right or expedient to undeceive people; or, that a truthful man may, in certain critical circumstances, be justified in leading on the wrong scent one who means him harm; or in acting so as to produce an impression the contrary of the fact, in order to save the life or honour of a friend. None of these affirmations would have excited much surprise, had they come even from a moralist of a severer school. There is a measure of reticence which the very constitution of our being implies and sanctions. We do not move about with a window in our bosoms. Each soul has the power of keeping what thoughts and feelings it pleases to itself. A truthful man may not only refrain from declaring much that passes within the sanctuary of his own mind and heart, he will proclaim himself a very imprudent man if he does otherwise. How much of his mind he may speak; when to utter all his mind; and when to refrain from uttering his mind at all—will be questions of judgment and conscience with him daily. There is here no sharp line separating prudence from imprudence or duty from sin. In innumerable cases, ever arising, each has, according to his light and convictions, to judge and decide for himself. And men of truth and honour will be found coming to opposite conclusions in very similar circumstances. Temperament, training, the tone of the family, and of the social circle one moves in, have each and all their influence. One man is frank and outspoken by nature, and to such it is comparatively easy to be explicit on principle. Another is naturally reserved or timid, and shrinks from the sound of his own voice in company. No one will affirm that there is, or ought to be—(as, indeed, there cannot be) a rigid canon, equally applicable to

men of these two classes, and making it binding on each to declare himself to the same extent and no farther. That would leave no room for the exercise of prudence or of judgment, and would very much circumscribe the sphere of conscience itself.

But the writer in the *Saturday Review* goes much farther than all this. We have been accustomed hitherto to believe that downright lying was inconsistent alike with the code of honour and of Christian morals. And, if our memory does not greatly deceive us, there appeared only a few months since, an article, in the *Saturday Review* itself, taking very decided ground on the opposite side from that on which the writer before us has placed himself.

If a gentleman is convicted of a lie, there is an end to his claim to that character. That is the doctrine held by the former writer, as it is that (as we have ever understood) of honourable and Christian society. This more recent instructor, however, gives us another view of the case. He makes us feel how much there may be in a name. To tell "white lies" may not only be innocent, but a duty! To teach a child otherwise; to instruct him to cherish a sacred regard for truth, in all circumstances,—to instruct him that he is never to utter what he knows to be false, is to launch him on the sea of life with a chart which will —instead of proving a clear and sure guide—precipitate him into moral chaos. To teach a youth that he must never tell a lie is, according to this writer, the surest way to convert the truthful man into a liar; whilst the way to maintain his truthfulness intact, is to instruct him, that practical life will now and again place him in circumstances where it will be, not only a necessity, but a duty to state what he knows to be false!

The principle which underlies this teaching is obvious enough. It is and can be no other than that "the end justifies the means." A thing so mean and unmanly as telling lies would be justified by no one on any other ground than that of the importance of the end it is expected to accomplish. But this principle has been generally regarded as bad in morals—as essentially *immoral*. And justly so, for the end never is, and never can be, higher than to avoid pain or loss, to ourselves or others; or, to secure a greater amount of profit or pleasure than the truth would secure. But once recognise this principle, and where are we to draw the line beyond which it is to be held mean and immoral to carry it? Once admit that we may tell lies to secure pleasure—to avoid enduring or giving pain—and where shall we stop? Who shall determine the amount of pleasure or the amount of pain—to secure which, or to avoid which, a lie becomes justifiable?

Were we to accept this writer's reading of the practice of society, we should find the license to be very wide indeed which it has actually

taken. "Politeness is," he assures us, "a huge white lie. Its essence is to display towards all men the outward signs of friendliness we can never feel in reality, except towards a very few." Now, admitting, (as we must admit, so far as politeness is mere seeming or pretence), that this judgment is just, we have to ask—Why should people pretend what they do not feel? It can only arise from one of two reasons:—Either they are ashamed of their real sentiments, or they are afraid of the consequences that might ensue from their real sentiments being known. If the first be the true state of the case, then the proper remedy is to be found not in concealing their sentiments, but in striving to have them changed—in having them brought into conformity with the law of justice and love. To cherish and conceal sentiments we are ashamed to express is cowardice, and it is cowardice too, to conceal sentiments we should feel bound to declare, were it not for the pain their declaration may give or occasion. Politeness is beautiful, so far as it is the expression of what we feel to be due to others; it is an hypocrisy and a nuisance when it is assumed to cover what we are either afraid or ashamed to declare. It is then essentially a lie, and a lie which we dare not pronounce "white."

But to whatever extent the politeness current in Society may merit the character assigned to it by the writer before us, there can be no justification, thence derived, of the more aggravated and conscious form of falsehood—the telling of direct, downright lies. "Two blacks don't make a 'white,'" here, more than anywhere else. To tell lies, is in all circumstances, the mark of a low *morale*, and a low culture—of a mean and unmanly character. In proportion as we become men and Christians, truth becomes natural and easy to us and falsehood not only unnatural, but impossible. Manly and Christian sentiments are sentiments of which no one ever needs to be ashamed. In proportion as we come to honour all men for whatever of manhood there is in them; in proportion as we come to love our neighbour as ourselves, in like proportion can we afford to be truthful. When we are what we ought to be, it will never be necessary for us to seem other than we are. Falsehood is excluded under all conditions; but in proportion as Society makes real—and not merely surface or sham advances—concealment will become less and less necessary. Everyone will be prepared to hear the truth when the truth is dearer to him than aught besides. But the world is never likely to reach this state, if telling lies is to be held innocent (not to speak of a duty) under any circumstances.

XXVII.—POPULAR INSTRUCTION—PROVERBS AND NOVELS.

READER did you ever run your eye over a collection of national Proverbs? —let it be Spanish, Italian, or English. You could hardly give such a collection the most cursory perusal without being struck with the vast amount of true philosophy—of deep, far-reaching, practical wisdom—treasured up in those brief and unpretending sentences. A profound interest now attaches to the study of language, as treasuring many a hitherto unsuspected feature of early-world life. To us a still deeper interest attaches to proverbs as the indubitable embodiment of the great guiding principles and life-thoughts of early times. We moderns have made vast progress in physical science, but no such advance in wisdom. For true life-guidance a few of the Proverbs of Solomon would outweigh all the discoveries of our Baconian Science. This great collection shows how early moral intuitions, and a widely generalised experience, had taken the proverbial form. Indeed, when the art of printing was unknown, books rare, and found in the hands of few if any of the common people, it was a necessity that the rules which guide to a virtuous and prudent life, should be put into the most brief, terse, and enduring form. Under such conditions, the wisdom of a people, if preserved at all, must be preserved in this way, as its storied sentiment and heroic achievements were in ballads and poems.

But the modern printing press has not only put an end to this necessity, it seems to have induced the very opposite. Periodicals and books now compete for public favour, not by presenting knowledge and wisdom in the tersest and most condensed form, but by diffusing the smallest modicum over the largest possible space. The consequence is, that we stand by no means on so high a vantage-ground above our benighted forefathers, as we are, in our inconsiderate vanity, so apt to imagine. For our intellectual food and moral aliment we have got novels where they had proverbs. As literature advances proverbs disappear. Polite society thinks itself above them, and cultivated intellect seeks its own modes of expression. They were going without the social ban which Lord Chesterfield recorded and endorsed—"A man of fashion never has recourse to proverbs or vulgar aphorisms." They now linger only in those few rural retreats where primitive manners linger, and threaten to disappear entirely along with the vernacular in which many of the most expressive of them were couched. Their great displacer and substitute is the tale

and novel. Novels form an immense proportion of all books and seriels which are issued, but a far larger proportion of the matter that is read. But the novelistic element (if we may use such a word), has a much wider diffusion in our literature than in the form of tale or fiction merely; and the general craving for excitement is met by writing for effect in the newspaper article, the magazine essay, the review, and even the sermon. Nay, is it not true that our popular histories *are* popular, just in proportion as they are imbued with the elements which attract in fiction?

The great craving is not for instruction, but for excitement and diversion, and the modern Press is ever becoming more and more the slave of the law of Demand-and-Supply. Competition has run down the price of the papers and popular magazines (as against the amount of letter-press), to the lowest, and writers are acceptable, not as they meet the intellectual and moral wants of readers, but in proportion as they can cater successfully for their tastes and cravings. "Literature," says Carlyle, "when noble is not easy, but only when ignoble. Literature too is a quarrel, an internecine duel, with the whole world of darkness that lies without one and within one." Few, however, have the courage to maintain such a combat, in either relation. It is more pleasant to glide along with the current. Hence a prevailingly ignoble literature. And hence, too, follows the unwelcome truth, that a reading age may by no means be a wise one,—may be made unwise in the highest and most practical sense, by the most potent instructional instrument the world has ever known. No: the diffusion of knowledge is one thing, the growth of wisdom another. Indeed, when we look at the treasures of moral insight and practical sagacity, stored up in any collection of national proverbs we are led to doubt whether, as we are gaining in knowledge, we are not losing in true wisdom. Those early sages, though they could not penetrate the secrets of Nature, had a keen eye for moral truth; and it is that, after all, which must yield the true life guidance. Proverbs do not always embody either indubitable truth or the most exalted principles, but the moral and spiritual intuitions they have embalmed, were, we have strong reason to conclude, freshest and most vivid in early times. As the world advanced, prudential maxims—the product of generalized experience—came to form a larger and larger proportion of national proverbs, and these often took in a large alloy of worldly wisdom. A chronology of proverbs, were such attainable, would form an invaluable contribution to the Philosophy of History. It would enable us to trace the moral and social state of mankind through the pre-historic ages. The result—we have strong ground to believe—would show that the course of the early world was one of degeneracy, not of progress. Indeed, we are apt to allow ourselves to be imposed upon as to what constitutes true advancement, and especially as to what constitutes real education. Edu-

cation consists neither of what is put on (in the way of surface polish), nor of what is laid in (of stores of knowledge). Nothing enters into the real education of a man, save what affects his principles of action, so as to mould his life and conduct. Formal and real education may thus be out of all proportion, the one to the other. "There is," says Mr Sharon Turner, "an education of mind, distinct from the literary, which is gradually imparted by the contingencies of active life." "In this education," he adds, "our ancestors were never deficient." We would not go quite so far as this with respect to our predecessors, but there are, at any rate, many indications that our superiority over them in this respect, by no means corresponds to our apparent advantages. These do not necessarily make us superior to our forefathers in anything belonging to the highest elements of well-doing and well-being. Much depends on the way we use them—very much more than we are accustomed to think. Apart from regard had to the proper use of them, our very facilities may become snares.

Do we then undervalue our advantages? Far otherwise. But the higher our estimate of them, the deeper must be our regret at our misuse of them—the greater our anxiety as to the moral and social issue, should that misuse continue and increase. We shall be told that we need not forego any of the wisdom of our forefathers—that we may combine it with the great advantages of our later times. The proverbial wisdom, not of one nation only, but of all nations, is open to us through books while we have all the vast stores of modern literature superadded. The fact is indeed so, and yet we may be doubly misled by it. Do the great bulk of the common people—who in other times found their intellectual food and moral nurture so largely in proverbs—read the master-pieces of our literature? Only, we apprehend in exceptional cases, and those, both mentally and morally, above the average of their class. The mental fare of the many is of a grosser and more stimulating kind than Milton or Shakspere, Wordsworth, and Tennyson—than Addison, Foster, and Charles Lamb supply. And as for imbibing proverbial wisdom through reading, the thing is preposterous. It is like attempting to gulp the food of a month at a meal. Proverbs are to be digested and assimilated singly, and only on fitting occasions. Their main value lies in their being aptly applied. They are the current coin of conversation in practical life, but are passed from hand to hand for purposes of business, not of display.

There is a principle in mechanics to the effect that what is gained in power is lost in time; in our modern popular literature you lose both in time and in power, and gain only in bulk. How many volumes of popular tales, and even of sermons, might we not profitably give in exchange for this old Italian proverb, "You are in debt, and run in far-

ther; if you are not yet a liar you will be one;" or, this other, "No man is greater in truth than he is in God's esteem;" or this, "We ought not to give the fine flour to the devil, and the bran to God," which may have suggested Henry Ward Beecher's famous saying that "Many pray cream and live skimmed milk;" or this English one, "God's mill grinds slow but sure;" or, this again, "The body is sooner well dressed than the soul," or, "The devil tempts others, an idle man tempts the devil." "Pleasure gives law to fools, God to the wise;" this one saying, fully understood and practically accepted, will give better life-guidance than can be found in all the writings of George Eliot. What a deep moral insight is treasured in this, "Every man's censure is usually first moulded in his own nature." "Pension never enriched young men," is a lesson the world needs none the less the older and wealthier it becomes. In this Scotch proverb—"It's a guid tongue that says nae ill, but a better heart that thinks nane"—we have embodied a realisation, at once of the highest reach of Christian perfection, and of the steps towards its difficult attainment. Again, what a knowledge of human nature in two of its main phases, is revealed in this—"A fool is mair happy in thinkin' weel o' himsel', than a wise man is in others thinkin' weel o' him." Whoever gave out—"A great fortune with a wife is a bed full of brambles"—must have been an inductive philosopher with no contemptible means of observation.

Then, good things were recognised and treasured in those days. They were recognised because the taste was not perverted; they were treasured because the need of them was felt. And, once recognised and accepted, they were conveyed from lip to lip more widely, and securely too, if not more rapidly, than the best thoughts of the wisest amongst us are or can be. The publication of the proverb cost nothing; there was no bookseller's commission, and no advertising charges. Indeed, the proverb, like the traveller in those early times, passed from house to house and from land to land on the general hospitality.

Then, our vile modern habit of doubting every thing that cannot be proved by hard figures or hard logic, was unknown to those ages of faith. Nor had they any reason to doubt; these terse embodiments of truth and wisdom verified themselves in each one's consciousness or experience. They did so because they were either intuitions of the moral reason or generalisations from wide observation. For it is quite a mistake to assume that the inductive, any more than intuitive method was unknown in those days. It was largely applied—if not in the domain of nature, yet in the more important sphere of human life. Of this, national proverbs supply innumerable examples. Here are one or two:—"Frost and fraud have always foul ends;" "Diseases are the interest of pleasures;" "He who eats but of one dish never wants a physician;"

"Extravagant offers are a kind of denial;" "God keep me from him whom I trust, from him whom I trust not I shall keep myself."

We have said proverbs—according to the class to which they belong—verified themselves either in the moral consciousness or the relational experience of every one. In either case there was induced a healthy, and, indeed, altogether invaluable mental process. In the first you saw one of your own life principles under a fresh light and in wider relations. In the second, you were led to review and verify the cases ranging under the same category which you had yourself observed. The train of reflection awakened in either case might well be worth more than a twelvemonth's popular reading of much that the million are now supplied with.

XXVIII.—LITERATURE AND NATIONAL LIFE.

THE relation of a national literature to the social life of a nation constitutes one of the most momentous questions which can engage the attention of thoughtful men. It has been always so; but much more now, by reason of the spread of popular education, a habit of reading ever extending amongst the people, and the fresh stirrings of Thought and Inquiry, leaving nothing now to be accepted on authority or trust.

Literature exercises two distinct kinds of influence—each highly important—the one on the æsthetic culture, the other on the beliefs of a people; and these two unite in forming a third not less important, viz., that exercised on the moral sentiments of the people and the moral tone of society. Now, of these three sorts of influence, the first is, if perhaps the most potent, yet the most limited, being exercised only by a high-class literature, and on a minority of cultivated and susceptible minds. There is indeed a distinction to be noted here, between the literature of popular sentiment and the literature embodying the ideas and moods peculiar to thoughtful and cultivated minds. Of the one class, Burns is a well known and distinct example, and Tennyson of the other. The one, of course, appeals to a much more numerous class than the other. The one appeals to the sympathies and hearts of the people, and presupposes no special susceptibility or culture to qualify for being appreciated and enjoyed, whilst the other requires some *corresponding* culture, and presupposes a community of mood and sentiment. A very subtle question might be raised, how far a literature which can be at once enjoyed by all,

can act as an instrument of æsthetic culture. Judging from the influence of the poetry of Burns as a refining agent on the common people of Scotland, we would be led to say, only to a limited extent. At all events, the literature of Popular Sentiment must be much inferior as an instrument of æsthetic culture to the literature of Ideas.

But what is the real distinction between the two? It consists, we apprehend, in this. The literature of popular sentiment gives vivid artistic expression to the feelings common to humanity, or the sentiments which have exercised abiding traditional sway in a nation for ages; whilst the literature of ideas embodies the thoughts and emotions which are stirring in the most original and productive minds of the time. And here, again, we have no better illustration of the two classes respectively than Burns and Tennyson. Burns sang of the loves and friendships of the people, and of the common sentiments of our Scottish patriotism, with a depth of realising emotion, and a felicity and beauty of diction never surpassed; but there were no new ideas—there was no fresh moral vitality—in his song. This was probably due, in part, to the cast of his genius, but still more to the fact, that such were not stirring in the social atmosphere under which his tone of thought and sentiment were formed and matured—under which the finest of his pieces were written. Ere he had become affected by the new tide of thought and sentiment which rose so high, and burst so violently on the old landmarks, in the French Revolution, his moral feelings had undergone a process of debasement, which more than neutralised the expansion and deepening of Thought that was, or might have been, thus induced. The consequence is, that the works of Burns—amid all the wide and various influence they have exercised over his countrymen—have given no impulse to the intellectual and moral life of the nation.

Ere it can do this great service, a literature must embody one of two elements. It must give vivid artistic expression to the thoughts which are stirring in the most active, productive, and original minds of the time, or to the fresh moral convictions which social progress and unwonted social exigencies are inducing. And, clearly, the power and influence of a writer will be greatest when he combines both. Tennyson does so. In *In Memoriam*, you meet the deepest problems of the time, laid hold of with marvellous grasp, and expressed with rare fidelity and appreciation, irradiated or shaded (as the case may be) by their appropriate or inevitable moral and spiritual implications. What Matthew Arnold says of Heinrich Heine is true of Tennyson:—"He has touched all the great points in the career of the human race, ... and with a wand which brings them under a light where the modern eye cares to see them." And he has touched them with strokes sounding deeper, and ringing truer than

anything Heine could reach; and because his hand is not paralysed by the fatal defect indicated so truly and suggestively by Professor Arnold. "To his [Heine's] intellectual deliverance, there was an addition of something else wanting, and that something else was something immense; the old fashioned, laborious, eternally needed moral deliverance." "He is [therefore] not an adequate interpreter of the modern world." In default of this no man can be. And, given the needful susceptibility, culture, and intellectual power, a man will be an "adequate interpreter of the modern world," according to the completeness of his moral and spiritual "deliverance."

And, if this is needful in order to the literary man being qualified for being an interpreter of the social and moral phenomena—of the prophetic longings, the tendencies, the exigencies of the time—much more to his being a guide, a moulder of the chaotic thought and sentiment, which are struggling for life; which, are, as it were, appealing to the purged eye and the plastic hand. As society never before embraced such elements of complication and danger, so there was never before such an urgent demand on Literature—never before a function of such delicacy and importance imposed on literary men. Would we could say that the responsibility is prevalently realised. Would we could say that it is so adequately by even any one of our accepted and popular writers. That temptation (or necessity shall we say?) to be "popular," is infecting with a fatal taint the productions of many more than one or two writers who are capable of better things than the public appetite cares to digest, or publishers to encourage. The money-changers have established themselves in the temple, and literature is in peril of becoming more degraded by the million purchasers than it was in other days by the one patron. Indeed, as has just been most pertinently said—(*Reader*, Aug. 22, 1863)—"What are those who pass as our most superior writers and thinkers, but, in many cases, mere vendors of what may be called carefully-connected thoughtlets?" Why, at this time of day, is it so? Partly because, as Professor Arnold says, Englishmen pooh-pooh "ideas," but partly also because there is not enough of what we must call spiritual discernment and moral earnestness in our literary men, to enable them, first to lay hold of the needful and struggling truth, and then to give it honest, unalloyed expression, be the message "popular" or the opposite. The current taste may not encourage that kind of literature which is the great intellectual and moral need of the time. It is not, therefore, any the less, on the contrary, it is the more the duty of those who are gifted with anything of the "vision and the faculty divine," to furnish it notwithstanding. If Moses and Joshua are unfaithful to their trust, how ever shall the people be led on to the Promised Land!

XXIX.—THE BIBLE AND ITS ASSAILANTS.

It would contribute greatly to the Bible obtaining its appropriate and uncontested recognition, if those who deem themselves specially charged with the duty of vindicating its claims, would substitute for the idea of Perfection that of Adaptation. Revelation had from the first a practical object; and, of all books, the Bible is the most practical. But such being the case, it has, of course, ever aimed at what was practicable. The divine intention—luminous on it from its first page to its last—is to make men what they ought to be; but in order to this it deals with men as they are. First of all, they are, (as they must be) addressed as men. They are addressed in human language, and in the speech of the people and the time. It follows that such a Revelation must submit, not merely to the conditions of human thought, but to the limits imposed by the language used, that being, indeed, the exponent of the thought of the people. The capacity of thought is a development, both in the individual and the race; and in the earlier ages of the world men seem to have been as incapable of pursuing abstract thought—even of admitting abstract ideas—as children are in the early years of life. Accordingly, in the early Scriptures, we find everything presented, so to speak, in the concrete. Men moved in, and were conversant with, the world of sense, and the sensible world was made the medium of all early divine instruction. God manifested Himself in bodily form, and He is represented as if acting by means of bodily organs, both in creating and governing the world. This one fact—so simple, so indisputable, we may even say, so inevitable—duly realised, would solve a host of difficulties, and clear away at once vast masses of inconsiderate objection. Realising this, we discern that the Bible does not describe the *mode* in which God created the world; the object is to give the most indubitable impression of the fact. The double object is ever kept in view to make God known as Creator, and as Sovereign or Moral Governor of the world. He is *El Shaddai*—the Maker of all things; He is *Jehovah*—self-existent and independent, therefore indisputably and absolutely supreme. And thus does revelation provide, at its very fountain-head, against what have been through all ages the two typical phases of religious error—Pantheism, or the tendency to merge the Divine personality and independence in a Spirit of the Universe, and Polytheism, or the tendency to distribute Divine attributes and honours

among a host of superior beings. So that, in a feature of the Mosaic writings which has proved the *pons asinorum* of so many critics, and the rock on which the faith of so many spiritual sciolists has made shipwreck, we may recognise a clear and special mark of Divine inspiration.

When we think that God was thus made known in His essential character, as the One Self-existent, Independent Being; and in His character as the Creator and Governor of the world, in the language of a simple and semi-barbarous people—a people so incapable of abstract thought, that their language could not express the essential nature of God as a Spirit, otherwise than by a metaphor;—we surely need have no hesitation as to the fact, that God Himself, and none other, was their teacher—that God did indeed appear unto Abraham, and speak to Moses "as a man speaketh to his friend."

But when thus regarded, we can see how necessarily all such manifestations and revelations must be inadequate. We never, indeed, regard the manifestations God made of Himself—*e. g.*, to Abraham at Mamre, or to Moses at Horeb, as other than symbolic of His real nature—as accommodations to the power of apprehension in His servants, and why should we impose severer conditions on the account of His work as Creator of the world, which He gave to them, or incited them to record? We have no more right to demand, in the opening portion of Genesis, an exact description of the *process* of creation, than to assume that God ought to have revealed Himself to the early fathers of the race, solely and alone in the essential spirituality of His *nature*. To that height, indeed, God meant to raise the conceptions of men, as the crowning portions of the Scripture Revelation leave us no room to doubt—but not at a jerk—not by miracle; not by re-creating man, but through a long, painful, chequered process of training, culture, and providential discipline. The proper exercise of man's intellectual faculties was not to be anticipated or superseded, but neither must violence be done to His moral constitution; for to do either would have been to defeat the object of Revelation altogether. God interposed to cure the moral malady which had affected man's nature, not to change his nature or constitution in any respect. The Bible, therefore, always deals with him as he is—addresses him in his own language—appeals to him through his natural sympathies—speaks to him, in short, in a way he can understand and feel. Thus may we see that the medium of Divine Revelation is, and must necessarily be, largely human, and adapted to the receptive capacity, and the susceptibilities of those addressed. But there is a progress, a training towards the higher and more adequate spiritual apprehension. At first, God appears to man in a human form, and speaks to him in audible words. Then He manifests Himself to him

in dreams and visions of the night. Then He makes the mind of the prophet the medium of His Word. Then when "the fulness of the time had come," the Word becomes incarnate, and the moral nature of God attains its most expansive and comprehensive manifestation in a living man. Finally, after a brief sojourn among us, Christ withdraws from the world, having introduced the dispensation of the Spirit. Under that dispensation, all manifestation of God to the senses ceases. Human thought has now so far liberated itself from sensuous forms and conditions, as to be capable of apprehending spiritual being. God proclaims Himself a Spirit, and demands that true worship should correspond to this latest and highest manifestation of His character. The days of tutelage under sense—the days of bondage to type and symbol—are past, and the spiritual must correspond to the intellectual emancipation of man. The symbolic and sensuous element must take a subordinate place in his worship, as he has now become capable of subordinating it in the motive forces of his individual and social activity.

And in this relation it is most note-worthy that the grand characteristic of this last dispensation is freedom—"Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Through a long process of discipline, thought, training, and culture, the human intellect has become liberated from the bondage of sense; but this mental freedom will become nugatory without a corresponding spiritual emancipation. The security and guarantee of the former can be found only in the latter. It is "he whom the Son makes free who is free indeed." His disciples and followers are liberated from sensuous and selfish considerations as the ruling motives of action.

Intellectual freedom (including social) is to be sustained, as it is conditioned, by spiritual freedom. That freedom is not a state of lawlessness, but of correspondence of the inner as well as the outer life to the law. It is man re-placed in his proper relation to God and to his fellowmen, and it approximates perfection in proportion as his life—inner and outer—becomes adjusted to the requirements of those relations.

To effect this is the clear purpose of the Scripture revelation from beginning to end. It is the purpose of all the manifestations there recorded, as made of Himself by God to man—of all His dealings with mankind—of all the educative and disciplinary treatment to which nations and races have been subjected.

And, as matter of historic fact, what system, force, or agency has been prevailingly, progressively, and abidingly available for this, save the truth which is embodied in the Scriptures? Where is social and intellectual freedom enjoyed?—where does mind show its greatest triumphs, in culture, in refinement, in productive power?—where has man attained the greatest mastery over Nature, acquired the deepest knowledge of her laws, and drawn from her forces the largest measure of service?—

who, in a word, are the peoples that are in the van of human progress the dominant nations, to which all other Powers and peoples are every day, and everywhere, succumbing? They are the nations in which Christianity is received, where its principles have, in a measure, blended with the intellectual and national life—where its facts have been believed, its doctrines taught, and its worship observed, through long and continuous ages.

And it is not due to any defect or inadequacy on its part, but to the imperfect recognition and embodiment of its principles, that these nations are still afflicted with perilous and disastrous evils. Christianity embraces a cure for them all, and needs only to be honestly, fully, and practically adopted in order to the cure being effected. The proof of its divine origin (we may admit without disparagement to it) is not yet complete, but there is nothing wanting save its universal acceptance and adequate realization. There would no longer be room for doubt about the "doctrine" of the Bible, if men would only set themselves "to do the will of God" as therein revealed.

XXX.—THE NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL.

THAT which has become in our day the great stumbling-block to the acceptance of the Bible is that which gives to the Bible its distinctive value and glory—the Supernatural element. Direct DIVINE REVELATION and DIVINE MANIFESTATION—to, and in, humanity—that is the vital and quickening power in Scripture. GOD there addresses man; that is the secret of the "spirit and life" which inhere in the Scriptures as nowhere else. You may explain away the physical miracles recorded in the Scriptures, but there is a higher witness which cannot be set aside or silenced; that witness is found in the living truth which they embody.

But whence this modern and ever-growing hostility to the Supernatural? The subject is worthy of a little investigation—is, indeed, one of the most momentous questions that can be raised.

The root and germ of all scepticism as to the supernatural, is found in Hume's argument against miracles, that they are contrary to experience. But, if we can recognise within our experience a power strictly analogous (not differing in *kind* but in *measure*) to the power of working miracles, then Hume's argument is cut up by the roots, and all the sceptical developments that have had their outcome from it, fall along with it. This is what we believe can be done, by an analytic and inductive process which we now propose to indicate.

We must begin with Nature, for, ere we can differentiate the Supernatural, we must first ascertain the characteristics of the Natural, and circumscribe its field. We must realise what science is, ere we can contradistinguish from it—Philosophy. "Things will change whether we like it or not," says Silas Marner; "things won't go on for a long while just as they are, and no difference." This is a simple expression of our most familiar and uniform experience, yet it contains the key to the phenomenal universe. It is in virtue of the constitution of the world that things are ever changing. But when we affirm that change goes on and on, by the very *constitution* of things, there is implied another fact. A constitution implies order. Under a constitution the changes are not capricious; they do not emerge by chance, or unrelated one to another. A nexus runs through them; they depend one on another. The bond of system, of type, of development, is traceable as far as our observation extends, through space and through time. It is the same light as that of our sun which comes to us from the most distant stars and nebulæ. There are great principles of organization pervading, not only all extant animal and vegetable life, but all remains of these embedded in the earth's crust, back to their earliest traces, in the stony records of the long dim Past. We will not now discuss the question, whether a system, at once so complicated and so comprehensive, traceable through space and through time, implies Design and points to a Designer. It is something else that, for our immediate purpose, we have to note, as implied in these two great facts of unceasing change and abiding order. How do they stand related to our knowledge? Knowledge is to us possible, only through diversity; through one thing being different, and thus distinguishable, from another. It is thus as respects things coming within the sphere both of our observation and our consciousness. But, what makes a knowledge of anything beyond that sphere possible to us? It is just this, that changes or phenomena are related one to another, that they emerge after a settled order or system. Had phenomena no relation one to another, we should never get beyond what we observe and experience. Our knowledge would consist of a mass of isolated, indigestible facts. Knowledge through testimony is possible only because men have common perceptions, understandings, and emotions. Without such a common ground, any rational communication with one another would be impossible.

Science acquaints us with facts beyond the sphere of our experience and observation, or underlying it. But science (as is thus evident) is attainable, only because there is change proceeding on system, according to definite and determinate laws. Only by reason of this is science possible at all; and there is no natural hindrance to our science becoming commensurate with the whole extent of the domain where phenomena emerge according to such laws. Wherever a nexus exists, and the phenomena are open to us, we may trace the connection of the one with the

other—by observation sufficiently extended and patient—by adequate perspicacity and mental grasp.

But, here the great question presents itself, Is the whole range of Being bound by this nexus of determinate, uniform, inflexible law? To this question three answers are possible to be rendered. We may affirm that it is; or we may deny that it is; or we may say that, for the present, we have no means of knowing. Those disposed to assume that all existence is bound by this nexus of inflexible natural law, are those who are also constantly reminding us that we are not warranted to conclude anything beyond our experience, save what is ascertained by strict scientific process. But a nexus of determinate law not having as yet been traced through all existence by any such process, it is according to their own showing, a pure unwarranted assumption that such nexus does bind all being. The Positivist, however, concludes, from what we have already achieved, that we can go on to conquer all. We are, indeed, warranted in no conclusion but such as strict science conducts us to, but we see science still advancing—ever conquering new domains—and we may not set any limits to her possible extension, short of the whole range of being. But in this assumption the Positivist ignores or mis-reads a whole class of familiar facts. Outside the sphere of his scientific conquests the world is not the blank he would have us believe. Science is the expression of invariable facts, and it extends as we detect the law underlying another and another such class of facts. It is really *science*, only because, like agents, operating under like conditions, always produce like effects. Science deals with what can be numbered, measured, weighed. Numbers, lines (lengths), definite proportions, are the instruments by which it works. When these fail, or become inapplicable, it can advance no farther. Chemistry bases on definite proportions. Biology, if it is to become a science, can become one only through the life-forces being determinable, mensurable. Social statics grounds on numbers, and can become science, just so far as numerical results (*e.g.*, forces, proportions, products) are definite, and no farther.

The question, then, as to the possible scientific ordination of all knowledge resolves itself into a question of fact. Do we know anything to which these scientific instruments are inapplicable—anything that refuses the strict limits of number, weight, and definite proportion? We do; and by the most intimate of all kinds of knowledge, that of experience. Our emotions, such as love, joy, fear, hope, are (it will be allowed) an essential constituent of our conscious life. But these are not mensurable. We cannot assign limits to either their intensity or their duration. But our emotions and passions constitute the great motive forces of individual and social activity. In the individual life, and in society, they occupy the place which corresponds to that of determinate force in nature. We do not say that they are not amenable to

natural forces They are so, largely, through our connection, by our bodily senses and sensibility, with the natural world. The world of sense, by its phenomena and laws, bears in on, and affects, our emotional life at all points; but it does not rule it, or does not, when we act up to the endowments of rationality. Another force meets, checks, modifies, and moulds its influence—that of WILL. Will implies an alternative; more than one course open—a choice. Man, in proportion as he acts rationally, guides or represses impulse for reasons; and he is capable of so acting, only in virtue of possessing that power we name WILL. Here we have a quite different kind of action from what we perceive in Nature —action induced by the combined forces of perception, emotion, reason, and will. The perceptions are not exactly the same in any two individuals; they are indefinitely variable. The emotions are indefinitely variable, both in their practical force, and in their interblending, one with another. The conclusions of the reason (operating upon the perceptions and emotions), are widely variable. But there is another distinction between physical and volitional force. In physical forces we have transition, re-direction, composition, and decomposition, but neither increase nor diminution in the sum total. But in volitional force, when the rational being acts up to his endowments, there is ever-increasing power. Knowledge is ever extending; and every exercise of will, in repressing passion, regulating emotion, and inducing action, enhances that power. There is ever-growing force, and not withdrawn from any other quarter.

But this is not all. The conditions and influences under which men act, are never, in the case of any two individuals, identical. Not only does each differ from every one of his fellows, in mental capacity, temperament, and susceptibility, as well as in culture; these have been in every case affected and influenced by the mental powers, temperament, and character of an ancestry, stretching back to an indefinite remoteness in time, and spreading out through indeterminate numbers. The vivid sketch given by Hugh Miller of his paternal and maternal ancestry, though reaching only a few removes backwards, is yet sufficient to suggest to us that the elements of this kind, entering, so to speak, into the composition of a man of genius, may have been forming, combining, concentrating, and ripening, onwards, through innumerable generations. And so, in measure, though the results are less conspicuous and impressive, in the case of every man.

We might, therefore, be fully warranted in maintaining, that a strict and definite science of rational activity is utterly unattainable—that we can never ordinate the motive influences in the case of any one individual —because a large portion of the data or elements are utterly beyond our reach. But, though this would rest the case on a sufficient and decisive ground, it would yet not rest it on the right ground. The limitation of our knowledge and powers, though a sufficient and decisive reason why

a strict science of rational action is unattainable, is not the distinctive and fundamental reason. That is found in the very nature of the case. The motives of rational activity do not admit of being weighed or measured, and, in blending, they do not obey the law of definite proportions. We cannot accurately compute the force of any one of them, and still less can we formulate all their possible combinations. We cannot say, in any individual case, what love may impel to; we cannot measure the intensity of hatred or revenge. We cannot say how far ambition may carry him in whom it is the master passion. The love of life is paramount, in the mass of men, over every other principle or sentiment, yet it has frequently yielded to despair on the one hand, and to the power of conscience on the other. But, who would undertake to predict how, after a lapse of years, any given individual would act, under a critical trial, whether of the one kind or the other. Look at an infant in the cradle; we cannot say what that child may become. A million—yea, many million chances to one—it will be, neither a Napoleon, a Newton, nor a Shakespeare. Yet Napoleon, and Newton, and Shakespeare smiled and screamed, were suckled and rocked to sleep, just like other children. And as little can we determine what, ultimately, any one may do, as what any one may become. Persons are, by their deeds, ever and anon exciting the wonder of their neighbours—are, often, in great measure unconsciously to themselves, cherishing passions and acquiring habits, tending one day to precipitate them into acts from which they would now recoil in horror. "Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?"

Our mental powers, our emotional susceptibilities are, in their original capacity and measure, physical. Their involuntary movements and exercise—however occasioned—are physical, conforming to their appropriate laws. But physical action is arrested, wherever WILL comes in, to check or guide emotion, to concentrate attention, or to direct thought. There is, then, introduced the element of choice. The mind has elected one of two alternatives, and the result is different from what it would have been—perhaps the opposite of what it would have been—had mere physical action gone on. The internal activity (and with it the external) has had a new direction given to it, not by a new physical force, but by the will, acting on conscious reasons and for a definite end. The course taken, whatever it may be, is matter of choice. But choice is an element of which physical nature, through all her ever-varying activities, knows nothing. And this elective power is no matter of dubious speculation; no matter of hearsay, or of mere inference. It is matter of consciousness. We possess it. If faithful to our capacities and endowments, we exercise it every day and hour.

Here, then, in our own consciousness, we can recognise the limit of mere physical action; we can (each one) recognise a power, arresting, diverting, controlling it. We have not to *speculate* concerning the

existence of another force, contradistinguished from physical force and transcending it. Within certain limits we wield this force, and, in virtue of possessing it, can suspend, control, and re-direct the forces of the natural world to new and special ends. And it would not need a force different in *kind* from this volitional power which we ourselves possess and exercise—it would but need that it should be of sufficient amount, and directed by sufficient knowledge and skill, to control, suspend, and re-direct all physical forces.

But, what regulates this volitional power? To regulate this order of activity something other than Natural Law is required; and, because it embraces elements that stand contrasted to, and altogether transcend natural agents and forces. But there is only another kind of law known to us, adapted to secure order. That is moral law, the appropriate guide and standard of rational activity. And moral law is not less profoundly adapted to secure order, to guide rational activity to its proper end, than is natural law adapted to the ends of physical action. In the case of each the adaptation is perfect; the difference in result arises from the difference in the nature of the subjects, respectively. These not only differ, they stand in entire contrast. The natural (material) substance obeys a determinate and resistless force. The moral agent, on the contrary, has to elect between two courses—to make a choice. It is what he is constituted and equipped for; reason (having ever regard to moral law) being his guide. When moral law is recognised as a paramount authority; when all the propensities, passions, and desires are brought under regulation, conformably to its dictates, order (the order proper to it) pervades the entire rational activity. The process of regulating and ruling becomes easier and easier as it passes into habit. The proper exercise of the power to choose (with a paramount regard to the right and wrong of the case) is ever strengthening that power. As new moral questions open up, and unwonted testing exigencies arise, there is a higher capacity of realisation, and a higher practical energy evolved. The principles of action become more deeply rooted and more comprehensive through every new occasion and every right decision. Conduct tends ever to become more consistent, and the course of action more and more determined. The grand secret of order is found in the force and fixity of moral law; and your confidence in any individual, as to how he will act, in any given circumstances, will be proportioned to the degree in which you know him to be amenable to that law, and to have got his propensions, passions, and desires in rein under its influence.

We have seen that every man is, in virtue of his compound nature, amenable, more or less, both to natural and moral law. And the one as the complement of the other. In proportion as a man acts agreeably to moral law, and disciplines his powers and propensions conformably thereto, in that proportion does he become free of the natural forces, both

exterior and interior. He becomes more and more independent of circumstances. He gets more and more the mastery of his passions and desires, as moral principles lay hold on, possess, and direct the spring of his activity. The moral element is ever more and more displacing the physical or natural—becoming the substance and pith of every constituent of the active nature. As this process advances, circumstance is ever losing its hold on the man; he becomes more free of his surroundings, more self-contained, ever more intimately related to, ever more and more drawing the nutriment of his true life from the Unseen. Till Andrew Marvell's beautiful image of the free soul is realised—

> ——"So girt and ready to ascend;
> Moving but on a point below,
> It all about does upward bend."

A process very much the reverse of this goes on in those who do not regulate their thoughts, emotions, and propensities by Will, under the guidance of moral reason. When the thoughts are allowed to wander, with no bridle on casual association; when there is no check on the emotions and desires, derived from fixed and ruling principles, involuntary forces acquire greater and greater power. From the constitution of the mind their proper guide and regulator is the Will. But if the will forego its function—and because the moral reason is dormant or unfaithful—there is then nothing to restrain that activity of the conscious forces which is really physical. And, as this action of desire, propension, and passion becomes habitual, proportionately is a determinate action given to the life-course. The greater the ascendency of any passion—be it for wealth, for power, for distinction, for pleasure—the more does that course come under the dominion of physical law. The forces proper to the rationality—reason, conscience, will—succumb and are overborne by physical influences and agencies which take their place. We cannot cease to recognise and honour the higher law without being delivered over to the tyranny of the lower.

And thus man is never abandoned to chance. If he fails to regulate his course by moral law, he will fall under the dominion of physical law. It is here that we find the solution of the proximate uniformity of social phenomena; and can see how social statics are possible. With every scope for variety in the individual, there is thus secured a certain uniformity in the aggregate; disorder in the moral world is prevented from becoming chaotic and limitless. In proportion as any man abnegates his birthright and high endowment of self-direction, in that proportion does natural law take hold of him and drive him on. He will, to a certainty, be absorbed in the natural world, and carried along by its resistless sweep if he fail or refuse to exercise his power of rising above it. And, thus do we find in man the meeting point, yea, the battle-field, of the physical and

moral. We are each of us summoned to a conflict whose significance few, if any, adequately realise. We dare not decline it, save at a peril which there is nothing in nature to illustrate or symbolise. But, declining or accepting, God never quits hold of us. His "hook is in the nose" of those who most proudly spurn his authority, and only all the more securely that the barb is of their own forging.

Let us now gather up our findings and apply them to that kind of action, popularly regarded as supernatural, but the very possibility of which is denied in our day, viz., that of working miracles. We see that we ourselves (puny creatures as we are) can arrest physical forces; can check, control, and re-direct them, both in our own conscious activity, and in the outer world. We see man effecting changes in nature, of a magnitude proportioned to the combined skill and force he can bring to bear upon it. In his mind —in its faculties and susceptibilities—is lodged a power, distinctly supernatural. The extent to which he can rule nature and direct her forces to his own specific ends, is proportioned to his knowledge of those forces, which again depends on the cultivation, discipline, and exercise of his powers. In proportion as he is true to himself—cultivates his mind, subdues his passions, wisely directs his studies and inquiries—in that proportion does his power over nature increase. His dominion extends in proportion as he governs himself. Then, the more intimately, the more widely, man comes to understand the laws of nature, the more wonderful the results—the new effects—he can produce. The boast of Archimedes that, give him a fulcrum, and he could move the world, was a symbol, if not a prophecy. It is only limitation of knowledge and limitation of power that circumscribe our control and mastery over nature. It needs not an agency *altogether different in kind* from ours, but one greater in measure, to work what we designate miracles. In our own conscious voluntary power we have a type—feeble it may be, but real—of highest supernatural power. We can control and re-direct physical forces—within us and around us—so far, at least, as to make miracles readily conceivable. All real difficulty vanishes from the Scripture Miracles in the light of these simple considerations—when the Agent is a Being who knows all physical forces, in their action and interaction, who has himself fixed their sphere and laws, and who wields the power of Omnipotence. In effecting our little changes in nature, time is an indispensible requirement. But many of the changes man effects in Nature would, were they instantaneously produced, fulfil the conditions of a true miracle. God—unless we deny to him the attributes of eternal Godhead—can act independently of the condition of time. As he speaks it is done. Time is not a necessity to him, but only to the finite life and activity of the creature.

Then, the miracles of Scripture never transcend what we may call the necessary limits and conditions of the physical system. They were all

wrought within these limits. They were not prodigies; they did not produce monstrosities. There is no evidence that any of them required the creation of a new element, or the destruction of any existent material or force. The miracles of healing were simply instantaneous restoration to health. When water was turned into wine, there was the instantaneous conversion of a liquid, with one set of qualities, into one with quite a different set of qualities. But the passing of constituents from one body to another is what we are familiar with as a natural process. We have entire changes in constituents where the exact form (as in petrifaction) is retained; only they require time. Even in the greatest of all the miracles recorded in Scripture—that of raising the dead—it was the same body that was resuscitated; and, in the body of the risen Lord himself were the mark of the spear-wound, and the "prints of the nails." Apart from the recalling of the spirit, in the last-named class of miracles, all else might be effected by a suspension, a re-direction, or on instantaneous combined concentration of existing agencies. Take the miracle of the loaves and fishes, for example. All the required elemental constituents existed in abundance in the surrounding air, earth, and water. If we credit God with the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence, to bogle at miracles is utterly childish.

Nor need we regard a special revelation of spiritual and moral truth as an incredible or altogether irreducible anomaly. All true moral action is above nature—could never have arisen out of mere natural agencies—and is therefore properly to be traced to a super-natural source. To be capable of it man was created in the "image of God." The law which regulates it must have been matter of Divine teaching, whether intuitively or by external revelation. And what but the power of spiritual and moral truth is it that has kept any section of mankind from sinking into the slaves of appetite and passion—of becoming subordinated to natural forces. To a Divine source all nations, who have a religious system, trace their religious ideas, thus greatly enhancing the probability of a primitive and truly divine revelation. It may not be easy to determine what amount of religion, or of religious truth, there would have been in the world had there been no special revelation; but we can hardly conclude there would have been much of either, if we reflect on the state of the outlying barbarous tribes on the one hand, and only glance at the influence of revealed truth on the other. In estimating that influence we must have regard, not only to all whom it has directly affected through their having believed it, but also to all the influence they have exerted on others in consequence of this belief. Who shall measure the extent of this influence, direct and indirect? Who will undertake to say how different the state of the race now is from what it would otherwise have been as regards knowledge, science, and institutions—as regards power to make nature contribute to its comfort, its well-being, and its still ad-

vancing progress. The difference between Christian nations and the heathen may serve, so far, to indicate it. But only so far; for we cannot tell how much Hinduism or Buddhism, for example, owes to a primitive revelation, either by direct or reactive stimulus. Indeed, in the absence of all revelation of spiritual truth man would, too probably, have everywhere sunk into a degrading Fetichism to rise no more.

It is for want of the recognition of a few simple but fundamental principles, and a few definite landmarks like these, that so many among us are losing themselves in the labyrinths of a scepticism, out of which they can find no certain clue. We have made great progress in exact and physical science, but we want something more than science. We want, not *savans* merely, but thinkers. Science has done much for us, but it cannot do all; and we have now been overtaken by the Nemesis of our contempt of Philosophy. We cannot carry our exact science into the great domain of rational activity, but are we therefore condemned never to get beyond a mere knowledge of isolated facts, or left to speculative guesses, unrealised hypotheses, and endless controversy as to their relations and meaning? There is no such necessity. The limits of Natural Law are not the limits of the Knowable. There is truth (and the highest) to be found in the sphere of rationality, but we must know both what to seek, and how to find it. The method must correspond to the subject-matter. The instruments of exact scienee, applied to that which refuses to be weighed or measured—which does not obey the law of definite proportions—would yield us anything but true results. But, though we may not have exact science, we may have something better. We may find here a higher truth than mere science can express. When we enter the sphere of Rational Activity, we have transcended that in which Natural Law reigns unchecked. But we have not been driven out into chaos. This. too, is the sphere of order. But we trace it—we find its guarantees—not in rigid Laws, but in PRINCIPLES.

But what is a Principle? A Principle differs from a Natural Law, as the two sets of facts differ, to which they respectively apply. A natural law expresses the uniformity of physical action; a principle expresses the unison of rational action. Under natural law a rigid uniformity is observed, when like forces act under like conditions. In volitional activity there is not this rigid uniformity, either as respects action or conditions. A principle expresses the invariable in the varying—at once allows variety and limits its range. Such variety begins to emerge with that mysterious thing LIFE. But it is in the sphere of rational activity that it reaches its limitless sweep and possibilities. And it is in this sphere that PRINCIPLES govern. We have here to deal with a new power, and must ordinate its action conformably with the elements it embraces. Instead of physical force we have volitional force; and we pass out of the sphere of Science into that of Philosophy. Science is conversant with the

strictly limited and conditioned—succeeds, advances, just as it descries, ascertains, and determines LIMITS. Philosophy is conversant with what underlies and transcends this sphere—with volitional activity, which, though, in the finite nature, not unlimited, is ever transcending its present limits—pressing outward and upward to new acquisitions and conquests.

In exact science you advance by ordinating facts under their appropriate laws; or you establish, link by link, a chain of inferences, logical or mathematical. But you must apprehend a principle INTUITIVELY or you do not apprehend it at all. If it does not verify itself in consciousness, or somehow connect itself with your experience, you must remain blind to it. But verifying itself there, or awakening conscious recognition, the sphere it will at once illuminate will be proportioned to the capacity, susceptibility, knowledge, culture, and moral realisation of the mind receiving it. Hence Philosophy demands, in those who would successfully cultivate it, the highest endowments and the richest and most various acquisitions. A broad moral experience is requisite to even apprehend its data. But to ordinate these data under their appropriate principles demands keen intuition, analytic power, and imaginative faculty. Philosophy is in its present backward state—has its function, its domain, its very possibility in debate—as much from these qualifications having been so seldom found combined in those who have essayed its cultivation as from their having mistaken the real nature of the work they had to do. The true philosopher is as rare as the true poet, for he needs corresponding endowment; and, superadded, that without which we may have a true poet, though not the highest, but a true philosopher never. The poet may be true to nature and life, so far; may faithfully represent the one and the other, without a living spiritual experience. But without that no one can *interpret* life. We talk of poesy demanding "the vision and the faculty divine," but Philosophy yet more. We say the true poet must be born not made, but the true philosopher must be both born and made. His endowments must be as rare as his training. The more rich and various the combination of natural powers, the broader and more thorough the culture, the deeper the moral experience, the higher will be his qualification for his work. True poetry gives us pictures of Nature and Life, but it gives us more. True poetry is also an unveiling. The true poet enables us to see something we did not see before, either in the scene or in its æsthetic and moral relations. But we owe as much to genius in philosophy as in poetry—in the disclosure of truth as in the unveiling of beauty. The Bard and the Seer are brothers; and, in those who have made the richest contributions to the intellectual heritage of the race, the powers of both have been combined. The true artist pourtrays the object or the scene so as to suggest its kindred, and lead you out on the line of its life-affinities; he touches the living cord which runs through the Beautiful and Lovely. The philosopher must be

and commercial sense—form an altogether insufficient bond. Their interests!—in the secular and commercial sense it is the interest of all men and nations to live at peace. Their interests! What more disastrous to all that we can conceive to be comprehended in the interests of the American people than for North and South to engage in this bloody, relentless war? Yet, though they were a people believed to be beyond almost all others alive to their interests, they are prosecuting this war with an augmenting and exterminating fury, almost if not altogether unexampled in the history of mankind. We have in this contest a most signal illustration of the feeble power of material interests as against enflamed popular passion.

The shock of this terrible conflict has vibrated throughout the world, paralysing industry and commerce in far separated regions. The disorganisation and ruin thence ensuing only serve to bring out into bolder relief the fact that the bonds which connect, which knit together, the different portions of the race are ever extending, multiplying, and becoming more intimate. Such are now the wants of human-kind that every people needs all the service every other people can render it. We cannot afford that there should be isolation, wanton destruction, or resources and productive powers lying undeveloped. The field is the world, and man's wants urge him on with a voice of ever-deepening energy to occupy it. We have compelled the Chinese to concede to us the rights and privileges of trade, and we are now in conflict with the Japanese—the most exclusive and isolated of all oriental peoples—for the same object. We are not now raising the question of the policy of such measures—the fact that they have been taken, and continue to be taken, in spite of remonstrance, in the face of our more immediate and obvious interests, has its deep significance.

Nor is colonisation, in its progress and implications, less significant. Those regions of the earth where the indigenous population is sparse and held together by few social bonds are being invaded and peopled from those where society is complicated, and the social ties close and many. This colonisation contributes in two ways to the growing and extending social cohesion of the race. Relations, many and intimate, are maintained between these new communities and the old societies from which they have migrated, whilst the tribes among whom they settle must accept the essential conditions of civilized neighbourhood, or be repelled and hemmed in on narrower and still narrower ground, till they ultimately perish.

But, in these and in many other phenomena of our time—social, political, and international—we have clear and ever-accumulating evidence that the tendency, requirement, necessity of the time is—social cohesion. Even those things which seem most to militate against this conclusion confirm the fact. The wars and social convulsions of the time arise out

of the obstructions to it, and are working their reduction. What do they assail? Either tyranny, which has ever been an isolating force, or the forceful maintenance of slavery, each of which is essentially repugnant to social cohesion.

But the spirit of trade is by itself inadequate to effect and secure the social adhesion it demands. Its essence is selfish. Its object is gain. Its fundamental maxim—"to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest"—contemplates not the "greatest good of the greatest number," but the greatest good of "number one" alone.

What is it that increases the need for mutual service? Increase of mutual wants. But, on the principle just referred to, each wishes to purchase the desiderated service at the least possible cost—that is, in plain terms, at the least amount of service in return. This is the principle which gives life to commercial activity, therefore commercial interest alone will not be an adequate social bond. This desire to render the lowest price, translated into the hard plain fact of every day human activity, means to get the largest amount of desirable objects at the least expenditure of labour. But human labour continues to be requisite, and such is the rate at which our wants grow and multiply, that, as a popular journalist has put it, "the class of the needy is as rapidly on the increase as the amount of the public wealth." We have enlisted immense mechanical powers, but our needs augment as fast as does its capacity of rendering us service. At their sources, so to speak, all commodities need much human labour. It is in agriculture, horticulture, mining, and building, that machinery does least for us. But the spirit of trade makes these slow and laborious occupations distasteful. Men will not be producers when they possess or can otherwise obtain the means of being purchasers. Of this we have sufficient proof in the dearth of breadstuffs and provisions in many of our colonies, where the agricultural resources are rich and limitless—where the soil needs but to be broken up and sown to produce the most abundant crops. Indeed, as we have before had occasion to remark, all eschew or try to escape from productive occupations who are not kept to them by want or compulsion.

Must this tendency continue to increase? If so, with our modern facilities for trade and power of purchase, the outlook is not an assuring one. The *Times* lately told us that, if we have the power, we have a clear right to compel any people to trade with us. That is, to compel them, however unwilling, to sell us the commodities we want. But if this be a sound principle, will it not follow, that we have also a right to compel them to do the work which may be needed to produce the commodities? Yet what were this but to assert our right to reduce them to slavery? *And, indeed, we may find a solution of the growing difficulties in the way of abolishing slavery and man-stealing, in the number and urgency of our wants, compared with the number of those who will voluntarily labour at*

supplying them. Where should we seek a cure? In increasing the number of labourers, or in restricting our wants? We need not directly attempt either the one or the other. What we require is a force that will silently operate both ways. Where shall we find such a force? The spirit of trade does not supply it. We have the bane there, but, certainly, not the antidote.——

What if the evil lie, not in the *number* but in the *character* of our wants —not in the *measure*, but in the *nature* of the demand. When the wants of our sensuous nature predominate over the wants of our intellectual and spiritual nature, the predominance operates in a twofold way in destroying the industrial balance. By stimulating unproductive consumption, it diminishes the wages' fund; and it limits the labourer's freedom of choice and action, both as to the kind of work he will undertake and the locality in which he will labour. Had not the indulgence of sensuous wants (by themselves or their progenitors) kept our labourers poor, many of those who are now crushed and pinched at home would have been producers in our colonies. Through the thinning of the labourers' ranks, wages would inevitably have risen; whilst, but for the same unbalanced sensuous expenditure among the rich, there would have been an ample wages' fund to supply the higher rate. Nor would this be all or even half of the happy result. One reason why so many desert productive labour is because it is so poorly paid. They are tempted into business, or drawn to the professions, from the hope of realising larger incomes. But, proportioned to the subordination of sensuous wants would be an equitable re-adjustment of remuneration. Workmen would be better paid in proportion as there was a less urgent necessity laid on them to labour. The workman who can maintain himself without labour for so many months, or transport himself to another country where there is ample scope and demand, can make his own terms with those who require his services. The labourer in such a case is truly free, and the question at what he will work, and where he will work, just resolves itself into the question, at what and where he will obtain the highest remuneration? Wages would thus adjust the industrial balance, and, under these conditions, they would come the nearest possible to adjusting it perfectly. The highest remuneration would be required to draw men to the most disagreeable and laborious occupations, and the remuneration would rise till the supply became adequate.

And thus, too, would social friction be reduced to a minimum. The labourer would have no reason to envy the capitalist, when everywhere meeting him on a footing of equal independence. In fact, it would be within the power of every labourer to become himself a capitalist. Given a few years of health, and with adequate exertion and self-control he, too, may become an employer.

And as social friction would be thus diminished, so, proportionately,

would social cohesion be increased. The power of selfishness to injure others would be minimised, through the majority having ample means of defence. What is required in order to all these happy results? An enhancement of virtue adequate to subordinate sensual and sensuous indulgence.

The amelioration of those social evils, which entail on us so much misery for the present and so much anxiety for the future, depends on a power or influence being brought into the ascendency adequate to the subordination of the prevalent desire for sensuous and sensual gratification. As we have shown in the earlier portion of these papers, there will be misery in proportion to the misdirection of our productive power, on the one hand, and the waste of its fruits, on the other. What force is adequate to check and cure these fatal mischiefs? Evidently it must be one stronger than the passion which induces them. Knowledge may do something. And yet, for all its increase and diffusion, we dare not say it has done much. We daily see persons with ample knowledge acting, notwithstanding, in utter disregard of it. The development of higher and purer tastes may do a good deal, but it is only in the case of a minority that the requisite susceptibility and influences can be brought into combined action. Religion—Christianity—alone embodies the requisite power. When its facts and doctrines are believed, and its principles incorporated with the inner and outer life, all that is required is accomplished. The sensual and sensuous nature is then subordinated, while all other selfish ends are, at the least, held in check, ultimately tempered, qualified, and over-borne by that love to others which is the principle and essence of all the developments of Christian law. In short, it needs only that Christianity be honestly embodied in human life to ensure the perfect social cohesion of the race, and reduce social friction to a minimum.

But a question yet remains, and, in closing these papers, it is desirable that our answer to it should not be left in doubt. Through what medium is this great and exigent consummation to be realised? Through what medium is Christianity to operate as the great agent curative of our social evils and woes? The medium is faith, and faith not in truth merely but faith in a Divine Person. Every earnest mind professes to be in quest of truth, but the search may only nourish selfishness instead of subduing it. What we need, each one of us for himself, and what human society needs, is the subordination of selfishness. What human nature wants is the inspiration of a new life; and faith in Christ supplies it. It is faith in a divine life—a life for the world, and in a divine death for the redemption of the world. What fallen man has ever wanted is the awakening of spiritual life; and through nothing else will the woes of society be cured. It is the distinctive characteristic of the Bible that it is full of this life—that above all other books it is adapted to awaken and nourish this life.

It presents us with the divine model of human life in Him who pleased not Himself—"who came not to be ministered unto but to minister," and to die for the redemption of men. And it is through loving faith in this one Divine Master and Lord that the highest unity of which human society is capable is realised. This is a bond of cohesion stronger and more intimate than any other, making its possessors of "one heart and one soul."

There is scarcely a dogma in the received theologies, and scarcely a fact even in the Scripture records, that is not now brought into question. An indolent, unenquiring—a mere traditionary credence, will not long be possible to any one.* We have entered on an era of conflict. First principles are again in requisition. The demand goes all round, and each one is called on to choose his side and elect where he will take his stand. Hitherto thousands have hung on by the skirts of the Church, and been tacitly accepted as believers, while living a life of utter worldliness. But this will not do much longer. Already those whose spiritual susceptibilities have been at all awakened feel the urgency of the demand, and are accepting the challenge, be they never so little prepared for passing through the ordeal. There is only one adequate preparation, and the prevalent want of it is signalised in the thousands of young men of bright parts and high literary culture who are being drifted away into scepticism and unbelief. There is but one adequate preparation. Men will not now be retained by the authority of priests or of dogmas. When the standard of revolt is raised, blazoned with the seductive legend "Spiritual freedom," nothing less than a hearty loyalty will secure spiritual allegiance. Two questions are put to each of us anew, and scarcely less pointedly than when they came from the lips of the Blessed Lord Himself. The one is—"What think ye of Christ? Whose Son is He?" The other—"Lovest thou ME?" We have to settle it whether we shall regard Jesus as a man of our own order merely, or as "the Christ the Son of the Living God." And it is neither a mere intellectual recognition nor a sentimental homage that will suffice. Intellect and heart must be in accord. We cannot be coldly intellectual Christians, and we cannot be merely sentimental Christians. Proofs of Christ's divinity will come short of satisfying the intellect if there is not at the same time that spiritual realisation through which He is seen to be "fairer than the sons of men." Regarded as less than Divine, He will fail to engage and command the homage of our whole nature. And short of this we cannot be rescued and redeemed. Thus are we to be saved, and thus do we need to be saved;

* Speaking with reference to Renan's "Life of Jesus," M. De Pressensé says—"Positions are becoming more and more defined. There is no such thing, now as a happy medium, or an attitude of indifference. In matters of religion a right of neutrality may be said to exist no longer. For my part, I bless God for this result, being thoroughly convinced that the worst thing of all is lukewarmness."—*Christian Work, November*, 1863.

and not merely from a future hell, but saved now. If the perils of faith have increased in these days, so, too, have the perils of life. The career of vice participates in the augmented celerity of the times; and those into whom the demon of sensuality enters rush sheer down to destruction.

But those in whom this spiritual life is awakened "become partakers of a divine nature, and escape the pollution that is in the world through lust." True life dates from this awakening. "Henceforth I live." "When it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, to reveal His Son in me, immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood." It is now a life, not according to liking—not conformable to mere rule—it is a life having its fountain in love; and, constrained by that, those who partake in it are rescued from living "to themselves." What then? Must not He who was the first to live such a life—who has power to inspire such a life—be of God? What higher proof of his divinity could we have than that He is daily accomplishing a work so divine?

> ——"His other gifts
> All bear the royal stamp that speaks them His,
> And are august; but this transcends them all."

That which Pantheism presumptuously claims—that which the noblest spirits of the race of old felt after "if haply they might find"—is here realised. Through this living faith we become "sons of God." There are many who aspire to a noble life, and there are many schemes of noble life, but all save this, having their root in self (under one phase or other) harbour and nurse the very mischief which needs to be expelled. Many would live a noble life, but will not submit to the process of being born into it. They would fondly enough be "sons of God," but will not submit to be "crucified with Christ." They will not enter in by the door. They will not become followers of Him "who, though he was a Son, yet learned obedience through the things that he suffered," and who could pass into His kingdom, and open its gates to His disciples, only through DEATH. It is the Cross which is still the stumbling-block; and yet there is no other way into life. Only those who are "crucified with Christ become alive unto God, have their fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life." It is not by an arbitrary decree, it is through a moral necessity that there is "none other name through which we can be saved but the name of Jesus." It was so from the first, and so it will continue. Man can never sink beneath the power of that name to save him, and can never rise above it. Many of the learned and cultured, now as heretofore, may miss sight of His glory, many reject His dominion, but "a seed SHALL serve Him." Now, as in early days, "they shall come from the east and from the west to sit down

with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob," the inheritors of the promise, "while the children of the kingdom are thrust out." The Galilean has conquered and will conquer still. "His name shall endure for ever, His name shall be continued as long as the sun. Men shall be blessed in Him; all nations shall call Him blessed." "Come forth out of thy chambers, O Prince of all the kings of the earth! put on the visible robes of Thy imperial majesty, take up that unlimited sceptre which thy Almighty Father hath bequeathed thee; for now the voice of thy bride calls thee, and all creatures sigh to be renewed."

THE END.

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